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Abstract
What determines the length of first-mover advantage in military innovation? In adopting revolutions in
military affairs, some first movers benefit from a lengthy advantage while others suffer from a brief advantage.
In this paper, I argue that that two factors, leadership and doctrinal congruence, relate to the two relevant
actors, a first mover and a secondary actor, to explain the length of a first mover’s strategic edge. The theory is
tested on the aircraft carrier, submarine, and intercontinental ballistic missile revolutions.
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ABSTRACT	   What	  determines	  the	  length	  of	  Hirst-­‐mover	  advantage	  in	  military	  innovation?	  In	  adopting	  revolutions	  in	  military	  affairs,	  some	  Hirst	  movers	  beneHit	  from	  a	  lengthy	  advantage	  while	  others	  suffer	  from	  a	  brief	  advantage.	  In	  this	  paper,	  I	  argue	  that	  that	  two	  factors,	  leadership	  and	  doctrinal	  congruence,	  relate	  to	  the	  two	  relevant	  actors,	  a	  Hirst	  mover	  and	  a	  secondary	  actor,	  to	  explain	  the	  length	  of	  a	  Hirst	  mover’s	  strategic	  edge.	  The	  theory	  is	  tested	  on	  the	  aircraft	  carrier,	  submarine,	  and	  intercontinental	  ballistic	  missile	  revolutions.
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I.	  INTRODUCTIONWith	  nothing	  more	  than	  a	  bow,	  a	  horse,	  and	  a	  vicious	  intensity,	  Genghis	  Khan	  and	  the	  Mongolians	  set	  out	  to	  conquer	  the	  world.	  Beginning	  in	  the	  Central	  Asian	  steppes	  and	  spreading	  from	  Eastern	  Europe	  to	  the	  Sea	  of	  Japan,	  Genghis	  Khan’s	  nomadic	  warriors	  united	  the	  largest	  contiguous	  land	  empire	  in	  the	  history	  of	  the	  world.	  In	  the	  13th	  century,	  they	  aspired	  for	  Pax	  Mongolica,	  or	  “Mongol	  Peace,”	  named	  after	  the	  uniHication	  of	  the	  Roman	  Empire.	  But	  the	  Mongolian	  conquest	  was	  anything	  but	  peaceful.	  At	  that	  point	  in	  history,	  the	  Mongolian	  invasions	  were	  the	  most	  violent	  military	  operations	  Europe	  or	  Asia	  had	  experienced.	  Arriving	  on	  horseback,	  they	  “swallowed	  whole	  nations	  at	  a	  stride,”	  writes	  Vic	  Hurley.	  They	  were	  not	  merely	  looters	  and	  raiders,	  but	  “had	  come	  to	  impose	  permanent	  rule	  upon	  Europe”	  (2011,	  150).	  The	  Mongolians	  mastered	  military	  logistics,	  weaponry,	  tactics,	  and	  physical	  stamina	  (149-­‐150).	  In	  turn,	  small	  towns	  and	  big	  cities	  experienced	  the	  deadly	  wrath	  of	  Genghis	  Khan.	  Across	  all	  of	  Eurasia,	  people	  heard	  about	  the	  Mongolians.	  Relying	  on	  psychological	  fear	  tactics,	  the	  Mongolian	  cavalry	  rode	  as	  far	  as	  they	  could	  see.	  Genghis	  Khan’s	  conquest	  was	  possible	  because	  of	  innovative	  military	  technology	  and	  strategy.	  Among	  the	  troops,	  the	  Mongolians	  were	  skilled	  and	  professional.	  “Khan	  inHlicted	  a	  dreadful	  iron	  discipline	  on	  his	  troops”	  and	  employed	  severe	  penalties.	  Their	  physical	  strength	  was	  extraordinary,	  for	  “if	  food	  was	  not	  available,	  the	  Mongols	  simply	  abstained	  from	  food”	  (150).	  The	  Mongolian	  army’s	  “speed,	  stamina,	  and	  horsemanship”	  surpassed	  that	  of	  any	  other	  military.	  In	  terms	  of	  organizational	  innovation,	  Genghis	  Khan	  set	  up	  task	  forces	  for	  arms	  and	  equipment	  supply,	  information,	  communications,	  and	  tactical	  and	  strategic	  planning	  (151).
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Most	  impactful,	  however,	  was	  the	  uniquely	  Mongolian	  recurved	  composite	  bow.	  Each	  a	  product	  of	  excellent	  workmanship,	  the	  improved	  bow	  increased	  the	  pull	  potential	  up	  to	  160	  pounds	  and	  could	  kill	  at	  the	  extreme	  range	  of	  300	  yards	  (151).	  The	  Mongolians	  perfected	  their	  lethal	  and	  precise	  archery	  on	  horseback.	  As	  Stephen	  Turnbull	  writes	  of	  one	  conquest,	  the	  Mongolians	  used	  a	  “different	  archery	  technique,	  whereby	  arrows	  were	  shot	  in	  huge	  clouds,	  rather	  than	  being	  used	  in	  long-­‐range	  individual	  combat.	  Dense	  showers	  of	  arrows,	  some	  tipped	  with	  poison,	  were	  poured	  into	  the	  [adversary’s]	  lines”	  (Turnbull	  2003,	  19). Alone	  in	  their	  quest,	  the	  Mongolians	  demonstrated	  that	  “a	  single	  state	  can	  initiate	  revolution	  by	  recognizing	  how	  to	  effectively	  combine	  various	  evolutionary	  developments,	  new	  ideas,	  and	  technology”	  (Metz	  and	  Kievit	  1995,	  13).	  The	  nomads	  marched	  through	  civilized	  cities	  and	  fought	  off	  armies,	  but	  “even	  the	  Great	  Wall	  of	  China	  was	  ineffective	  in	  stopping”	  the	  Mongolians	  (McNeill	  1982,	  17).	  With	  innovative	  technology	  and	  novel	  thinking,	  Genghis	  Khan	  conquered	  the	  largest	  empire	  in	  history.As	  in	  the	  conquests	  of	  Genghis	  Khan,	  the	  character	  of	  every	  war	  is	  marked	  by	  the	  technology	  employed.	  The	  type	  of	  weapon	  systems	  used	  in	  war	  dictates	  the	  disposition	  of	  the	  conHlict—the	  bayonet	  in	  the	  American	  Civil	  War,	  tear	  and	  mustard	  gas	  in	  World	  War	  I,	  the	  atomic	  bomb	  in	  World	  War	  II.	  Military	  technology	  not	  only	  changes	  the	  way	  we	  Hight,	  but	  it	  also	  transforms	  the	  way	  we	  even	  think	  about	  war.	  As	  weaponry	  has	  evolved	  from	  the	  spear	  to	  the	  nuclear	  weapon,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  the	  arrival	  of	  a	  new	  technology	  can	  lead	  to	  dramatic	  implications	  for	  how	  a	  war	  is	  fought.Military	  innovation	  profoundly	  impacts	  the	  state	  of	  international	  politics.	  A	  technological	  advantage	  in	  war	  can	  likely	  decide	  the	  victor.	  To	  put	  it	  in	  economics	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terminology,	  comparative	  advantage	  is	  essential	  in	  dictating	  the	  outcome.	  A	  military	  will	  remain	  unbeatable	  so	  long	  as	  it	  is	  able	  to	  hold	  a	  strategic	  technological	  and	  bureaucratic	  edge	  over	  its	  adversaries.	  When	  a	  technology	  is	  introduced,	  the	  actor	  who	  Hirst	  possesses	  the	  technology	  has	  a	  beneHit	  over	  its	  competitors.	  This	  is	  a	  powerful	  boon	  for	  any	  organization—be	  it	  the	  local	  take-­‐out	  restaurant	  or	  the	  United	  States	  Armed	  Forces.	  In	  fact,	  debut	  of	  a	  technology	  by	  the	  Hirst	  mover	  can	  shift	  the	  entire	  market.	  The	  next	  actors	  to	  pursue	  this	  innovation	  will	  then	  attempt	  to	  mitigate	  the	  Hirst	  mover’s	  beneHit.	  This	  is	  a	  common	  occurrence	  in	  both	  business	  and	  war.	  The	  purpose	  of	  this	  study	  is	  to	  understand	  how	  innovations	  spread	  between	  actors	  in	  general	  and	  the	  length	  of	  Hirst-­‐mover	  advantage	  in	  particular.	  However,	  as	  innovations	  diffuse,	  they	  do	  not	  all	  have	  the	  same	  impact.	  In	  adopting	  revolutions	  in	  military	  affairs,	  some	  actors	  beneHit	  from	  a	  lengthy	  Hirst-­‐mover	  advantage;	  some	  actors	  suffer	  from	  a	  brief	  Hirst-­‐mover	  advantage.	  Why	  does	  this	  disparity	  occur?	  Understanding	  this	  central	  puzzle	  has	  consequences	  for	  international	  security.	  A	  military	  able	  to	  exploit	  Hirst-­‐mover	  advantage	  increases	  its	  relative	  geopolitical	  power;	  a	  military	  unable	  to	  do	  so	  may	  undermine	  its	  relative	  power	  (Hundley	  1999,	  13).Within	  the	  Hield	  of	  military	  innovation,	  this	  study	  aims	  to	  contribute	  to	  speciHic	  debates	  as	  well	  as	  shed	  light	  on	  grander	  philosophical	  military	  theory.	  In	  particular,	  this	  study	  aims	  to	  answer	  an	  ostensibly	  simple	  question:	  what	  are	  the	  determinants	  of	  Hirst-­‐mover	  advantage?	  But	  this	  is	  part	  of	  a	  larger,	  more	  philosophical	  discussion.	  Of	  course,	  the	  classical	  military	  theorists	  like	  Sun	  Tzu	  and	  Carl	  von	  Clausewitz	  desired	  to	  understand	  the	  fundamental	  debates	  on	  war	  and	  its	  virtue.	  The	  grand	  philosophical	  debate	  to	  which	  I	  hope	  
Silverstein	  3
to	  contribute	  is	  more	  deHined;	  that	  is,	  why	  does	  Hirst-­‐mover	  advantage	  even	  occur	  in	  the	  Hirst	  place,	  or	  is	  this	  just	  another	  inevitable	  phenomenon	  in	  warfare?In	  this	  paper,	  I	  will	  present	  a	  theory	  to	  explain	  the	  length	  of	  Hirst-­‐mover	  advantage	  in	  military	  technology.	  For	  the	  purposes	  of	  argument	  and	  convenience,	  I	  will	  refer	  to	  the	  presented	  theory	  as	  the	  “FMA	  Theory.”	  The	  FMA	  Theory	  will	  argue	  that	  two	  factors,	  leadership	  and	  doctrinal	  congruence,	  relate	  to	  the	  two	  relevant	  actors,	  the	  Hirst	  mover	  and	  secondary	  actor,	  to	  explain	  the	  length	  of	  a	  Hirst	  mover’s	  strategic	  edge.	  Under	  certain	  conditions,	  an	  actor	  either	  increases	  or	  decreases	  the	  length	  of	  its	  advantage.	  Then,	  the	  FMA	  Theory	  will	  be	  tested	  on	  three	  case	  studies—the	  aircraft	  carrier,	  the	  submarine,	  and	  the	  intercontinental	  ballistic	  missile.I	  Hind	  that	  the	  FMA	  Theory	  properly	  explains	  the	  length	  of	  FMA,	  as	  evidenced	  by	  the	  three	  case	  studies.	  In	  the	  adoption	  of	  the	  aircraft	  carrier,	  the	  United	  States	  Navy	  achieved	  a	  lengthy	  advantage	  while	  the	  British	  Royal	  Navy	  and	  Japanese	  Imperial	  Navy	  suffered	  from	  a	  brief	  advantage.	  For	  the	  submarine,	  the	  German	  Imperial	  Navy	  experienced	  a	  brief	  advantage	  in	  the	  First	  World	  War.	  The	  intercontinental	  ballistic	  missile	  presents	  a	  brief	  FMA	  as	  both	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  United	  States	  simultaneously	  innovated	  in	  the	  1950s.
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II.	  A	  THEORY	  OF	  FIRST-­MOVER	  ADVANTAGE
A.	  Key	  DeJinitionsBefore	  the	  study	  is	  furthered,	  I	  will	  deHine	  relevant	  terms.1	  The	  following	  are	  essential	  terminology	  for	  the	  FMA	  Theory.
Military	  innovation	  is	  the	  Hield	  of	  research	  within	  international	  security	  studies	  that	  examines	  the	  process	  of	  change	  in	  conHlict.	  In	  particular,	  this	  paper	  scrutinizes	  change	  within	  military	  organizations.	  Like	  any	  organization,	  militaries	  alter	  their	  ways	  in	  order	  to	  adapt	  to	  changing	  norms,	  environments,	  and	  needs.	  This	  process	  is	  known	  as	  military	  innovation.	  As	  deHined	  by	  Harvard	  Professor	  Stephen	  Peter	  Rosen,	  military	  innovation	  is:“a	  change	  that	  forces	  one	  of	  the	  primary	  combat	  arms	  of	  a	  service	  to	  change	  its	  concepts	  of	  operation	  and	  its	  relation	  to	  other	  combat	  arms,	  and	  to	  abandon	  or	  downgrade	  traditional	  missions.	  Such	  innovations	  involve	  a	  new	  way	  of	  war,	  with	  new	  ideas	  of	  how	  the	  components	  of	  the	  organization	  relate	  to	  each	  other	  and	  to	  the	  enemy,	  and	  new	  operational	  procedures	  conforming	  to	  those	  ideas.	  They	  involve	  changes	  in	  the	  critical	  military	  tasks,	  the	  tasks	  around	  which	  war	  plans	  revolve”	  (1988,	  134).
Weapon	  system	  innovation	  is	  “the	  process	  of	  accommodation	  between”	  alien	  systems	  and	  preexisting	  doctrine.	  If	  “military	  innovation”	  is	  the	  research	  umbrella,	  then	  “weapon	  system	  innovation”	  is	  the	  evidence.	  The	  novel,	  or	  alien,	  platform	  is	  called	  an	  innovative	  weapon	  system.	  An	  innovative	  weapon	  system	  is	  deHined	  as	  a	  “potential	  leap	  in	  combat	  power	  over	  traditional	  means	  while	  challenging	  and	  requiring	  the	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1	  De%initions	  will	  also	  be	  dispersed	  throughout	  the	  study.
transformation	  of	  essential	  tasks,	  organizational	  power	  structures,	  or	  key	  roles”	  (Ehrhard	  2000,	  6).
Revolution	  in	  Military	  Affairs	  (RMA)	  is	  an	  innovative	  weapon	  system	  or	  doctrine	  that	  fundamentally	  changes	  the	  essence	  of	  war.	  An	  RMA	  is	  a	  game-­‐changer	  in	  war.	  It	  is	  best	  deHined	  by	  Andrew	  Marshall,	  Director	  of	  the	  OfHice	  of	  Net	  Assessment	  in	  the	  United	  States	  Defense	  Department	  as,“a	  major	  change	  in	  the	  nature	  of	  warfare	  brought	  about	  by	  the	  innovative	  application	  of	  new	  technologies	  which,	  combined	  with	  dramatic	  changes	  in	  military	  doctrine	  and	  operational	  and	  organizational	  concepts,	  fundamentally	  alters	  the	  character	  and	  conduct	  of	  military	  operations”	  (McKitrick	  1995).In	  citing	  Marshall,	  Dima	  Adamsky	  notes	  “the	  term	  ‘revolution’	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  change	  will	  be	  rapid	  but	  implies	  that	  it	  will	  be	  profound,	  making	  new	  methods	  of	  warfare	  more	  powerful	  than	  the	  old”	  (2010,	  1;	  Marshall	  1995).	  Richard	  Hundley	  similarly	  deHines	  an	  RMA:	   “An	  RMA	  involves	  a	  paradigm	  shift	  in	  the	  nature	  and	  conduct	  of	  military	  operations	  which	  either	  renders	  obsolete	  or	  irrelevant	  one	  or	  more	  core	  competencies	  of	  a	  dominant	  player,	  and/or	  creates	  one	  or	  more	  new	  core	  competencies,	  in	  some	  new	  dimension	  of	  warfare”	  (1999,	  9).The	  idea	  of	  an	  RMA	  is	  perhaps	  best	  illustrated	  through	  historical	  examples,	  as	  shown	  in	  Figure	  1.
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Figure	  1.	  List	  of	  Revolutions	  in	  Military	  Affairs2
Armored/Tank	  Warfare Transport	  Aircraft Strategic	  Defense	  InitiativeBomber	  Warfare Strategic	  Guerrilla	  Warfare Anti-­‐ballistic	  MissileIntercontinental	  Ballistic	  Missile Submarine	  Warfare Nuclear	  WarfareFlamethrower Machine	  Gun Manned	  AircraftRadar Blitzkrieg Total	  WarfareAircraft	  Carrier Macroelectronics Information	  Warfare
A	  schism	  exists	  with	  regards	  to	  the	  nature	  of	  an	  RMA.	  Some	  RMAs	  are	  technology-­‐driven	  while	  others	  are	  doctrine-­‐driven.	  For	  instance,	  the	  submarine	  and	  nuclear	  warfare	  are	  based	  on	  technological	  advances,	  while	  German	  blitzkrieg	  and	  Maoist	  strategic	  guerrilla	  warfare	  are	  based	  on	  innovations	  in	  military	  doctrine.	  Consider	  the	  combat	  strategies	  in	  the	  American	  Revolutionary	  War	  that	  employ	  doctrinal	  innovation.	  When	  the	  Americans	  “engaged	  the	  opponent	  from	  behind	  cover	  rather	  than	  in	  formation	  out	  in	  the	  open”	  and	  targeted	  ofHicers,	  they	  did	  so	  against	  standard	  warfare	  practices	  of	  the	  day	  (Hundley	  1999,	  14).	  Solely	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  comparison,	  this	  study	  will	  only	  deal	  with	  technology-­‐driven	  RMAs.3
First-­mover	  advantage	  (FMA)	  is	  the	  gain	  due	  to	  a	  player’s	  status	  as	  the	  Hirst	  to	  utilize	  an	  RMA.	  An	  RMA	  “frequently	  bestows	  an	  enormous	  and	  immediate	  advantage	  on	  this	  Hirst	  actor	  to	  exploit	  [the	  RMA]	  in	  combat”	  (13).	  The	  purpose	  of	  this	  study	  is	  the	  length	  at	  which	  the	  Hirst	  mover	  keeps	  this	  strategic	  beneHit.
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2	  Based	  off	  the	  list	  provided	  by	  Hundley	  1999,	  1;	  Horowitz	  2010,	  61.	  This	  is	  a	  well-­‐accepted,	  non-­‐exhaustive	  list	  of	  RMAs	  since	  1800	  in	  no	  particular	  order.3	  While	  the	  FMA	  Theory	  ought	  to	  vaguely	  apply	  to	  doctrine-­‐driven	  RMAs,	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  I	  am	  able	  to	  extrapolate	  is	  uncertain.	  I	  recommend	  this	  as	  a	  follow-­‐up	  study.
First	  mover	  is	  an	  international	  actor	  that	  Hirst	  uses	  an	  innovative	  weapon	  system.	  For	  this	  study,	  the	  Hirst	  mover	  is	  the	  actor	  that	  not	  only	  introduces	  the	  weapon	  system,	  but	  also	  adopts	  it.	  As	  the	  only	  actor	  using	  the	  RMA,	  the	  Hirst	  mover	  has	  the	  opportunity	  to	  beneHit	  from	  it.	  In	  order	  to	  do	  so,	  the	  actor	  will	  seek	  to	  both	  integrate	  the	  innovative	  weapon	  system	  in	  its	  defense	  bureaucracy	  and	  protect	  it	  from	  competing	  actors.
Secondary	  actors	  are	  international	  players	  that	  follow	  the	  Hirst	  mover.	  In	  response	  to	  the	  introduction	  of	  an	  RMA,	  the	  secondary	  actor	  will	  act	  to	  “catch	  up”	  to	  the	  Hirst	  mover.	  The	  degree	  to	  which	  the	  secondary	  actor	  succeeds	  partly	  determines	  FMA	  length.	  
Major	  power	  is	  an	  international	  actor	  that	  holds	  military	  power	  over	  other	  actors.	  It	  is	  considered	  with	  regards	  to	  its	  international	  inHluence,	  its	  budgetary	  might,	  and	  its	  capital	  force.	  A	  player	  is	  labeled	  a	  major	  power	  for	  both	  its	  absolute	  and	  relative	  power.	  Major	  powers	  tend	  to	  be	  the	  Hirst	  movers.	  While	  RMAs	  are	  not	  always	  brought	  about	  by	  hegemonic	  players,	  they	  are	  seldom	  used	  to	  the	  advantage	  of	  a	  low-­‐level	  actor.
B.	  Literature	  Review	  on	  Military	  InnovationWith	  war	  comes	  tragedy.	  This	  is	  a	  well-­‐established	  truth.	  War	  brings	  death,	  and	  a	  lot	  of	  it.	  Any	  theory	  on	  warfare	  must	  Hirst	  begin	  by	  mentioning	  the	  honorable	  sacriHices	  made	  during	  it	  and	  horrendous	  casualties	  that	  result	  from	  it.	  In	  fact,	  war	  has	  no	  intrinsic	  value,	  but	  is	  instead	  a	  means	  of	  achieving	  a	  political	  goal,	  argued	  Carl	  Von	  Clausewitz	  in	  his	  famous	  treatise	  On	  War.	  States	  pursue	  conHlict	  to	  achieve	  societal	  objectives;	  whether	  that	  pursuit	  translates	  into	  justice	  is	  a	  grander	  debate.	  The	  tragic	  reality	  of	  war	  sometimes	  renders	  virtue:	  pushing	  the	  natural	  bounds	  of	  human	  bravery,	  genuine	  togetherness	  among	  peers,	  and	  societal	  commitment	  to	  innovation	  and	  progress.	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Technology	  is	  constantly	  changing—be	  it	  military	  or	  civilian.	  Military	  innovation	  has	  applications	  for	  the	  business	  community.	  Today,	  it	  is	  common	  for	  business	  leaders	  to	  explore	  war	  studies.4 	  The	  military	  innovation	  process	  is	  not	  dissimilar	  to	  that	  of	  a	  private	  Hirm.	  Innovative	  technology	  can	  similarly	  shift	  an	  entire	  market.	  Technology-­‐intensive	  companies	  are	  constantly	  seeking	  the	  next	  “revolution	  in	  non-­‐military	  affairs.”	  Within	  a	  Hirm,	  advances	  in	  either	  technological	  change	  or	  managerial	  change	  will	  increase	  productivity;	  a	  business	  that	  embraces	  both	  technological	  and	  managerial	  innovation	  add	  an	  even	  greater	  increase	  in	  productivity	  (Horowitz	  2010,	  6).	  In	  many	  ways,	  a	  military	  behaves	  like	  any	  other	  human	  organization.	  Organizations	  function	  to	  maximize	  efHiciency	  and	  promote	  a	  common	  goal.	  In	  a	  competitive	  marketplace,	  innovation	  is	  necessary	  for	  survival.	  According	  to	  MIT	  Professor	  Barry	  R.	  Posen,	  “warfare	  is	  an	  extremely	  competitive	  endeavor.	  Its	  most	  successful	  practitioners	  strive	  for	  even	  the	  smallest	  advantages”	  (Posen	  1984,	  48).	  This	  is	  why	  bureaucratic	  organizations	  must	  constantly	  implement	  change.	  However,	  while	  the	  newest	  cell	  phone’s	  speciHications	  may	  improve	  efHiciency	  in	  civilian	  tasks,	  new	  technologies	  in	  large	  bureaucracies	  can	  achieve	  the	  opposite	  effect.	  In	  a	  business	  organization,	  new	  technological	  or	  managerial	  processes	  are	  costly.5	  In	  a	  military	  organization,	  innovation	  is	  similarly	  disruptive.	  For	  that	  reason,	  explains	  Harvard	  Political	  Scientist	  Graham	  Allison,	  “bureaucratic	  functionalists	  emphasize	  the	  inherently	  conservative	  nature	  of	  large	  organizations”	  (1971,	  78-­‐94).6
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4	  For	  this	  reason,	  many	  of	  my	  classmates	  who	  study	  business	  are	  assigned	  Sun	  Tzu’s	  The	  Art	  Of	  War	  in	  management	  courses.5	  For	  more	  on	  disruption	  due	  to	  innovation,	  see	  Harvard	  Professor	  Clayton	  M.	  Christensen,	  The	  
Innovator’s	  Dilemma	  (1997).6	  “Conservative”	  connotes	  less	  willing	  to	  innovate	  in	  a	  particular	  RMA,	  not	  overarching	  political	  outlook.
Military	  bureaucracies	  are	  not	  just	  any	  organization,	  however.	  Change	  occurs	  within	  a	  military	  in	  order	  to	  foster	  an	  advantage	  in	  war.	  As	  Sun	  Tzu	  writes,	  “To	  not	  prepare	  is	  the	  greatest	  of	  crimes;	  to	  be	  prepared	  beforehand	  for	  any	  contingency	  is	  the	  greatest	  of	  virtues.”	  This	  piece	  of	  wisdom	  is	  as	  true	  today	  as	  it	  was	  in	  the	  ancient	  Chinese	  civilization.	  Preparation	  can	  transpire	  by	  means	  of	  innovative	  weapon	  systems.	  Talk	  is	  cheap	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  innovation.	  A	  Hirm’s	  executives	  never	  admit	  that	  they	  will	  forgo	  innovation	  while	  its	  competitors	  vigorously	  invest	  in	  the	  most	  cutting-­‐edge	  technology.	  Military	  organizations	  act	  similarly.	  Established	  militaries	  continuously	  assert	  their	  intention	  to	  integrate	  each	  novel	  weapon	  that	  arises.	  One	  needs	  to	  look	  no	  further	  than	  heightened	  rhetoric	  from	  military	  and	  political	  leadership	  on	  innovation	  over	  the	  centuries.	  Accordingly,	  understanding	  innovation	  requires	  one	  to	  distinguish	  between	  genuine	  action	  and	  mere	  rhetoric;	  this	  study	  focuses	  on	  the	  former	  and	  ignores	  the	  latter.	  War	  impacts	  economics,	  social	  society,	  and	  technology,	  explains	  University	  of	  Chicago	  historian	  William	  H.	  McNeill.	  For	  economics,	  there	  is	  a	  strong	  relationship	  between	  market	  growth	  and	  capacity	  for	  military	  development	  (1982,	  362).	  Economics	  impact	  war—economically	  powerful	  states	  tend	  to	  pursue	  military	  power.	  All	  military	  leaders	  understand	  that	  their	  organization	  beneHits	  in	  the	  long-­‐term	  from	  a	  well-­‐fed	  and	  well-­‐equipped	  Highting	  force.	  His	  examples	  stand	  the	  test	  of	  time.	  For	  example,	  Xerxes	  the	  Great	  of	  Persia	  found	  strength	  against	  the	  Greeks	  from	  efHicient	  supply	  lines.	  Military	  victory	  is	  commonly	  a	  result	  of	  relative	  economic	  advantage	  (3-­‐16).	  The	  relationship	  goes	  both	  ways;	  just	  as	  economic	  power	  inHluences	  military	  power,	  military	  power	  inHluences	  economic	  power.	  War	  prompts	  industrial	  growth,	  domestic	  production,	  and	  increased	  market	  coordination	  (262).	  Similarly,	  war	  is	  a	  deeply	  social	  occurrence.	  A	  military	  is	  a	  public	  entity	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that	  serves	  domestic	  interest	  and	  impacts	  foreign	  culture.	  It	  is	  comprised	  of	  people	  from	  the	  community,	  yet	  inHluences	  culture	  abroad	  in	  wartime	  service.	  Thus,	  innovation	  demonstrates	  a	  society’s	  capacity	  to	  change.Most	  relevantly,	  McNeill	  writes	  that	  war	  impacts	  technology,	  and	  vise	  versa.	  On	  one	  hand,	  for	  strategic	  necessity,	  war	  pressures	  a	  society	  to	  innovate.	  On	  the	  other,	  new	  technologies	  frequently	  upset	  balances	  of	  power	  throughout	  history.	  He	  cites	  examples	  of	  RMAs,	  such	  as	  the	  introduction	  of	  gunpowder	  in	  the	  14th	  and	  15th	  centuries	  and	  the	  steamship	  and	  railroad	  in	  the	  19th	  century	  (80-­‐81).	  If	  one	  is	  to	  accept	  that	  a	  military	  innovates,	  the	  next	  curiosity	  regards	  its	  timing.	  When	  is	  the	  best	  time	  for	  a	  military	  to	  innovate?	  Will	  a	  military	  innovate	  due	  to	  necessity	  during	  the	  chaos	  of	  war	  or	  will	  it	  innovate	  during	  the	  complacency	  of	  peace?	  Wartime	  innovation	  is	  determined	  by	  successes	  and	  failures	  in	  combat.	  An	  innovative	  weapon	  system’s	  successful	  debut	  can	  lead	  to	  an	  auspicious	  future	  for	  the	  system.	  In	  this	  case,	  innovation	  occurs	  “because	  an	  inappropriate	  strategic	  goal	  is	  being	  pursued,	  or	  because	  the	  relationship	  between	  military	  operations	  and	  that	  goal	  has	  been	  misunderstood”	  (Rosen	  1991,	  35).	  Or,	  in	  other	  words,	  innovation	  transpires	  when	  a	  war	  is	  not	  being	  won	  regardless	  of	  how	  well	  the	  traditional	  methods	  are	  being	  used.	  If	  stress	  on	  an	  organization	  can	  highlight	  a	  domain	  worthy	  of	  reform,	  war	  is	  appropriately	  a	  stressor.	  The	  convention	  wisdom	  is	  that	  militaries	  tend	  to	  innovate	  following	  a	  war.7	  Lessons	  ought	  to	  be	  learned	  from	  experience.	  As	  in	  life,	  this	  is	  not	  always	  the	  case.	  Defeat	  in	  war	  is	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7	  This	  aligns	  with	  the	  notion	  that	  power	  transition	  increases	  the	  likelihood	  of	  con%lict.	  According	  to	  the	  dynamic	  differentials	  theory,	  major	  war	  occurs	  when	  strong	  military	  powers	  fear	  signi%icant	  decline	  in	  their	  relative	  power.	  Consequently,	  the	  strong	  state	  may	  see	  militarized	  con%lict	  as	  a	  strategic	  tool	  for	  self-­‐preservation,	  especially	  if	  it	  faces	  only	  one	  challenger	  rather	  than	  many	  challengers.	  For	  instance,	  strategic	  worries	  led	  to	  the	  Cold	  War	  between	  the	  United	  States	  and	  Soviet	  Union.	  This	  strategic	  insecurity	  can	  drive	  innovation	  as	  well.	  For	  more,	  see	  Dale	  Copeland,	  
The	  Origins	  Of	  Major	  War	  (2000).
not	  “sufHicient	  to	  produce	  innovation”	  following	  a	  conHlict.	  Contrary	  to	  prevailing	  notions,	  “defeat	  by	  itself”	  will	  not	  produce	  change	  in	  subsequent	  peacetime.	  Change	  in	  personnel	  or	  practices	  are	  not	  immediate	  following	  a	  failure	  (9).	  Consider	  the	  United	  States	  Army’s	  lack	  of	  innovation	  following	  the	  Vietnam	  War.	  The	  conHlict	  failed	  to	  yield	  innovative	  strategies	  in	  counterinsurgency	  (Lovell	  1987,	  121-­‐154).	  Instead,	  militaries	  learn	  lessons	  from	  previous	  wars	  in	  order	  to	  apply	  them	  to	  future	  scenarios.	  Dependency	  on	  lessons	  learned	  from	  the	  last	  war	  is	  not	  the	  most	  efHicient	  way	  to	  innovate.	  When	  a	  military	  innovates	  solely	  based	  on	  preexisting	  notions,	  it	  fails	  to	  consider	  future	  challenges.	  Avant-­‐garde	  thinking	  is	  required	  in	  innovation,	  because	  struggles	  from	  the	  most	  recent	  war	  may	  not	  remain	  in	  the	  next	  war.	  Tactics	  and	  technology	  change	  the	  nature	  of	  war	  on	  a	  linear	  time	  basis;	  innovation	  relates	  to	  the	  future,	  not	  just	  the	  past.	  Posen	  asserts	  that	  the	  British	  Royal	  Air	  Force	  as	  well	  as	  the	  French	  and	  German	  armies	  did	  not	  innovate	  in	  the	  time	  between	  Hirst	  and	  second	  world	  wars	  (1984	  ,	  223).	  This	  does	  not	  suggest	  militaries	  are	  innately	  anti-­‐innovation;	  they	  still	  incrementally	  innovate	  based	  on	  their	  preexisting	  philosophies.	  Rather,	  it	  means	  militaries	  tend	  to	  not	  be	  efHicient	  in	  doing	  so. Innovation	  is	  possible	  during	  peacetime,	  though	  it	  is	  a	  slow	  process.	  Some	  argue	  that	  a	  military’s	  intelligence	  estimates	  on	  enemy	  weapon	  systems	  inHluence	  its	  own	  weapon	  system	  investments.	  However,	  Rosen	  makes	  the	  argument	  that	  American	  military	  development	  in	  technology	  from	  1930	  to	  1955	  occurred	  without	  much	  inHluence	  from	  the	  activities	  of	  potential	  enemies.	  Rosen	  argues	  that	  this	  was	  a	  “self-­‐contained	  process,”	  determined	  by	  the	  actions	  and	  actors	  within	  the	  military	  establishment	  and	  unaffected	  by	  external	  actors	  (1991,	  250).	  Peacetime	  military	  innovation	  occurs	  “remarkably	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independent	  of	  intelligence	  about	  foreign	  military	  powers”	  (57).	  Potential	  adversaries	  fail	  to	  effectuate	  change	  within	  a	  military	  bureaucracy.
C.	  Literature	  Review	  on	  Revolutions	  In	  Military	  AffairsHow	  do	  RMAs	  occur?	  History	  illustrates	  that	  a	  military	  will	  only	  innovate	  under	  certain	  conditions.	  On	  a	  micro-­‐level,	  a	  successful	  weapon	  system	  innovation	  is	  achieved	  through	  three	  steps:	  development,	  adoption,	  and	  integration	  (Ehrhard	  2000,	  10).First,	  weapon	  system	  development	  is	  the	  process	  of	  creating	  a	  functional	  platform.	  This	  is	  accomplished	  through	  an	  incubation	  period	  of	  research	  and	  development.8	  In	  order	  for	  this	  to	  occur,	  defense	  organizations	  invest	  in	  the	  innovative	  weapon	  system.	  Innovation-­‐friendly	  militaries	  have	  institutional	  mechanisms	  for	  experimentation	  (Hundley	  1999,	  66).	  Military	  technology	  research	  and	  development	  occurs	  through	  the	  private	  industry	  or	  state-­‐driven	  public	  sector.	  A	  technology-­‐driven	  RMA	  is	  typically	  a	  result	  of	  combinations	  of	  “enabling	  technologies,”	  rather	  than	  just	  an	  individual	  introduction.	  Multifaceted	  stages	  of	  new	  technology	  development	  “culminate	  in	  a	  new	  military	  reality”	  (61).	  For	  examples	  of	  enabling	  technologies,	  see	  Figure	  2.	  Military	  organizations	  will	  continuously	  invest	  in	  developing	  new	  systems	  and	  adopt	  them	  through	  a	  trial	  and	  error	  process.	  Then,	  if	  both	  development	  and	  adoption	  are	  successful,	  the	  organization	  will	  integrate	  the	  system	  into	  its	  bureaucracy.	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8	  It	  is	  also	  important	  to	  note	  the	  inverse;	  that	  is,	  failed	  RMAs.	  The	  purpose	  of	  the	  study	  is	  of	  course	  to	  understand	  successful	  RMAs,	  but	  for	  every	  successful	  RMA	  there	  are	  probably	  far	  more	  failed	  RMAs	  (Hundley	  1999,	  15).	  Much	  can	  be	  learned	  about	  military	  affairs	  from	  a	  failed	  RMA.	  
Figure	  2.	  An	  RMA	  Requires	  an	  Enabling	  Technology9
RMA Period	  of	  Development Enabling	  Technology Years	  of	  EmergenceICBM 1995-­‐1965 Fusion	  weapons 1950-­‐1955Multistage	  rockets 1945-­‐1955Inertial	  guidance 1950-­‐1955Atomic	  bomb 1941-­‐1945 Nuclear	  Hission 1938Carrier	  warfare 1921-­‐1939 Aviation 1900-­‐1915Radio	  communications 1900-­‐1915Blitzkrieg 1921-­‐1939 Tanks 1915-­‐1918Radio	  communications 1900-­‐1915Dive	  bombing 1921-­‐1926
Second,	  in	  weapon	  system	  introduction,	  the	  platform	  Hirst	  experiences	  operational	  realities.	  In	  this	  stage,	  the	  innovative	  weapon	  system	  is	  tested	  and	  acquisitioned	  into	  the	  military	  bureaucracy	  (22).	  It	  is	  then	  debuted	  in	  its	  “demonstration	  point,”	  the	  moment	  at	  which	  it	  is	  proved	  effective.	  The	  only	  way	  a	  weapon	  system	  proves	  to	  be	  worthy	  of	  full	  system	  integration	  is	  by	  means	  of	  actual	  experience.	  This	  is	  the	  innovative	  weapon	  system’s	  critical	  demonstration	  point;	  or,	  the	  pivotal	  moment	  “when	  the	  relevant	  community	  has	  sufHicient	  information	  to	  reasonably	  understand	  the	  signiHicance	  of	  an	  innovation”	  (Horowitz	  2010,	  8).Third,	  weapon	  system	  integration	  is	  the	  point	  at	  which	  the	  platform	  is	  a	  functional	  and	  viable	  means	  of	  action	  within	  the	  military	  bureaucracy	  and	  doctrine.	  Integration	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9	  Adapted	  from	  the	  chart	  found	  in	  Richard	  O.	  Hundley,	  Past	  Revolutions,	  Future	  Transformations:	  
What	  Can	  The	  History	  Of	  Revolutions	  In	  Military	  Affairs	  Tell	  Us	  About	  Transforming	  The	  US	  Military?	  (1999,	  61).	  The	  requirement	  is	  for	  technology-­‐driven	  RMAs.
requires	  a	  military	  to	  have	  its	  own	  demonstration	  point.	  An	  innovative	  weapon	  system	  will	  only	  receive	  investment	  if	  it	  seems	  auspicious.	  It	  is	  likely	  that	  a	  demonstration	  point	  typically	  occurs	  during	  warfare,	  because	  a	  conHlict	  will	  display	  either	  the	  boons	  or	  deHiciencies	  of	  a	  weapon	  system.	  In	  some	  instances,	  peacetime	  demonstration	  points	  may	  occur.	  And,	  if	  the	  demonstration	  point	  is	  remarkable	  enough	  for	  the	  technology’s	  mass	  diffusion,	  it	  may	  not	  need	  operational	  experience.	  For	  example,	  the	  diffusion	  of	  the	  nuclear	  weapons	  has	  been	  sufHicient	  to	  be	  integrated	  into	  plenty	  of	  countries’	  military	  doctrines	  without	  them	  using	  it.	  It	  also	  explains	  the	  diffusion	  of	  the	  technology	  to	  other	  actors.	  A	  demonstration	  point	  for	  one	  actor	  may	  provide	  justiHication	  for	  many	  countries	  adopting	  the	  system.	  Only	  when	  the	  technology	  has	  been	  developed	  and	  initially	  adopted	  can	  it	  be	  fully	  integrated	  into	  a	  military	  bureaucracy.Integration	  requires	  the	  military	  to	  have	  its	  own	  operational	  concept,	  or	  “the	  manner	  in	  which	  the	  new	  system	  is	  employed	  in	  some	  type	  of	  military	  situation,	  accomplishing	  some	  military	  task	  either	  dramatically	  better	  or	  dramatically	  differently	  than	  it	  had	  been	  accomplished	  before,	  or	  performing	  a	  new	  task	  that	  did	  not	  exist	  previously”	  (Hundley	  1999,	  24).	  An	  RMA	  is	  the	  result	  of	  the	  union	  of	  a	  technological	  device	  and	  an	  employment	  concept.	  It	  is	  more	  than	  solely	  the	  culmination	  of	  hitherto	  unavailable	  enabling	  technologies.	  As	  military	  historian	  Max	  Boot	  writes	  in	  a	  history	  of	  military	  innovation	  since	  1500,“Technology	  only	  sets	  the	  parameters	  of	  the	  possible	  and	  creates	  the	  potential	  for	  military	  revolution.	  What	  indeed	  produces	  an	  actual	  innovation	  is	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  militaries	  recognize	  and	  exploit	  the	  opportunities	  inherent	  in	  new	  tools	  of	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war,	  through	  organizational	  structures	  and	  deployment	  of	  force.	  It	  was	  how	  people	  responded	  to	  technology	  that	  produced	  seismic	  shifts	  in	  warfare”	  (2006,	  10).10 	  Militaries	  must	  focus	  to	  invest	  in	  both	  the	  technical	  and	  doctrinal	  areas.	  Consider	  the	  examples	  of	  innovative	  systems	  and	  their	  required	  employment	  concepts	  in	  Figure	  3.	  
Figure	  3.	  An	  RMA	  Requires	  an	  Employment	  Concept11
RMA Device/System Employment	  ConceptICBM Long-­‐range	  ballistic	  missile	  with	  fusion	  warhead	  and	  inertial	  guidance Bombardment	  of	  strategic,	  Hixed	  targetsCarrier	  warfare Wheeled	  planes	  operated	  from	  fast,	  Hlat-­‐desk	  ships Airborne	  attack	  of	  naval	  surface	  targetsBlitzkrieg Tanks,	  two-­‐way	  radios,	  and	  dive	  bombers Mobile	  maneuver	  warfareMachine	  Gun Rapid	  Hire,	  anti-­‐personnel	  gun Direct-­‐Hire	  weapon	  against	  massed	  infantry	  formations
C1.	  Leadership	  In	  Revolutions	  In	  Military	  AffairsInnovation	  is	  difHicult,	  for	  change	  disrupts	  norms.	  Leadership	  is	  needed	  to	  break	  through	  the	  natural	  resistance	  to	  change.	  For	  the	  FMA	  Theory,	  leadership	  will	  be	  considered	  in	  four	  regards:	  organizational	  culture,	  administrative	  support,	  bureaucratic	  competition,	  and	  information	  safeguards.Organizational	  culture	  is	  how	  the	  military’s	  bureaucratic	  norms	  relate	  to	  the	  innovation	  process.	  Dr.	  Rosen	  notes	  the	  innate	  resistance	  to	  change	  in	  bureaucracies.	  Citing	  political	  theorist	  Max	  Weber,	  Rosen	  says,	  “Almost	  everything	  we	  know	  in	  theory	  about	  large	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10	  Quoted	  from	  Dima	  Adamsky,	  The	  Culture	  of	  Military	  Innovation:	  The	  Impact	  of	  Cultural	  Factors	  on	  
the	  Revolution	  in	  Military	  Affairs	  in	  Russia,	  the	  US,	  and	  Israel	  (2010,	  1).11	  Adapted	  from	  the	  chart	  found	  in	  Richard	  O.	  Hundley,	  Past	  Revolutions,	  Future	  Transformations:	  
What	  Can	  The	  History	  Of	  Revolutions	  In	  Military	  Affairs	  Tell	  Us	  About	  Transforming	  The	  US	  Military?	  (1999).
bureaucracies	  suggests	  not	  only	  that	  they	  are	  hard	  to	  change,	  but	  that	  they	  are	  designed	  not	  to	  change”	  (Rosen	  1991,	  2).	  Sociologist	  Tom	  Burns	  and	  psychologist	  George	  MacPherson	  Stalker	  argue	  that	  bureaucratic	  organizations	  value	  consistency	  and	  repetition;	  efHicient	  management	  is	  derived	  from	  retaining	  the	  status	  quo	  (1961).There	  is	  an	  inherent	  paradox	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  military	  change.	  The	  commonplace	  assumption	  is	  that	  militaries	  are	  “seen	  as	  traditional	  in	  nature	  and	  therefore	  as	  being	  strongly	  disinclined	  to	  undertake	  major	  change.”	  This	  is	  because	  “militaries	  prefer	  to	  preserve	  tried	  and	  tested	  strategies	  and	  structures.”	  A	  military	  operationally	  assumes	  practices	  and	  holds	  fastidiously	  to	  its	  consistent	  traditions.	  Notwithstanding,	  a	  military	  must	  “make	  major	  changes	  in	  terms	  of…how	  they	  prepare	  to	  Hight”	  (Farrell	  and	  Terriff	  1991,	  4).	  While	  a	  military	  must	  be	  operationally	  consistent,	  a	  strategic	  edge	  only	  occurs	  when	  it	  has	  the	  most	  advanced	  systems.Rosen	  argues	  that	  military	  organizations	  tend	  to	  resist	  outside	  intervention.	  If	  regular	  bureaucracies	  are	  “not	  supposed	  to	  innovate,”	  then	  certainly	  “military	  bureaucracies…are	  especially	  resistant	  to	  change”	  (1991,	  2).	  	  Likewise,	  Posen	  says	  a	  military	  endeavors	  to	  “reduce	  both	  internal	  and	  external	  sources	  of	  uncertainty,”	  which	  is	  achieved	  by	  relying	  on	  dependable	  routines.	  Like	  Farrell	  and	  Terriff,	  Posen	  writes	  that	  there	  is	  a	  bias	  against	  innovation	  within	  a	  military	  organization,	  for	  it	  is	  easier	  to	  repeat	  standard	  operating	  procedures	  (SOPs)	  than	  to	  introduce	  disruptive	  innovative	  weapon	  systems	  (1984,	  44).	  Farrell	  and	  Terriff	  cite	  the	  “prolonged	  and	  painful	  birth	  of	  battleHield	  mechanization”	  as	  exemplifying	  the	  instinctive	  partiality	  toward	  SOPs	  (2002,	  4).	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Uncertainty	  is	  not	  the	  only	  reason	  behind	  this	  innate	  “inHlexibility	  of	  military	  institutions.”	  Traditionalism	  is	  deeply	  rooted	  in	  a	  military’s	  culture.	  Rosen	  recites	  a	  Hitting	  quote	  by	  Colonel	  John	  Mitchell	  of	  the	  British	  Army	  in	  1839:	  “OfHicers	  enter	  the	  army	  at	  an	  age	  when	  they	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  take	  up	  existing	  opinions	  than	  to	  form	  their	  own.	  They	  grow	  up	  carrying	  into	  effect	  orders	  and	  regulations	  founded	  on	  those	  received	  opinions;	  they	  become,	  in	  some	  measure	  identiHied	  with	  existing	  views,	  till,	  in	  the	  course	  of	  years,	  the	  ideas	  thus	  gradually	  imbibed	  get	  too	  Hirmly	  rooted	  to	  either	  shaken	  or	  eradicated	  by	  the	  force	  of	  argument	  or	  reHlection.	  In	  no	  profession	  is	  the	  dread	  of	  innovation	  so	  great	  as	  in	  the	  army”	  (1991,	  2).The	  long-­‐standing	  traditions	  of	  a	  military	  organization	  are	  ingrained	  in	  a	  culture	  that	  vehemently	  resists	  change.	  The	  source	  of	  a	  military’s	  consistent	  operational	  routines	  is	  the	  same	  source	  that	  disallows	  drastic	  innovation.	  Like	  most	  human	  organizations,	  a	  military	  does	  not	  maintain	  a	  culture	  that	  incentivizes	  innovation.An	  innovation-­‐friendly	  organization	  will	  maintain	  a	  culture	  of	  “productive	  paranoia,”12	  or	  a	  mindset	  receptive	  to	  change.	  A	  military	  with	  productive	  paranoia	  will	  look	  for	  unmet	  strategic	  challenges	  and	  value	  those	  who	  do	  so.	  An	  organization	  with	  a	  culture	  of	  productive	  paranoia	  will	  be	  able	  to	  focus	  on	  a	  deHinite	  thing	  or	  short	  list	  of	  things	  (Hundley	  1999).	  This	  emphasis	  on	  novel	  concepts	  are	  a	  result	  of	  trial	  and	  error	  in	  the	  development	  stage.	   Due	  to	  the	  nature	  of	  an	  RMA,	  military	  organizations	  sometimes	  face	  a	  challenge	  to	  its	  core	  competency.	  Hundley	  deHines	  a	  core	  competency	  as	  “a	  fundamental	  ability	  that	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12	  A	  term	  coined	  by	  Hundley	  (1999,	  xix)	  and	  adapted	  from	  former	  CEO	  of	  Intel	  Andrew	  Grove,	  Only	  
the	  Paranoid	  Survive	  (1999).
provides	  the	  foundation	  for	  a	  set	  of	  military	  capabilities”	  (Hundley	  1999,	  9).	  In	  other	  words,	  it	  is	  what	  the	  military	  is	  excellent	  at	  doing.	  Thus,	  challenging	  the	  virtue	  of	  one’s	  core	  competency	  is	  very	  difHicult.	  By	  challenging	  a	  weapon	  system	  that	  is	  one’s	  core	  competency,	  one	  risks	  undermining	  the	  program.	  This	  is	  very	  difHicult	  when	  the	  actor	  is	  especially	  skillful	  at	  the	  program.	  The	  process	  of	  considering	  a	  change	  in	  a	  core	  competency	  includes	  doctrinal	  changes,	  acquisition	  programs,	  force	  structure	  modiHications	  (Posen	  1984,	  53;	  Hundley	  1999,	  24).	  	  When	  one	  actor	  innovates,	  other	  actors	  will	  attempt	  to	  catch	  up.	  Cultural	  and	  psychological	  factors	  impact	  an	  actor’s	  ability	  to	  respond.	  In	  his	  study	  of	  military-­‐technical	  revolutions	  in	  the	  Soviet,	  American,	  and	  Israeli	  militaries,	  Adamsky	  discusses	  the	  cultural	  factors	  necessary	  for	  an	  RMA.	  Despite	  the	  assumed	  belief	  that	  technologically-­‐established	  militaries	  would	  be	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  a	  Hirst	  mover,	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  an	  organizational	  culture	  favors	  innovation	  matters	  just	  as	  much	  (2010).	  Like	  other	  types	  of	  organizations,	  bureaucratic	  politics	  play	  a	  role	  in	  determining	  decisions	  for	  a	  military.	  If	  an	  actor	  faces	  obstacles	  to	  responsiveness,	  adoption	  can	  be	  more	  challenging.	  As	  Allison	  and	  Halperin	  explain,	  “the	  ‘maker’	  of	  government	  policy	  is	  not	  one	  calculating	  decision-­‐maker,	  but	  rather	  a	  conglomerate	  of	  large	  organizations	  and	  political	  actors	  who	  differ	  substantially	  about	  what	  their	  government	  should	  do	  on	  any	  particular	  issue	  and	  who	  compete	  in	  attempting	  to	  affect	  both	  governmental	  decisions	  and	  the	  actions	  of	  their	  government”	  (1972,	  42).	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A	  mission-­‐oriented	  organization	  will	  “attempt	  to	  maintain	  or	  further	  their	  autonomy,	  organizational	  morale,	  organizational	  essence,	  and	  their	  roles	  and	  missions,”	  writes	  Halperin	  (1971,	  76;	  Beard	  1976,	  229).	  	   Nonetheless,	  an	  actor	  can	  override	  “obstacles	  to	  responsiveness,”	  or	  factors	  that	  will	  slow	  down	  the	  innovation	  process,	  by	  overcoming	  denial	  of	  the	  RMA’s	  importance,	  avoiding	  diversion	  from	  adopting	  the	  RMA,	  and	  achieving	  acceptance	  of	  the	  RMA	  and	  implementing	  the	  pertinent	  action	  (Hundley	  1999,	  50-­‐53).	  When	  one’s	  core	  competency	  is	  challenged,	  the	  obstacles	  to	  responsiveness	  are	  even	  higher.	  Hundley	  reasons,	  “Established	  military	  organizations	  more	  often	  than	  not	  fail	  to	  respond	  adequately	  to	  emerging	  RMAs	  threatening	  their	  core	  competencies,	  even	  ones	  of	  which	  they	  are	  aware,	  primarily	  because	  of	  inherent	  obstacles	  to	  the	  changes	  necessary	  to	  cope	  with	  an	  RMA”	  (49).Strong	  administrative	  support	  is	  necessary	  for	  the	  integration	  of	  an	  innovative	  weapon	  system.	  There	  are	  a	  few	  characteristics	  of	  a	  fully	  integrated	  weapon	  system.	  The	  platform	  will	  receive	  a	  “system-­‐unique	  unit”	  within	  the	  organization;	  a	  division	  solely	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  implementing	  that	  innovative	  weapon	  system.	  Also,	  it	  will	  obtain	  “an	  ofHicer	  specialty	  for	  system	  operators;”	  that	  is,	  the	  individual	  operating	  the	  platform	  will	  be	  given	  a	  credentialed	  position.	  When	  an	  organization	  holds	  the	  weapon	  system	  in	  high	  regard,	  the	  cap	  on	  ofHicer	  rankings	  will	  be	  higher.	  Subsequently,	  these	  system	  operators	  will	  become	  “a	  politically	  active,	  powerful	  constituency”	  within	  the	  bureaucracy.	  The	  platform	  will	  Hind	  support	  within	  the	  government	  and	  legislative	  bodies	  as	  well	  as	  the	  defense	  industry	  (Ehrhard	  2000,	  49).In	  Rosen’s	  study	  on	  whether	  endogenous	  or	  exogenous	  elements	  are	  mostly	  responsible	  for	  weapon	  system	  innovation,	  he	  found	  that	  peacetime	  innovation	  occurs	  due	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to	  the	  inHluence	  of	  senior	  military	  ofHicers.	  A	  respected	  high-­‐ranking	  military	  ofHicer,	  or	  “maverick,”	  will	  value	  the	  innovative	  weapon	  system	  and	  push	  for	  its	  adoption	  (1991,	  18).	  Career	  promotion	  is	  the	  internal	  source	  of	  power	  in	  a	  military.	  Senior	  ofHicers	  will	  pioneer	  new	  promotion	  patterns	  or	  even	  “create	  new	  career	  paths”	  for	  younger,	  junior	  ofHicers	  in	  specialty	  roles	  (76).	  When	  a	  high-­‐ranking	  military	  ofHicer	  can	  provide	  “both	  intellectual	  and	  organizational	  components”	  to	  an	  innovative	  weapon	  system,	  the	  military	  can	  consider	  adoption	  and	  implementation	  (21).	  This	  is	  most	  effective	  when	  the	  innovation	  originates	  from	  a	  maverick	  within	  a	  subgroup	  whose	  norms	  would	  be	  challenged	  by	  the	  innovation.13	  Innovation	  created	  by	  personnel	  changes	  often	  lag	  by	  one	  generation.	  This	  inevitable	  one-­‐generation	  time	  lag	  is	  sufHicient	  for	  young	  ofHicers	  who	  use	  the	  new	  technologies	  to	  become	  senior	  ofHicers	  (76).	  Surely,	  British	  Colonel	  Mitchell’s	  quotation	  holds	  value;	  younger	  ofHicers	  accept	  the	  majority	  of	  practices	  from	  their	  superior	  ofHicers.	  But	  gradual	  change	  does	  occur	  by	  these	  young	  ofHicers	  adopting	  innovative	  technologies	  and	  strategies,	  and	  eventually	  passing	  on	  the	  improved	  doctrine	  to	  posterity.	  Civilian	  actors	  can	  affect	  peacetime	  innovation	  too.	  A	  civilian	  political	  leader	  who	  is	  supportive	  of	  a	  particular	  platform	  can	  be	  instrumental	  in	  perpetuating	  a	  particular	  innovative	  weapon	  system.	  A	  politician	  will	  provide	  protective	  cover	  for	  the	  military	  maverick	  and	  the	  technology.	  Support	  for	  the	  technology’s	  adoption	  is	  achieved	  through	  budgetary	  support	  for	  the	  program	  and	  public	  statements	  of	  approval	  of	  the	  innovation.	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13	  For	  example,	  United	  States	  Air	  Force	  General	  Bernard	  Schriever,	  a	  nuclear	  bomber	  pilot,	  was	  instrumental	  in	  the	  integration	  of	  the	  ICBM	  into	  the	  Air	  Force.	  For	  more,	  see	  the	  chapter	  on	  the	  ICBM.
Support	  for	  the	  military	  maverick	  is	  achieved	  through	  recommending	  promotion	  of	  the	  individual	  (14).14Nonetheless,	  civilian	  political	  leaders	  are	  less	  instrumental	  to	  weapon	  system	  innovation	  than	  one	  would	  expect.	  Barnard	  College	  Professor	  Kimberly	  Marten	  Zisk	  argues	  that	  civilian	  intervention	  in	  military	  innovation	  is	  not	  always	  required.	  In	  Zisk’s	  study	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union’s	  military	  bureaucracy,	  lack	  of	  civilian	  intervention	  permitted	  innovation.	  Interestingly,	  the	  Soviet	  military	  was	  “not	  as	  tied	  to	  the	  status	  quo	  as	  many	  believed.”	  Based	  on	  evidence	  from	  declassiHied	  Soviet	  military	  journals,	  Gorbachev’s	  leadership	  incentivized	  enough	  military	  innovation	  so	  to	  not	  produce	  a	  “civil-­‐military	  conHlict”	  (1993,	  121).	  Innovation	  in	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  occurred	  because	  civilian	  leadership	  did	  not	  interfere.Oftentimes,	  a	  political	  leader’s	  beneHit	  is	  only	  his	  or	  her	  support	  for	  the	  key	  military	  mavericks	  who	  have	  innovative	  ideas.	  In	  the	  United	  States,	  civilian	  leaders	  seldom	  “push	  the	  American	  military	  to	  develop	  capabilities	  it	  otherwise	  would	  have	  neglected”	  (Rosen	  1991,	  256).	  Budgetary	  support	  for	  a	  weapon	  system	  is	  needed,	  but	  Rosen	  warns	  that	  “it	  is	  wrong	  to	  focus	  on	  budgets	  when	  trying	  to	  understand	  or	  promote	  innovation.”	  This	  is	  because	  “talented	  military	  personnel,	  time,	  and	  information”	  are	  purportedly	  the	  “key	  resources	  for	  innovation”	  during	  peacetime	  (252).	  Posen	  contends	  that	  civilian	  political	  leaders	  invest	  their	  time	  on	  military	  oversight	  depending	  on	  the	  threat	  level.	  Civilians	  tend	  be	  more	  involved	  in	  a	  military	  organization’s	  strategies	  in	  “periods	  of	  crisis”	  than	  in	  “periods	  of	  low	  threat.”	  During	  low	  threat	  intervals,	  civilian	  elites	  do	  not	  spend	  their	  time	  on	  military	  oversight,	  but	  instead	  on	  other	  public	  policy	  matters.	  Meanwhile,	  military	  organizations	  tend	  to	  be	  unconHined	  in	  their	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14	  Civilian	  support	  for	  a	  military	  maverick	  can	  sometimes	  even	  be	  more	  impactful	  than	  budgetary	  support.
bureaucratic	  planning.	  Civilian	  intervention	  peaks	  in	  high	  threat,	  or	  “crisis”	  moments.	  When	  this	  occurs,	  civilian	  assessments	  are	  made	  on	  “realpolitik”	  considerations,	  which	  are	  inclined	  to	  “trump	  organizational	  proclivities”	  (1984,	  34-­‐35).	  Hence,	  innovations	  made	  during	  crisis	  are	  based	  on	  political	  objectives	  instead	  of	  organizational	  needs.Moreover,	  interservice	  bureaucratic	  competition	  can	  serve	  to	  promote	  or	  hinder	  an	  innovative	  weapon	  system.	  Integration	  must	  occur	  within	  each	  branch	  of	  a	  military.	  When	  one	  branch	  “fails	  to	  integrate	  it	  into	  its	  standard	  combat	  scheme…that	  particular	  innovative	  system	  is	  stiHled”	  (Ehrhard	  2000,	  49).	  Relevant	  branches	  must	  interact	  appropriately	  in	  order	  to	  foster	  operational	  coordination	  and	  continued	  innovation.	  Each	  branch	  must	  work	  with	  the	  others	  in	  order	  to	  satisfy	  operational	  and	  management	  needs.Alternatively,	  competition	  between	  branches	  is	  necessary	  for	  innovation.	  Each	  branch	  will	  strive	  to	  out-­‐compete	  the	  other	  in	  terms	  of	  integration.	  Political	  scientist	  Samuel	  Huntington	  writes	  that	  “conventional	  wisdom	  holds	  that	  interservice	  competition	  necessarily	  undermines	  economy,	  efHiciency,	  and	  effective	  central	  control	  in	  the	  military	  establishment.”	  Rivalry	  occurs	  due	  to	  the	  impacts	  of	  jurisdiction,	  budgetary	  needs,	  operational	  sovereignty,	  and	  promotion	  potentials.	  For	  example,	  interservice	  competition	  in	  the	  United	  States	  is	  “the	  competition	  between	  military	  services	  (Army,	  Navy,	  Air	  Force,	  and	  Marines)	  for	  prestige,	  funding,	  and	  inHluence,	  particularly	  in	  the	  Congress.”	  (”Interservice	  rivalry”,	  2001).	  Nonetheless,	  Huntington	  argues	  that	  in	  analyzing	  “American	  military	  politics	  and	  interservice	  rivalry	  since	  World	  War	  II...conventional	  wisdom	  may	  err”	  (Huntington	  1961,	  40).	  Institutional	  safeguards	  protect	  proprietary	  information.	  A	  culture	  favoring	  innovation	  also	  seeks	  to	  protect	  its	  development,	  adoption,	  and	  integration	  methods	  from	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other	  actors.	  Such	  militaries	  will	  take	  meaningful	  steps	  to	  avoid	  sharing	  its	  precious	  technological	  or	  organizational	  secrets	  regarding	  an	  RMA.	  For	  strategic	  and	  security	  reasons,	  a	  military	  will	  attempt	  to	  collect	  and	  assess	  an	  adversary’s	  weaponry	  (Hundley	  1999,	  41).	  Information,	  both	  open-­‐source	  and	  clandestine,	  is	  instrumental	  to	  the	  ability	  to	  develop,	  adopt,	  and	  integrate	  an	  innovative	  weapon	  system	  (39).	  
C2.	  Doctrine	  In	  Revolutions	  In	  Military	  AffairsLike	  leadership,	  doctrine	  is	  fundamental	  to	  military	  innovation.	  Every	  military	  maintains	  a	  speciHic	  doctrine.	  Doctrine	  dictates	  an	  actor’s	  commitment	  to	  certain	  goals,	  such	  as	  value	  among	  competing	  innovative	  weapon	  systems.	  When	  an	  weapon	  system	  aligns	  with	  a	  military’s	  doctrine,	  the	  military	  will	  hold	  it	  in	  higher	  value.	  Reliance	  on	  the	  platform,	  or	  speculation	  that	  future	  scenarios	  will	  require	  reliance	  on	  the	  platform,	  causes	  an	  organization	  to	  commit	  to	  the	  platform.	  For	  the	  purposes	  of	  this	  study,	  doctrine	  will	  be	  considered	  through	  compatibility	  and	  resource	  allocation.An	  innovative	  weapon	  system	  must	  be	  “compatible	  with	  valued	  local	  patterns”	  within	  the	  organization	  (Rogers,	  14-­‐16).	  A	  military	  will	  be	  far	  more	  willing	  to	  develop,	  adopt,	  and	  integrate	  an	  innovative	  weapon	  system	  if	  it	  aligns	  with	  its	  overall	  goals.	  Military	  organizations	  are	  inherently	  “risk-­‐averse,”	  explains	  political	  scientist	  Emily	  Goldman.	  Thus,	  militaries	  seek	  to	  “adopt	  technologies	  and	  strategies	  that	  support	  existing	  goals,	  deHined	  in	  terms	  of	  protecting	  resources,	  autonomy	  (jurisdiction	  and	  independence),	  and	  organizational	  essence	  (the	  views	  on	  missions	  and	  capabilities	  held	  by	  the	  dominant	  group	  in	  the	  organization)”	  (Goldman,	  267).	  Compatibility	  relates	  to	  the	  offensive	  versus	  defensive	  strategic	  thinking.	  Militaries	  tend	  to	  hold	  a	  consistent	  position	  in	  bureaucratic	  strategy:	  an	  offensive	  bias.	  If	  militaries	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were	  “left	  to	  their	  own	  devices,”	  which	  Posen	  says	  happens	  “frequently,”	  they	  would	  favor	  offensive	  strategies.	  This	  offensive	  bias	  is	  commonplace	  among	  all	  “large,	  functionally	  specialized	  bureaucracies”	  (1984,	  34-­‐45).	  In	  a	  military,	  this	  bias	  translates	  into	  larger	  budgets	  and	  greater	  resources,	  both	  of	  which	  “reduce	  uncertainty.”	  Offensive	  doctrines,	  as	  exempliHied	  in	  the	  German	  Army	  and	  Air	  Force	  in	  the	  interwar	  period,	  limit	  civilian	  inHluence	  and	  therefore	  promote	  more	  autonomy	  (222).Posen	  claims	  that	  a	  military’s	  offensive	  bias	  is	  intensiHied	  by	  an	  apparent	  information	  asymmetry.	  Military	  ofHicers	  naturally	  understand	  more	  than	  their	  civilian	  overseers.	  Accordingly,	  military	  actors	  utilize	  this	  asymmetrical	  knowledge	  base	  in	  order	  to	  push	  for	  offensive	  strategies	  (69).However,	  the	  availability	  of	  alternative	  platforms	  impacts	  the	  likelihood	  of	  pursuing	  an	  innovative	  weapon	  system.	  If	  a	  military	  can	  invest	  in	  a	  cheaper	  offsetting	  weapon	  system,	  then	  the	  innovative	  weapon	  system	  is	  less	  urgently	  needed.	  Many	  weapon	  systems	  are	  responded	  with	  a	  less	  costly	  defensive	  alternative.15	  The	  pursuit	  of	  that	  defensive	  alternative	  impacts	  the	  trajectory	  of	  the	  original	  system.	  Similarly,	  the	  ability	  to	  bandwagon	  affects	  a	  military’s	  doctrine.	  If	  possible,	  a	  country	  will	  form	  alliances	  with	  a	  Hirst	  mover	  in	  order	  to	  avoid	  the	  cost	  of	  the	  innovative	  weapon	  system.	  If	  a	  country	  is	  not	  able	  or	  not	  willing	  to	  coordinate	  with	  the	  Hirst	  mover,	  then	  it	  may	  seek	  out	  other	  potential	  adopters	  to	  balance	  against	  the	  Hirst	  mover	  (Elman;	  Horowitz	  2010,	  79).Resource	  allocation	  shows	  commitment	  to	  an	  innovative	  weapon	  system.	  Internal	  value	  is	  determined	  via	  resources.	  A	  valued	  weapon	  system	  receives	  adequate	  funding	  and	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15	  Costliness	  is	  considered	  in	  terms	  of	  technological	  expense	  and	  organizational	  requirements.
support;	  an	  undervalued	  weapon	  system	  struggles	  to	  Hind	  budgetary	  support.	  A	  platform	  is	  protected	  and	  furthered	  through	  research	  and	  development	  and	  adoption	  measures,	  both	  of	  which	  require	  resources.A	  modernizing	  military	  is	  more	  Hlexible	  in	  its	  resource	  allocation	  than	  an	  well-­‐established	  military.	  For	  a	  modernizing	  military,	  free	  resource	  mobilization	  can	  be	  a	  boon	  for	  an	  innovative	  weapon	  system.	  
D.	  DeJining	  The	  Scope	  Of	  First-­Mover	  AdvantageThe	  purpose	  of	  this	  study	  is	  to	  explain	  the	  length	  of	  FMA.	  For	  any	  study	  in	  the	  social	  sciences	  assumptions	  must	  be	  considered.Length	  is	  divided	  into	  two	  categories:	  “lengthy”	  and	  “brief.”	  But	  what	  does	  this	  really	  mean?	  How	  long	  is	  “lengthy”	  and	  how	  long	  is	  “brief”?	  Length,	  it	  must	  be	  assumed,	  is	  not	  necessarily	  measured	  in	  years.	  Instead,	  length	  must	  be	  relative	  to	  the	  circumstance	  of	  the	  RMA.	  Length	  measurement	  is	  deemed	  lengthy	  or	  brief	  relative	  to	  the	  era	  in	  which	  the	  RMA	  occurred.	  For	  example,	  consider	  the	  length	  of	  an	  RMA	  introduced	  during	  the	  Second	  World	  War	  compared	  to	  an	  RMA	  introduced	  during	  the	  Thirty	  Years’	  War.	  In	  absolute	  terms,	  the	  spread	  of	  an	  innovative	  weapon	  system	  may	  have	  taken	  longer	  before	  communication	  technology	  and	  advancements	  in	  defense	  organizations.	  For	  the	  purposes	  of	  this	  study,	  we	  must	  hold	  for	  such	  factors	  among	  the	  case	  studies.	  In	  addition,	  an	  assumption	  must	  be	  held	  regarding	  the	  barriers	  of	  entry	  of	  an	  RMA.	  In	  order	  to	  be	  considered	  for	  this	  study,	  an	  RMA	  must	  be	  of	  sufHicient	  difHiculty	  for	  integration.	  As	  previously	  discussed	  at	  length,	  innovation	  adoption	  can	  be	  costly.	  According	  to	  University	  of	  Pennsylvania	  Professor	  Michael	  C.	  Horowitz,	  a	  military	  can	  only	  adopt	  an	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innovative	  practice	  or	  technology	  if	  it	  meets	  the	  requisite	  “level	  of	  Hinancial	  intensity”	  and	  “organizational	  capital”	  (2010).	  Horowitz’s	  Adoption-­‐Capacity	  Theory	  explains	  when	  a	  military	  bureaucracy	  is	  capable	  of	  adopting	  an	  innovative	  weapon	  system,	  which	  occurs	  only	  under	  certain	  conditions.	  First,	  for	  a	  military	  to	  adopt	  a	  new	  system,	  it	  must	  be	  able	  to	  Hinancially	  support	  it.	  This	  “Hinancial	  intensity	  required	  to	  adopt	  innovation,”	  measured	  in	  the	  cost	  per	  unit	  of	  technology,	  can	  deter	  a	  military	  from	  adopting	  an	  innovative	  weapon	  system.	  As	  the	  “cost	  per	  unit	  of	  the	  technological	  component”	  increases,	  fewer	  militaries	  are	  qualiHied	  to	  adopt	  the	  platform.	  In	  fact,	  the	  costlier	  the	  innovation,	  the	  more	  likely	  a	  military	  will	  resort	  to	  alternative	  means,	  such	  as	  offsetting	  technologies,	  bandwagoning,	  and	  alliances	  (2010).Second,	  Horowitz	  states	  that	  in	  order	  for	  the	  diffusion	  of	  an	  innovative	  weapon	  system	  across	  militaries,	  each	  must	  also	  have	  the	  requisite	  organizational	  capital.	  In	  particular,	  a	  military	  organization	  must	  have	  the	  institutional	  ability	  to	  accept	  change.	  The	  Adoption-­‐Capacity	  Theory	  states	  that	  effective	  innovation	  goes	  further	  than	  mere	  adoption.	  “There	  is	  a	  big	  difference	  between	  the	  introduction	  of	  a	  technology	  onto	  the	  battleHield	  and	  the	  full	  integration	  of	  that	  technology	  into	  national	  strategy,”	  he	  writes.	  In	  fact,	  the	  “difference”	  can	  dictate	  the	  victor	  and	  loser	  in	  war	  (2010,	  2-­‐3).	  This	  is	  a	  costly	  process	  for	  large	  military	  bureaucracies	  with	  well-­‐established	  SOPs.	  But	  all	  innovations	  are	  “not	  created	  equal	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  the	  ease	  of	  adoption.”	  Some	  innovative	  weapon	  systems	  are	  adopted	  and	  integrated	  with	  ease,	  while	  others	  are	  more	  costly.	  This	  can	  depend	  on	  the	  particular	  military	  actor.	  Horowitz	  posits	  that	  when	  an	  innovation	  demands	  high	  Hinancial	  requirements,	  a	  preexisting	  wealthy	  and	  powerful	  state	  will	  beneHit.	  When	  an	  innovation	  requires	  a	  higher	  organizational	  change,	  smaller	  actors	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will	  beneHit,	  which	  can	  “upset	  the	  balance	  of	  power	  toward	  newer	  and	  more	  nimble	  actors”	  (4-­‐8).16
E.	  Lengthy	  First-­Mover	  AdvantageThe	  FMA	  Theory	  seeks	  to	  explain	  the	  success	  stories.	  Lengthy	  FMA	  is	  a	  pattern	  for	  which	  military	  leaders	  strive.	  It	  occurs	  when	  a	  Hirst	  mover	  receives	  an	  advantage	  over	  an	  innovative	  weapon	  system	  and	  holds	  on	  to	  it	  for	  an	  extended	  period	  of	  time.	  The	  Hirst	  mover	  introduces	  and	  integrates	  the	  technology.	  And,	  very	  importantly,	  a	  secondary	  actor	  is	  not	  able	  to	  do	  the	  same.	  FMA	  is	  determined	  by	  two	  variables,	  internal	  conditions	  and	  external	  conditions.	  With	  all	  other	  things	  being	  equal,	  the	  interaction	  between	  internal	  and	  external	  conditions	  either	  increases	  or	  decreases	  the	  length	  of	  FMA.	  Internal	  conditions	  explain	  the	  Hirst	  mover’s	  capacities;	  external	  conditions	  explain	  the	  second	  mover’s	  conditions.17	  Both	  highlight	  an	  important	  part	  in	  the	  FMA	  process.	  Lengthy	  FMA	  is	  a	  result	  of	  a	  Hirst	  mover	  developing,	  adopting,	  and	  integrating	  an	  RMA;	  the	  Hirst	  mover	  holding	  on	  to	  that	  RMA;	  and	  the	  secondary	  actor	  failing	  in	  that	  same	  regard.18	  
E1.	  Internal	  Conditions:	  Lengthy	  First-­Mover	  AdvantageInternal	  conditions	  explain	  phenomena	  within	  the	  actor’s	  own	  bureaucracy.	  The	  process	  of	  FMA	  is	  simple.	  First,	  the	  military	  must	  develop	  the	  RMA.	  Second,	  the	  military	  must	  adopt	  and	  then	  integrate	  the	  RMA.	  Internal	  conditions	  that	  allow	  for	  greater	  ease	  in	  the	  innovation	  process	  lead	  to	  lengthier	  FMA.	  This	  is	  because	  constant	  innovations	  create	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16	  For	  example,	  nuclear	  weapons	  are	  seen	  only	  in	  larger	  military	  bureaucracies.	  Nuclear	  weapons	  have	  a	  very	  high	  per	  unit	  cost,	  yet	  they	  are	  an	  organizationally	  inexpensive	  weapon	  system	  (Horowitz	  2010,	  4-­‐8).17	  For	  simplicity,	  this	  paper	  takes	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  %irst	  mover.	  Accordingly,	  “internal”	  factors	  belong	  to	  the	  %irst	  mover	  while	  “external”	  factors	  belong	  to	  a	  secondary	  actor;	  the	  “adversary”	  represents	  a	  secondary	  actor.18	  See	  Figure	  4,	  FMA	  Theory:	  Lengthy	  First-­‐Mover	  Advantage	  (33).
greater	  likelihood	  of	  FMA.	  In	  essence,	  in	  order	  for	  lengthy	  Hirst-­‐mover	  advantage,	  a	  military	  needs	  to	  Hirst	  become	  a	  Hirst	  mover.	  Third,	  once	  the	  RMA	  is	  set	  within	  the	  Hirst	  mover’s	  bureaucracy,	  the	  Hirst	  mover	  must	  protect	  the	  RMA	  from	  a	  secondary	  actor.	  Internal	  conditions	  are	  divided	  into	  two	  categories:	  strong	  leadership	  and	  doctrinal	  congruence.	  Leadership	  within	  a	  bureaucracy	  has	  telling	  effects	  on	  FMA.	  A	  military	  with	  leadership	  conducive	  to	  innovation	  and	  protection,	  known	  as	  “strong	  leadership,”	  elicits	  a	  lengthy	  FMA.	  Strong	  leadership	  includes	  the	  following:	  liberal	  organizational	  culture,	  strong	  administrative	  support,	  bureaucratic	  competition	  that	  enhances	  innovation,	  and	  strong	  information	  safeguards.19	  A	  liberal	  organizational	  culture	  favors	  constant	  innovation,	  accepts	  criticism,	  questions	  its	  own	  core-­‐competencies,	  and	  maintains	  institutions	  within	  it	  that	  aim	  to	  identify	  areas	  in	  which	  innovation	  is	  needed.20	  “Liberal”	  is	  not	  necessarily	  a	  political	  distinction,	  though	  politically	  liberal	  militaries	  tend	  to	  be	  organizationally	  liberal.	  Rather,	  liberal	  is	  synonymous	  with	  “innovation-­‐friendly.”	  Strong	  administrative	  support	  is	  achieved	  by	  individuals	  standing	  up	  for	  an	  RMA.	  Senior	  military	  mavericks	  promote	  and	  protect	  innovative	  weapon	  systems,	  and	  their	  civilian	  political	  counterparts	  promote	  and	  protect	  them.	  Administrative	  support	  also	  includes	  how	  decisions	  are	  made.	  Adoption	  and	  integration	  of	  novel	  technologies	  Hlourishes	  with	  less	  hesitation	  from	  the	  leadership.	  With	  more	  central	  leadership,	  quick	  changes	  in	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19	  It	  is	  important	  not	  to	  confuse	  the	  factors	  within	  leadership.	  Information	  protection	  can	  be	  valued	  regardless	  of	  the	  extent	  of	  its	  liberalism.	  Whether	  or	  not	  the	  bureaucracy	  is	  open	  to	  new	  ideas,	  or	  even	  the	  military	  is	  one	  of	  a	  liberal	  state,	  has	  little	  to	  do	  with	  its	  commitment	  to	  keeping	  its	  innovative	  weapon	  systems	  from	  competing	  actors.	  20	  Liberal	  versus	  rigid	  is	  measured	  with	  respect	  to	  each	  RMA.	  Conceivably,	  there	  could	  be	  a	  military	  with	  a	  notably	  rigid	  organizational	  culture	  but,	  for	  whatever	  reason,	  is	  willing	  to	  be	  liberal	  for	  a	  speci%ic	  RMA.	  In	  this	  hypothetical,	  the	  culture	  is	  deemed	  “liberal”	  for	  this	  particular	  RMA,	  even	  though	  the	  label	  may	  seem	  undeserved.
planning	  are	  possible.	  Policy-­‐making	  processes	  are	  swifter	  with	  fewer	  actors	  involved,	  which	  occurs	  in	  less	  inclusive	  institutions.21Strong	  leadership	  indicates	  bureaucratic	  competition	  is	  healthy	  and	  does	  not	  stiHle	  growth.	  Inter-­‐branch	  competition	  over	  operational	  roles	  and	  weapon	  system	  programs	  can	  drive	  development,	  adoption,	  and	  integration,	  so	  long	  as	  rivalry	  does	  not	  undermine	  the	  program.22 	  Information	  protection	  decreases	  the	  likelihood	  that	  a	  technology	  is	  adopted	  by	  a	  secondary	  actor	  in	  the	  short-­‐term.	  Military	  organizations	  keep	  their	  clandestine	  innovations	  from	  other	  actors.	  A	  Hirst	  mover	  with	  institutional	  information	  safeguards	  is	  more	  likely	  to	  halt	  the	  diffusion	  of	  the	  RMA.	  The	  extent	  to	  which	  an	  RMA	  is	  congruent	  with	  one’s	  doctrine	  determines	  the	  length	  of	  FMA.	  A	  weapon	  system	  that	  is	  “doctrinally	  congruent”	  aligns	  with	  the	  organization’s	  goals	  and	  increases	  the	  length	  of	  FMA.	  Doctrinal	  congruence	  is	  determined	  through	  compatibility	  and	  resource	  allocation.	  When	  a	  weapon	  system	  is	  compatible	  with	  a	  military’s	  own	  grand	  strategy,	  it	  seeks	  to	  protect	  it.	  Resource	  allocation	  reHlects	  a	  military	  organization’s	  value	  on	  a	  weapon	  system.	  Favorable	  resource	  allocation	  increases	  FMA	  length.	  When	  an	  RMA	  aligns	  with	  a	  military’s	  vision	  for	  the	  future,	  the	  military	  attempts	  to	  keep	  its	  advantage	  through	  budgetary	  support.
E2.	  External	  Conditions:	  Lengthy	  First-­Mover	  Advantage
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21	  There	  exists	  a	  trade-­‐off	  between	  liberal	  culture	  and	  central	  planning.	  Central	  planning,	  which	  increases	  the	  length	  of	  FMA,	  is	  usually	  associated	  with	  a	  rigid	  organizational	  culture,	  which	  decreases	  the	  length	  of	  FMA.	  In	  order	  for	  Lengthy	  FMA,	  the	  central	  planning	  must	  not	  inhibit	  the	  organizational	  culture.	  There	  is	  much	  theory	  dedicated	  to	  the	  virtues	  of	  central	  planning	  versus	  dispersed	  governance,	  which	  will	  not	  being	  examined.	  22	  This	  is	  mostly	  critical	  in	  innovative	  weapon	  systems	  that	  bridge	  two	  or	  more	  branches	  of	  a	  military.
External	  conditions	  explain	  phenomena	  within	  the	  secondary	  actor	  that	  relate	  to	  the	  innovation	  process.	  The	  factors	  that	  contribute	  to	  the	  Hirst	  mover’s	  success	  must	  not	  be	  present	  for	  the	  secondary	  actor.	  The	  secondary	  actor	  is	  understood	  through	  “external	  conditions.”	  By	  deHinition,	  external	  conditions	  should	  demonstrate	  the	  antithesis	  of	  internal	  conditions.	  In	  order	  for	  a	  condition	  to	  prompt	  lengthy	  FMA	  for	  the	  Hirst	  mover,	  the	  opposite	  of	  that	  same	  condition	  is	  present	  in	  the	  adversary’s	  military.	  External	  conditions	  are	  expressed	  via	  weak	  leadership	  and	  incongruence	  to	  adversary	  doctrine.23First,	  for	  lengthy	  FMA,	  the	  secondary	  actor	  must	  exhibit	  weak	  leadership.	  Weak	  leadership	  hinders	  innovation	  and	  disallows	  catch-­‐up	  to	  the	  Hirst	  mover.	  Weak	  leadership	  is	  demonstrated	  through	  rigid	  organizational	  culture,	  weak	  administrative	  support,	  bureaucratic	  competition	  that	  stiHles	  innovation,	  and	  weak	  information	  safeguards.	  A	  rigid	  organizational	  culture	  is	  not	  open	  to	  criticism,	  does	  not	  question	  its	  core-­‐competencies,	  and	  does	  not	  have	  institutions	  that	  aim	  to	  identify	  areas	  in	  which	  innovation	  is	  needed.	  Weak	  administrative	  support	  creates	  dispersed	  and	  indecisive	  decisions,	  rather	  than	  centrally-­‐planned	  and	  decisive	  ones.	  Military	  mavericks	  and	  civilian	  leaders	  do	  not	  support	  innovative	  weapon	  systems;	  or	  they	  are	  unwilling	  or	  unable	  to	  do	  so.	  In	  weak	  leadership,	  bureaucratic	  rivalry	  over	  competing	  resources	  and	  programs	  stiHles	  the	  growth	  of	  these	  very	  resources	  and	  programs.	  And	  information	  protection	  is	  not	  institutionalized,	  thus	  other	  militaries	  can	  consider	  the	  potential	  for	  catch-­‐up.Second,	  lengthy	  FMA	  occurs	  when	  the	  RMA	  is	  incongruent	  with	  the	  secondary	  actor’s	  doctrine,	  evidenced	  by	  incompatibility	  and	  unfavorable	  resource	  allocation.	  For	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23	  For	  a	  comparison	  between	  strong	  leadership	  and	  weak	  leadership,	  see	  Figure	  7,	  FMA	  Theory:	  Leadership	  (34).	  For	  a	  comparison	  between	  doctrinal	  congruence	  and	  doctrinal	  incongruence,	  see	  Figure	  8,	  FMA	  Theory:	  Doctrinal	  Congruence	  (34).
incompatibility,	  a	  military	  is	  less	  likely	  to	  pursue	  a	  technology	  if	  it	  does	  not	  serve	  an	  integral	  function	  to	  its	  organizational	  goals.	  The	  secondary	  actor	  continues	  to	  pursue	  other	  weapon	  systems,	  while	  the	  Hirst	  mover	  values	  the	  RMA	  and	  take	  steps	  to	  protect	  it.	  Unfavorable	  resource	  allocation	  for	  the	  secondary	  actor	  indicates	  that	  the	  RMA	  is	  not	  valued	  as	  a	  vital	  necessity	  for	  war	  planning.	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Figure	  4.	  FMA	  Theory:	  Lengthy	  First-­‐Mover	  Advantage
ConditionsLeadership Congruence
Internal	  vs.	  External	  Explanations
Internal	  (First	  Mover) Strong CongruentExternal	  (Secondary	  Actor) Weak Incongruent
Figure	  5.	  FMA	  Theory:	  Brief	  First-­‐Mover	  Advantage
ConditionsLeadership Congruence
Internal	  vs.	  External	  Explanations
Internal	  (First	  Mover) Weak IncongruentExternal	  (Secondary	  Actor) Strong Congruent
Figure	  6.	  FMA	  Theory:	  Brief	  First-­‐Mover	  Advantage:	  Simultaneous	  Innovation
ConditionsLeadership Congruence
Internal	  vs.	  External	  Explanations
Internal	  (First	  Mover) Strong CongruentExternal	  (Secondary	  Actor) Strong Congruent
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Figure	  7.	  FMA	  Theory:	  Leadership
















Figure	  8.	  FMA	  Theory:	  Doctrinal	  Congruence
Congruent Compatible	  (Offensive	  versus	  Defensive	  Doctrine) Favorable	  Resource	  Allocation
Incongruent Incompatible	  (Offensive	  versus	  Defensive	  Doctrine) Unfavorable	  Resource	  Allocation
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F.	  Brief	  First-­Mover	  AdvantageBrief	  Hirst-­‐mover	  advantage	  occurs	  when	  a	  Hirst	  mover	  receives	  an	  advantage	  over	  an	  innovative	  weapon	  system,	  yet	  it	  does	  not	  last.	  The	  Hirst	  mover	  introduces	  and	  integrates	  the	  technology,	  but	  a	  secondary	  actor	  soon	  is	  able	  to	  do	  the	  same.	  By	  deHinition,	  brief	  FMA	  stands	  opposite	  to	  lengthy	  FMA.	  The	  converses	  of	  the	  conditions	  that	  explain	  lengthy	  FMA	  are	  those	  that	  explain	  brief	  FMA.	  The	  argument	  for	  brief	  FMA	  follows	  that	  of	  lengthy	  FMA,	  only	  in	  its	  antithetical.24	  Like	  lengthy	  FMA,	  brief	  FMA	  is	  determined	  by	  two	  variables:	  internal	  conditions	  and	  external	  conditions.	  Internal	  conditions	  explain	  one’s	  own	  capacities;	  external	  conditions	  explain	  the	  adversary’s	  conditions.
F1.	  Internal	  Conditions:	  Brief	  First-­Mover	  Advantage
	  Some	  Hirst	  movers	  fail	  to	  keep	  a	  Hirst-­‐mover	  advantage.	  The	  internal	  conditions	  of	  the	  Hirst	  mover	  that	  lead	  to	  brief	  FMA	  include	  capacities	  that	  neither	  prompt	  constant	  innovation	  nor	  protect	  it	  from	  a	  secondary	  actor.	  These	  are	  similar	  conditions	  as	  the	  external	  conditions	  that	  disallow	  a	  secondary	  actor	  to	  catch	  up	  in	  lengthy	  FMA.	  The	  internal	  conditions	  include	  weak	  leadership	  and	  doctrinal	  incongruence.A	  Hirst	  mover’s	  weak	  leadership	  decreases	  the	  length	  of	  FMA.	  If	  a	  Hirst	  mover	  has	  a	  rigid	  organizational	  culture,	  weak	  administrative	  support,	  bureaucratic	  competition	  that	  stiHles	  innovation,	  and	  weak	  information	  safeguards,	  secondary	  actors	  are	  capable	  of	  exploiting	  the	  opportunity,	  resulting	  in	  a	  brief	  FMA.	  The	  innovative	  weapon	  system’s	  incongruence	  with	  the	  Hirst	  mover’s	  doctrine	  will	  lead	  to	  short	  FMA.	  When	  the	  weapon	  system	  is	  incompatible	  with	  one’s	  own	  grand	  strategy,	  a	  military	  does	  not	  have	  the	  incentive	  for	  resource	  allocation	  and	  protection	  of	  the	  system.	  Although	  the	  Hirst	  mover	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24	  See	  Figure	  5,	  FMA	  Theory:	  Brief	  First-­‐Mover	  Advantage	  (33).
holds	  an	  advantage,	  it	  does	  not	  view	  the	  RMA	  as	  vital	  to	  its	  security	  and	  doctrinal	  future	  and	  will	  not	  take	  steps	  to	  protect	  it.	  
F2.	  External	  Conditions:	  Brief	  First-­Mover	  AdvantageA	  secondary	  actor	  can	  quickly	  catch	  up,	  if	  the	  conditions	  are	  correct.	  These	  are	  similar	  conditions	  as	  those	  that	  contribute	  to	  a	  Hirst	  mover’s	  success	  in	  lengthy	  FMA.	  In	  particular,	  the	  secondary	  actor’s	  catch	  up	  is	  accomplished	  through	  strong	  leadership	  and	  doctrinal	  congruency.	  For	  leadership,	  the	  secondary	  actor	  has	  a	  liberal	  organizational	  culture,	  strong	  administrative	  support,	  bureaucratic	  competition	  that	  enhances	  innovation,	  and	  strong	  information	  safeguards.	  For	  congruence,	  the	  weapon	  system	  is	  compatible	  with	  its	  doctrine	  and	  receives	  favorable	  resource	  allocation.
F3.	  External	  Conditions:	  Brief	  First-­Mover	  Advantage	  (Simultaneous	  Innovation)There	  is	  another	  explanation	  for	  brief	  FMA,	  called	  “simultaneous	  innovation.”	  Simultaneous	  innovation	  occurs	  when	  both	  the	  Hirst	  mover	  and	  secondary	  actors	  measure	  well	  on	  the	  leadership	  and	  doctrine	  metrics.	  Consider	  two	  actors	  pursuing	  a	  technology-­‐intensive	  RMA	  at	  the	  same	  time.	  If	  one	  actor	  (the	  Hirst	  mover)	  achieves	  the	  RMA	  Hirst,	  the	  other	  actor	  (the	  secondary	  actor)	  will	  shortly	  follow.	  The	  secondary	  actor’s	  ability	  to	  catch	  up	  is	  not	  attributed	  to	  a	  transgression	  of	  the	  Hirst	  mover.25	  For	  simultaneous	  innovation,	  internal	  conditions	  include	  strong	  leadership	  and	  congruent	  doctrine;	  likewise,	  external	  conditions	  present	  strong	  leadership	  and	  congruent	  doctrine.
G.	  Research	  DesignThe	  research	  design	  chosen	  for	  this	  study	  is	  strictly	  qualitative.	  The	  research	  presented	  in	  this	  study	  is	  predominantly	  a	  synthesis	  of	  secondary	  sources,	  though	  primary	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25	  See	  Figure	  6,	  FMA	  Theory:	  Brief	  First-­‐Mover	  Advantage:	  Simultaneous	  Innovation	  (33).
sources	  are	  considered.	  Much	  theory	  and	  study	  has	  been	  advanced	  in	  this	  Hield.	  Our	  current	  understanding	  of	  military	  affairs	  is	  an	  amalgamation	  of	  great	  military	  leaders	  and	  academics	  producing	  theory	  generation	  after	  generation.	  In	  turn,	  the	  FMA	  Theory	  and	  the	  subsequent	  three	  case	  studies	  stand	  on	  the	  shoulders	  of	  military	  and	  academic	  giants.Given	  the	  large	  universe	  of	  RMA	  cases,	  the	  three	  selected—the	  aircraft	  carrier,	  the	  submarine,	  and	  the	  intercontinental	  ballistic	  missile—test	  both	  lengthy	  and	  brief	  FMA.	  They	  were	  chosen	  for	  generalizability.	  The	  RMAs	  are	  contemporary	  historical	  examples	  that	  encompass	  the	  pre-­‐nuclear,	  major-­‐war	  period	  and	  the	  post-­‐nuclear	  Cold	  War	  era.	  The	  selected	  case	  studies	  are	  all	  used	  in	  the	  present	  day.26	  ConHirming	  the	  hypotheses	  tested	  in	  this	  paper	  would	  demonstrate	  important	  implications	  of	  the	  FMA	  Theory	  for	  today’s	  actors.	  Predicting	  the	  next	  RMA	  is	  the	  topic	  of	  many	  other	  papers,	  but	  the	  FMA	  Theory	  explains	  the	  length	  at	  which	  the	  Hirst	  mover	  maintains	  a	  strategic	  advantage	  over	  the	  RMA.	  The	  secrets	  behind	  how	  war	  is	  won	  is	  indeed	  a	  subject	  of	  critical	  importance.
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26	  The	  FMA	  Theory	  ought	  to	  hold	  for	  RMAs	  introduced	  before	  the	  20th	  century,	  though	  the	  selected	  case	  studies	  do	  not	  afford	  such	  an	  extrapolation.	  
III.	  CASE	  STUDY:	  THE	  AIRCRAFT	  CARRIERAny	  discussion	  on	  the	  projection	  of	  naval	  power	  ought	  to	  begin	  with	  the	  aircraft	  carrier.	  The	  aircraft	  carrier	  has	  become	  a	  symbol	  of	  military	  superiority.	  Today	  the	  United	  States	  is	  the	  overwhelming	  major	  naval	  power	  because	  of	  its	  aircraft	  carrier	  capabilities.	  The	  United	  States	  Navy	  operates	  11	  carrier	  Hleets	  while	  no	  other	  country	  operates	  more	  than	  one	  carrier	  Hleet.	  Only	  14	  actors	  have	  ever	  possessed	  aircraft	  carriers;	  no	  actor	  other	  than	  Great	  Britain	  operates	  more	  than	  one	  carrier	  of	  any	  type	  (Verma	  2011,	  6).	  What	  is	  carrier	  warfare?	  As	  deHined	  by	  Horowitz,	  it	  is	  “the	  combined	  use	  of	  Hleet	  aircraft	  carriers	  and	  an	  array	  of	  logistical	  ships	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  conducting	  strikes	  against	  enemy	  naval	  assets	  and	  establishing	  sea	  control”	  (2010,	  67).	  At	  its	  basics,	  an	  aircraft	  carrier	  is	  a	  sea-­‐going	  warship	  designed	  for	  both	  deploying	  and	  retrieving	  aircraft.	  The	  stakes	  are	  high	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  carrier	  warfare.	  Within	  a	  single	  generation,	  the	  aircraft	  carrier	  “replaced	  the	  battleship	  as	  a	  beating	  heart	  of	  successful	  naval	  organizations.”	  The	  carrier	  became	  a	  “mobile	  airHield,	  abandoning	  reliance	  on	  gunHire,”	  which	  had	  been	  a	  staple	  of	  navies	  for	  a	  few	  centuries	  (67-­‐68).	  The	  beauty	  of	  the	  carrier	  is	  that	  it	  “represents	  a	  diverse	  set	  of	  capabilities	  that	  transcend	  the	  narrow	  conHines	  of	  just	  ‘sea	  power’”	  (Verma	  2011,	  3).	  The	  aircraft	  carrier	  combines	  air	  and	  sea	  platforms	  into	  a	  revolutionary	  weapon	  system,	  the	  ideal	  platform	  for	  the	  pursuit	  of	  naval	  aviation.	  A	  self-­‐contained	  system,	  the	  aircraft	  carrier	  allows	  navies	  to	  conduct	  “operations	  with	  far-­‐reaching	  effects	  at	  the	  strategic,	  operational,	  and	  tactical	  levels”	  (4).	  They	  greatly	  maximize	  distance	  covered—projecting	  naval	  power	  from	  the	  sea	  over	  hundreds	  of	  miles.	  This	  RMA	  is	  part	  of	  a	  larger	  trend	  in	  military	  innovation:	  the	  increase	  of	  distance	  in	  battle.	  Hand-­‐to-­‐hand	  combat	  at	  short	  range	  developed	  to	  line-­‐of-­‐sight	  combat	  at	  a	  greater	  range.	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Then,	  the	  aircraft	  carrier	  expanded	  the	  distance	  of	  reach	  even	  farther	  (Fontenoy	  2006,	  vii;	  Verma	  2011,	  4).The	  history	  of	  the	  aircraft	  carrier	  begins	  in	  the	  First	  World	  War	  and	  continues	  today.	  It	  is	  the	  story	  of	  how	  three	  prominent	  navies—the	  United	  States	  Navy,	  the	  British	  Royal	  Navy,	  and	  the	  Imperial	  Japanese	  Navy—fought	  to	  keep	  their	  relative	  advantages.27	  In	  World	  War	  I,	  the	  British	  Royal	  Navy	  was	  the	  Hirst	  to	  introduce	  the	  aircraft	  carrier	  with	  the	  HMS	  Furious.	  In	  the	  interwar	  period,	  the	  Japanese	  Imperial	  Navy	  was	  the	  Hirst	  to	  adopt	  the	  aircraft	  carrier.	  Carrier	  warfare	  largely	  dictated	  the	  outcome	  of	  many	  sea	  battles	  during	  the	  Second	  World	  War.	  Following	  World	  War	  II,	  the	  United	  States	  Navy	  fully	  integrated	  the	  aircraft	  carrier	  and	  reorganized	  its	  organization	  around	  carriers,	  presenting	  a	  dominance	  that	  continues	  today.	  Since	  the	  Second	  World	  War,	  the	  aircraft	  carrier	  has	  been	  used	  in	  various	  types	  of	  missions	  other	  than	  traditional	  combat,	  including	  humanitarian	  assistance	  and	  disaster	  relief	  operations,	  peacekeeping,	  support	  of	  low-­‐intensity	  operations,	  and	  for	  power	  projection	  (Verma	  2011,	  4).	  The	  history	  of	  the	  aircraft	  carrier	  raises	  a	  two	  critical	  questions.	  First,	  why	  were	  the	  British	  or	  Japanese	  not	  able	  to	  keep	  their	  FMA?	  Second,	  why	  has	  no	  other	  actor	  been	  able	  to	  challenge	  the	  United	  States	  Navy	  in	  carrier	  warfare	  in	  the	  post-­‐war	  era?	  In	  the	  following	  chapter,	  I	  will	  outline	  the	  development,	  adoption,	  and	  integration	  of	  the	  aircraft	  carrier,	  explain	  the	  two	  FMAs,	  and	  test	  carrier	  warfare	  with	  the	  FMA	  Theory.	  I	  Hind	  that	  the	  FMA	  Theory	  indicates	  strong	  leadership	  and	  congruent	  doctrine	  by	  United	  States	  Navy	  and	  weak	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27	  Other	  navies	  have	  adopted	  the	  aircraft	  carrier	  but	  are	  not	  of	  relevance	  to	  the	  study	  on	  FMA.	  Other	  less	  prominent,	  perhaps	  “tertiary,”	  countries	  that	  experimented	  with	  the	  aircraft	  carrier	  include	  Germany,	  Italy,	  France,	  and	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  Only	  the	  United	  States,	  Japan,	  Great	  Britain,	  and	  possibly	  France	  have	  ever	  had	  the	  operational	  capacity	  to	  establish	  a	  carrier-­‐centric	  %leet	  (Horowitz	  2010,	  77).
leadership	  and	  incongruent	  doctrine	  by	  the	  British	  Royal	  Navy	  and	  the	  Imperial	  Japanese	  Navy.	  Depending	  on	  how	  Hirst-­‐mover	  status	  is	  determined,	  which	  in	  this	  case	  is	  contentious,	  the	  FMA	  Theory	  explains	  both	  lengthy	  and	  brief	  FMA.	  
A.	  Development	  And	  AdoptionThe	  First	  World	  War	  set	  the	  aircraft	  carrier	  in	  motion.	  Prior	  to	  the	  war,	  the	  British	  Royal	  Navy	  was	  a	  hegemonic	  force,	  but	  the	  actuality	  of	  naval	  aviation	  was	  limited	  to	  a	  great	  theoretical	  promise	  (Horowitz	  2010,	  66).	  In	  the	  second	  half	  of	  the	  19th	  century,	  warship	  design	  was	  enhanced	  by	  steam	  power	  and	  advances	  in	  artillery	  (Fontenoy	  2006,	  1).	  Then,	  as	  all	  the	  great	  powers	  met	  in	  conHlict,	  the	  idea	  of	  naval	  aviation	  became	  tangible.	  	  The	  British	  Royal	  Navy	  and	  the	  Japanese	  Imperial	  Navy	  Hirst	  introduced	  the	  aircraft	  carrier	  in	  World	  War	  I.	  The	  British	  began	  with	  the	  HMS	  Furious,	  debuting	  the	  world’s	  Hirst	  aircraft	  carrier.	  The	  United	  States	  used	  the	  Furious	  as	  a	  basis	  for	  their	  Hirst	  carriers	  due	  to	  the	  inHluential	  writings	  of	  British	  naval	  constructor	  S.	  V.	  Goodall	  on	  their	  carrier	  experience	  (Friedman	  1983,	  33).	  The	  United	  States	  brieHly	  deployed	  two	  aircraft	  on	  the	  battleship	  
Mississippi	  in	  April	  1914.	  However,	  the	  United	  States	  Navy	  did	  not	  undertake	  serious	  efforts	  until	  after	  the	  war	  (Fontenoy	  2006,	  11-­‐12).	  Simultaneously,	  the	  Japanese	  launched	  the	  earliest	  carrier-­‐based	  aircraft	  in	  September	  1914.	  The	  Imperial	  Japanese	  Navy	  used	  the	  seaplane	  carrier	  Wakamiya	  Maru	  for	  a	  reconnaissance	  mission	  over	  the	  German	  fortress	  city	  of	  Tsingtao	  (14).By	  the	  conclusion	  of	  the	  First	  World	  War,	  naval	  aviation	  had	  “secured	  for	  itself	  an	  important	  place	  in	  operations.”	  While	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  carriers	  remained	  shore-­‐based,	  the	  Furious	  demonstration	  point	  “conHirmed	  the	  potential	  of	  carrier-­‐based	  aviation,”	  despite	  its	  technological	  and	  organizational	  infancy	  (Fontenoy	  2006,	  21).	  Before	  the	  war,	  carriers	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were	  expected	  only	  to	  be	  useful	  in	  reconnaissance	  roles;	  during	  the	  war,	  however,	  they	  proved	  to	  be	  effective	  in	  offensive	  missions	  and	  Hleet	  defense	  (13).	  While	  World	  War	  I	  provided	  the	  introduction,	  the	  interwar	  period	  served	  as	  the	  incubation	  period	  for	  aircraft	  carrier	  experimentation.	  Following	  the	  end	  of	  World	  War	  I	  and	  the	  decline	  of	  the	  German	  and	  Austro-­‐Hungarian	  navies,	  three	  prominent	  naval	  powers	  remained:	  Great	  Britain,	  the	  United	  States,	  and	  the	  Empire	  of	  Japan.	  And	  in	  the	  1920s	  and	  1930s,	  these	  three	  navies	  experimented	  with	  carrier	  warfare	  (23).	  United	  States	  Navy	  Admiral	  William	  Sims	  designed	  tabletop	  exercises	  featuring	  carriers	  at	  the	  Naval	  War	  College	  in	  the	  early	  1920s.	  The	  commitment	  to	  carrier	  experimentation	  in	  this	  era	  later	  “made	  it	  easier	  for	  the	  United	  States	  Navy	  to	  make	  the	  Hinal	  jump	  to	  adopt	  carrier	  warfare”	  in	  World	  War	  II	  (Hone,	  Friedman,	  and	  Mandeles,	  1999).	  The	  British	  Royal	  Navy	  ordered	  the	  
Hermes,	  the	  Hirst	  vessel	  designed	  speciHically	  for	  carrier	  operations	  in	  July	  1917.	  Then	  in	  1924,	  the	  British	  converted	  the	  battleship	  Almirante	  Cochrane,	  an	  incomplete	  battleship	  bought	  from	  the	  Chileans,	  into	  the	  carrier	  HMS	  Eagle	  (Fontenoy	  2006,	  24).
B.	  Integration	  And	  First-­Mover	  AdvantageFor	  the	  aircraft	  carrier,	  the	  FMA	  was	  established	  in	  the	  Second	  World	  War.	  Following	  the	  war,	  the	  fall	  of	  the	  Imperial	  Japanese	  Navy	  and	  the	  end	  of	  the	  hegemonic	  British	  Navy	  led	  the	  United	  States	  Navy	  to	  launch	  ahead	  as	  the	  leader	  in	  aircraft	  carrier	  warfare.	  However,	  while	  the	  Hinal	  outcome	  of	  the	  war	  impacted	  the	  trajectory	  of	  the	  carrier,	  actions	  taken	  during	  World	  War	  II	  prompted	  the	  lengthy	  American	  advantage	  and	  brief	  Japanese	  and	  British	  advantages.Carrier	  warfare	  in	  World	  War	  II	  can	  be	  explained	  through	  three	  demonstration	  points.	  First,	  the	  British	  attack	  on	  the	  Taranto	  Italian	  harbor	  on	  November	  12,	  1940	  “hinted	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at	  the	  potential	  of	  the	  carrier	  as	  an	  offensive	  strike	  element”	  (Goldman	  2003,	  267).	  Still,	  the	  British	  degraded	  the	  carrier	  to	  a	  defensive	  role	  in	  the	  war.	  As	  a	  result,	  World	  War	  II	  became	  a	  period	  of	  British	  carrier	  stagnation,	  characterized	  by	  an	  unwillingness	  to	  completely	  adoption.	  Late	  in	  the	  war,	  the	  British	  PaciHic	  Fleet	  began	  adopting	  American	  management	  operations	  for	  carrier	  task	  forces	  in	  the	  joint	  Okinawa	  campaign	  of	  1945	  (2003,	  277;	  Friedman	  1989).Second,	  the	  use	  of	  carriers	  in	  the	  Japanese	  attack	  on	  Pearl	  Harbor	  on	  December	  7,	  1941	  illustrated	  an	  internal	  value	  placed	  on	  carrier-­‐based	  strikes.	  While	  the	  British	  lost	  their	  edge,	  the	  Japanese	  and	  Americans	  saw	  the	  value	  of	  carrier	  warfare	  as	  an	  offensive	  weapon	  and	  took	  Hirst-­‐mover	  steps	  to	  integrate	  (Goldman	  2003,	  267-­‐277).	  By	  the	  mid	  1930s,	  the	  Imperial	  Navy	  had	  overtaken	  the	  Royal	  Navy	  in	  naval	  aviation.	  This	  was	  evidenced	  by	  the	  attack	  on	  Pearl	  Harbor	  as	  well	  as	  the	  sinking	  of	  the	  British	  HMS	  Prince	  of	  
Wales	  by	  Japanese	  naval	  air	  three	  days	  later.	  Also,	  in	  July	  1942	  the	  Japanese	  naval	  Hleet	  ofHicially	  reorganized	  around	  carrier	  task	  forces	  (Horowitz	  2010,	  69-­‐70).	  Third,	  for	  both	  the	  Japanese	  and	  Americans,	  the	  Battle	  of	  Midway	  on	  June	  4	  to	  7,	  1942	  served	  as	  a	  demonstration	  point	  for	  carrier	  warfare	  (Stulberg	  2005,	  510).	  Midway	  indicated	  the	  necessity	  of	  carriers	  in	  Japanese	  and	  American	  war	  planning,	  such	  as	  “decisions	  concerning	  the	  Hleet	  compositions	  by	  both	  [United	  States	  Navy	  Fleet	  Admiral]	  Chester	  Nimitz	  and	  [Japanese	  Marshall	  Admiral]	  Isoroku	  Yamamoto,”	  as	  well	  as	  realtime	  response	  (Fuquea	  1997,	  710).	  The	  battle	  “signiHied	  a	  conceptual	  shift,	  as	  the	  aircraft	  carrier	  came	  to	  be	  seen	  as	  the	  primary	  capital	  ship	  in	  Britain,	  the	  United	  States,	  and	  Japan”	  (Goldman	  2003,	  267).	  The	  Americans	  brought	  its	  carriers,	  not	  its	  battleships,	  to	  Midway.	  According	  to	  Admiral	  Nimitz’s	  report,	  long-­‐range	  air	  strikes	  became	  a	  decisive	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element	  in	  the	  naval	  battle	  (Horowitz	  2010,	  69;	  Nimitz	  1942).	  Following	  Midway,	  naval	  aviation	  secured	  its	  place	  as	  “the	  principal	  offensive	  element”	  of	  the	  two	  navies.	  And	  both	  navies	  “changed	  their	  force	  structures	  to	  task	  forces	  centered	  on	  [aircraft	  carrier]	  employment	  in	  combination	  with	  screening	  and	  logistical	  ships	  (Horowitz	  2010,	  69-­‐70).	  Goldman	  writes,	  “Collectively,	  Taranto,	  Pearl	  Harbor,	  and	  Midway	  compelled	  naval	  leaders	  to	  revise	  how	  they	  viewed	  the	  relationship	  between	  battleship,	  battle	  line,	  and	  aircraft	  carrier.”	  In	  turn,	  the	  carrier	  was	  viewed	  in	  a	  vital	  independent	  role	  (Goldman	  2003,	  273).The	  post-­‐war	  period	  solidiHied	  American	  supremacy	  over	  the	  aircraft	  carrier.	  The	  American	  carrier	  program	  is	  so	  central	  to	  its	  navy	  that	  “whenever	  the	  United	  States	  gets	  involved	  in	  a	  foreign	  crisis,	  one	  of	  the	  Hirst	  questions	  the	  White	  House	  asks	  the	  Pentagon	  is	  ‘Where	  are	  the	  carriers?’”	  (Gardiner	  1993,	  14).28	  Through	  different	  conHlicts—the	  Korean	  War,	  Vietnam	  War,	  Gulf	  War,	  Iraq	  War,	  and	  Afghanistan	  War,	  not	  to	  mention	  the	  Cold	  War	  with	  the	  Soviet	  Union—the	  United	  States	  has	  relied	  on	  carrier	  warfare	  as	  both	  an	  offensive	  strike	  weapon	  and	  a	  defensive	  stronghold	  (Goldman	  2003,	  267).	  Since	  1945,	  carrier	  modernization	  has	  been	  a	  priority	  of	  the	  United	  States	  Navy.	  Innovation	  within	  the	  RMA	  has	  Hlourished,	  both	  technically	  and	  operationally.	  Carrier	  warfare	  has	  changed	  from	  propeller-­‐driven	  aircraft	  to	  jet	  aircraft,	  from	  hydraulic	  catapult	  to	  the	  steam	  catapult,	  and	  from	  Hlat	  decks	  to	  angled	  decks.	  Carriers	  can	  now	  be	  nuclear-­‐powered	  and	  permit	  vertical	  and	  short	  take-­‐off	  landing	  (V/STOL)	  aircraft	  (Gardiner	  1993,	  23).	  While	  the	  United	  States	  has	  invested	  heavily	  in	  carrier	  warfare	  since	  World	  War	  II,	  no	  secondary	  actors	  have	  yet	  been	  able	  to	  adopt	  the	  RMA.	  Since	  1945,	  the	  aircraft	  carrier	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28	  For	  security	  purposes,	  the	  answer	  to	  the	  aforementioned	  question	  is	  that	  the	  carrier	  %leets	  are	  strategically	  placed	  so	  as	  to	  always	  have	  one	  in	  close	  proximity	  to	  a	  con%lict.	  
has	  failed	  to	  diffuse.	  The	  post-­‐war	  period	  is	  only	  relevant	  to	  the	  FMA	  Theory	  in	  that	  American	  dominance	  persisted	  while	  other	  actors	  have	  mainly	  been	  unable	  to	  integrate	  (Horowitz	  2010,	  67).	  After	  World	  War	  II,	  Great	  Britain	  is	  the	  only	  other	  country	  to	  integrate	  the	  carrier,	  and	  that	  was	  only	  due	  to	  their	  lasting	  alliance	  with	  the	  United	  States.	  Instead	  of	  adopting	  the	  RMA,	  other	  actors	  have	  pursued	  alternative	  response	  strategies	  (67).	  The	  most	  likely	  secondary	  actor	  in	  the	  post-­‐war	  era	  would	  have	  been	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  Despite	  a	  commitment	  to	  military	  buildup	  in	  the	  Cold	  War,	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  “disdained	  the	  acquisition	  of	  carriers.”	  In	  turn,	  the	  Soviet	  Union’s	  naval	  doctrine	  became	  “dictated	  by	  the	  Western	  carrier	  task	  forces,	  and	  the	  need	  to	  guard	  against	  them”	  (Gardiner	  1993,	  14).	  The	  Soviets	  were	  “late	  adopters”	  by	  forming	  a	  relatively	  unsuccessful	  program	  toward	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Cold	  War.	  Instead,	  the	  Soviets	  invested	  in	  alternative	  platforms—namely,	  the	  submarine	  and	  missile	  technologies—in	  order	  to	  offset	  the	  carrier	  (Fontenoy	  2006,	  133-­‐136).29Recently,	  the	  People’s	  Liberation	  Army	  Navy	  of	  China	  shows	  signs	  of	  becoming	  an	  adopter	  of	  carrier	  warfare.	  As	  a	  growing	  regional	  and	  global	  military	  actor,	  the	  People’s	  Republic	  of	  China	  has	  demonstrated	  their	  interest	  in	  carrier	  development	  by	  buying	  the	  
Varyag,	  a	  failed	  Soviet	  carrier,	  and	  commissioning	  it	  into	  Liaoning	  (Chang	  2012).
C.	  AnalysisIt	  is	  possible	  to	  argue	  that	  there	  were	  two	  FMAs—not	  only	  the	  obvious	  lengthy	  American	  FMA	  from	  World	  War	  II	  and	  continuing	  to	  this	  day,	  but	  also	  the	  brief	  British	  and	  Japanese	  FMAs	  from	  World	  War	  I	  to	  the	  interwar	  period.	  Which	  FMA	  matters	  depends	  only	  on	  how	  one	  interprets	  who	  the	  Hirst	  mover	  is.	  If	  Hirst-­‐mover	  status	  begins	  at	  weapon	  system	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29	  For	  more	  on	  the	  Soviet	  pursuit	  of	  offsetting	  weapon	  systems,	  see	  the	  following	  chapters	  on	  the	  submarine	  and	  intercontinental	  ballistic	  missile.
introduction,	  the	  British	  Royal	  Navy	  held	  a	  brief	  FMA;	  if	  it	  begins	  at	  weapon	  system	  adoption,	  the	  Japanese	  Imperial	  Navy	  held	  a	  brief	  FMA;	  and	  if	  it	  begins	  at	  weapon	  system	  integration,	  the	  United	  States	  Navy	  held	  a	  lengthy	  FMA.	  For	  an	  overview	  of	  how	  the	  FMA	  Theory	  holds	  either	  way,	  see	  Figure	  9.	  For	  the	  British	  and	  Japanese	  carrier	  programs,	  brief	  FMA	  occurred	  because	  of	  internal	  weak	  leadership	  and	  doctrinal	  incongruence	  as	  well	  as	  the	  external	  American	  strong	  leadership	  and	  doctrinal	  congruence.	  For	  the	  American	  carrier	  program,	  lengthy	  FMA	  is	  attributed	  to	  internal	  strong	  leadership	  and	  doctrinal	  congruence	  as	  well	  as	  weak	  leadership	  and	  doctrinal	  incongruence	  by	  any	  adversaries.
Figure	  9.	  Aircraft	  Carrier	  Results
Leadership CongruenceUnited	  States	  Navy Strong CongruentJapanese	  Imperial	  Navy Weak IncongruentBritish	  Royal	  Navy Weak Incongruent
It	  must	  Hirst	  be	  argued	  that	  the	  aircraft	  carrier	  passes	  the	  requisite	  assumptions;	  that	  is,	  that	  the	  RMA,	  according	  to	  Horowitz’s	  Adoption-­‐Capacity	  Theory,	  has	  sufHiciently	  high	  barriers	  to	  entry.	  Organizationally,	  the	  carrier	  warfare	  RMA	  necessitates	  vital	  changes	  in	  doctrine.	  Organizational	  requirements	  include	  extensive	  training	  of	  a	  tremendous	  quantity	  of	  personnel	  in	  order	  to	  integrate	  both	  traditional	  naval	  functions	  with	  air	  power	  functions.	  The	  multiplicity	  of	  independent	  tasks	  serves	  as	  a	  severe	  challenge	  for	  any	  military	  actor	  to	  adopt	  (Horowitz	  2010,	  72).	  High	  organizational	  barriers	  are	  demonstrated	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  only	  three	  navies—the	  United	  States	  Navy,	  British	  Royal	  Navy,	  and	  WWII-­‐
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era	  Imperial	  Japanese	  Navy—have	  ever	  been	  capable	  of	  the	  “core	  organizational	  practices	  associated	  with	  carrier	  strike	  operations”	  (65).	  Unlike	  other	  highly	  technical	  RMAs,	  such	  as	  the	  atomic	  bomb,	  the	  carrier	  technology	  by	  itself,	  without	  the	  organizational	  expertise,	  is	  useless	  for	  international	  security	  (71).	  Technologically,	  the	  aircraft	  carrier	  is	  extremely	  costly.	  The	  carrier	  warfare	  RMA	  requires	  the	  carrier	  itself,	  a	  weapon	  platform	  of	  extreme	  Hinancial	  cost.	  Consider	  the	  expense	  of	  the	  USS	  George	  H.W.	  Bush,	  the	  Hinal	  United	  States	  Nimitz-­‐class	  aircraft	  carrier:	  6.35	  billion	  dollars	  in	  total	  procurement	  cost	  (O’Rourke	  2005).30	  Horowitz	  explains	  the	  technological	  barrier	  to	  entry:“Investing	  a	  little	  bit	  every	  year	  would	  not	  culminate	  in	  a	  modern	  and	  competitive	  carrier	  warfare	  force.	  Today,	  decades	  after	  the	  introduction	  of	  the	  innovation,	  even	  if	  a	  state	  purchases	  a	  prebuilt	  carrier	  and	  avoids	  developmental	  costs,	  the	  maintenance	  costs	  of	  running	  an	  aircraft	  carrier	  are	  still	  on	  the	  order	  of	  hundreds	  of	  millions	  of	  dollars	  a	  year”	  (2010,	  71).In	  addition,	  because	  of	  the	  dual	  sea-­‐air	  functionality,	  carrier	  warfare	  requires	  “the	  integration	  of	  technological	  advancements	  also	  utilized	  in	  other	  military	  areas”	  (2010,	  68).	  	   The	  introduction	  of	  the	  aircraft	  carrier	  RMA	  was	  the	  result	  of	  two	  enabling	  technologies,	  radio	  communications	  and	  aviation.	  From	  1900	  to	  1915,	  aviation	  and	  radio	  became	  feasible	  technologies	  with	  military	  applications	  (Hundley	  1999,	  61).31	   It	  must	  next	  be	  demonstrated	  how	  the	  Japanese,	  British,	  and	  American	  navies	  Hit	  into	  the	  FMA	  Theory	  model—via	  leadership	  and	  congruence.	  The	  model	  will	  explain	  why	  the	  British	  swiftly	  squandered	  their	  innovation	  edge	  during	  the	  interwar	  period	  and	  why	  the	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30	  The	  USS	  George	  H.W.	  Bush	  was	  more	  costly	  than	  the	  average	  Nimitz-­‐class	  carrier,	  but	  the	  central	  point	  of	  high	  “%inancial	  intensity”	  remains.31	  See	  Figure	  2,	  An	  RMA	  Requires	  an	  Enabling	  Technology	  (14).
Americans	  became	  the	  dominant	  actor	  over	  the	  Japanese	  in	  World	  War	  II	  and	  over	  other	  adversaries	  in	  the	  post-­‐war	  era.	  
C1.	  The	  Aircraft	  Carrier:	  Doctrinal	  CongruenceHow	  did	  the	  aircraft	  carrier	  Hit	  into	  the	  navies’	  doctrines?	  First,	  doctrine	  consists	  of	  	  the	  internal	  compatibility	  of	  the	  weapon	  system	  with	  its	  overall	  offensive	  or	  defensive	  bias.	  While	  the	  overall	  assumed	  doctrine	  in	  the	  interwar	  period	  was	  that	  carriers	  would	  be	  “supporting	  elements,	  providing	  reconnaissance,	  scouting,	  and	  protecting	  battleships	  from	  enemy	  planes,”	  this	  was	  not	  sustained	  in	  World	  War	  II	  (Horowitz	  2010,	  73).	  For	  the	  United	  States	  Navy,	  carrier	  warfare	  was	  considered	  an	  offensive	  platform,	  which	  was	  compatible	  with	  its	  offensive	  bias.	  With	  a	  big	  ship-­‐big	  gun	  orthodoxy,	  the	  American	  carrier	  was	  adopted	  in	  “moderate/high	  capacity,”	  as	  deHined	  by	  Goldman	  (2003,	  299-­‐302).	  The	  Navy	  needed	  “offensive	  power	  projection	  across	  vast	  ocean	  expanses,	  a	  mission	  for	  which	  the	  carrier	  was	  ideally	  suited.”	  The	  British	  Royal	  Navy	  viewed	  carrier	  warfare	  as	  a	  defensive	  platform,	  conHlicting	  with	  its	  gunnery	  naval	  bias.	  They	  intended	  to	  use	  carriers	  in	  conjunction	  with	  battleships	  for	  protection,	  not	  “autonomous	  offensive	  or	  defensive	  missions”	  (Rosen	  1991,	  97-­‐98;	  Till	  1977,	  112).	  Offensive	  carrier	  warfare	  had	  the	  potential	  to	  Hlourish	  in	  the	  Mediterranean,	  but	  the	  offensive	  strike	  doctrine	  did	  not	  come	  from	  the	  British	  until	  late	  in	  the	  war	  against	  the	  Germans	  in	  Norwegian	  waters	  (Goldman	  2003,	  270).	  The	  British	  carrier	  was	  adopted	  in	  “very	  low	  adoption	  capacity”	  (299-­‐302).The	  Imperial	  Japanese	  Navy	  considered	  naval	  aviation	  a	  defensive	  means	  of	  supporting	  other	  operations,	  which	  directly	  contradicted	  its	  offensive	  war	  bias.	  Kings	  College	  London	  Professor	  George	  Till	  cites	  one	  of	  the	  Hirst	  Japanese	  aviators,	  “The	  strategic	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concept	  of	  the	  Japanese	  Navy	  was	  undoubtedly	  based	  upon	  the	  doctrine	  of	  annihilating	  the	  enemy	  in	  decisive	  battle,	  with	  battleships	  the	  backbone	  of	  the	  Japanese	  Fleet”	  (Till	  1996,	  220).	  While	  Japanese	  carriers	  shifted	  to	  an	  offensive	  carrier	  role	  in	  1932,	  the	  Naval	  General	  Staff	  always	  valued	  traditional	  battleship	  engagement	  more	  than	  carrier	  warfare	  (Horowitz	  2010,	  73).	  The	  Japanese	  carrier	  program	  was	  adopted	  in	  “moderate/low	  capacity,”	  as	  deHined	  by	  Goldman	  (2003,	  299-­‐302).Also	  relevant	  to	  doctrinal	  congruence	  is	  the	  actor’s	  expectations	  regarding	  its	  adversary.	  On	  one	  hand,	  a	  potential	  threat	  can	  spur	  innovation.	  In	  the	  interwar	  period,	  both	  the	  United	  States	  and	  Japan	  regarded	  each	  other	  as	  threats,	  prompting	  war	  planning	  in	  favor	  of	  naval	  aviation.	  Unlike	  the	  European	  theater,	  signiHicant	  geographic	  distance	  between	  these	  two	  powers	  meant	  that	  far-­‐reaching	  power	  projection	  was	  vital.	  Because	  of	  the	  limited	  range	  of	  land-­‐based	  aircraft,	  naval	  aviation	  became	  a	  critical	  goal	  for	  both	  sides	  (Horowitz	  2010,	  74).	  Braisted	  writes	  on	  the	  American	  pre-­‐war	  expectations:	  “On	  the	  assumption	  that	  Japan,	  not	  Britain	  was	  the	  most	  likely	  antagonist,	  the	  planners	  in	  Operations	  drew	  up	  a	  building	  program	  that	  gave	  Hirst	  priority	  to	  preparations	  against	  the	  more	  immediately	  dangerous	  Asian	  rival.	  The	  recommendations	  of	  the	  Plans	  Division	  were	  based	  on	  a	  scheme	  for	  a	  three-­‐phase	  PaciHic	  war.	  During	  the	  Hirst,	  the	  Navy	  would	  concentrate	  its	  main	  battle	  forces	  in	  the	  Eastern	  PaciHic.	  This	  would	  prepare	  for	  phase	  two,	  the	  advance	  to	  the	  Western	  PaciHic,	  during	  which	  the	  United	  States	  would	  occupy	  points	  in	  the	  Japanese	  mandates	  and	  recapture	  Guam.	  The	  third	  phase	  would	  be	  aimed	  toward	  bringing	  decisive	  pressure	  on	  Japan	  through	  close	  blockage	  and	  occupation	  of	  her	  territories...Since	  completion	  of	  the	  1916	  program	  would	  guarantee	  the	  United	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States	  decisive	  superiority	  over	  Japan	  in	  capital	  ships	  through	  1924,	  the	  Plans	  Division	  favored	  laying	  down	  during	  the	  coming	  year	  other	  types	  in	  which	  the	  Navy	  was	  seriously	  deHicient:	  four	  airplane	  carrier...and	  six	  submarines”	  (1971,	  472).On	  the	  other	  hand,	  an	  adversary	  hinders	  weapon	  system	  integration	  when	  the	  threat	  does	  not	  align	  with	  its	  doctrine.	  During	  World	  War	  II,	  the	  British	  viewed	  Nazi	  Germany	  and	  Fascist	  Italy	  as	  its	  most	  urgent	  threats,	  and	  neither	  possessed	  aircraft	  carriers.	  Therefore,	  as	  the	  British	  valued	  a	  “Germany-­‐Hirst”	  strategy,	  resources	  were	  allocated	  to	  the	  Royal	  Air	  Force	  and	  its	  land-­‐based	  air	  attacks,	  not	  the	  aircraft	  carrier	  (Goldman	  2003,	  276-­‐277).Similarly,	  in	  the	  post-­‐1945	  period,	  the	  Soviet’s	  inaction	  actually	  furthered	  the	  American	  carrier	  doctrine.	  Japan	  served	  as	  the	  primary	  naval	  threat	  in	  the	  Second	  World	  War,	  so	  the	  subsequent	  weak	  Soviet	  surface	  challenge	  was	  to	  the	  American	  boon.	  American	  naval	  planners	  used	  carriers	  as	  a	  forward	  deterrent	  weapon.	  United	  States	  Navy	  carriers	  mitigated	  the	  threat	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  “overrunning	  forward	  land	  bases.”	  So,	  the	  United	  States	  Navy	  valued	  carriers	  as	  “a	  major	  means	  of	  striking	  back	  at	  Soviet	  forces”	  (Gardiner	  1993,	  18).Availability	  of	  alternatives	  to	  the	  weapon	  system	  can	  impact	  its	  doctrinal	  congruence,	  as	  evidenced	  by	  the	  lengthy	  American	  FMA	  after	  1945.	  “Other	  states	  interested	  in	  pursuing	  naval	  capabilities,	  but	  lacking	  the	  Hinancial	  and	  organizational	  capabilities	  to	  adopt	  or	  the	  willingness	  to	  ally	  with	  an	  adopter,	  have	  chosen	  to	  develop	  alternative	  naval	  capabilities,	  especially	  submarines	  and	  anti-­‐ship	  missiles.”	  Instead	  of	  its	  own	  carrier	  program,	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  invested	  in	  offsetting	  technologies	  like	  submarines	  with	  advanced	  torpedoes	  and	  anti-­‐ship	  missiles	  technologies	  (Horowitz	  2010,	  82).	  Hitherto,	  the	  Chinese	  have	  followed	  likewise,	  integrating	  alternative	  weapon	  systems	  rather	  than	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adopting	  Chinese	  carriers	  (O’Rourke,	  2005).	  Since	  the	  1970s	  reform	  era,	  Chinese	  ofHicials	  have	  expressed	  interest	  in	  the	  aircraft	  carrier	  as	  a	  program	  vital	  to	  naval	  modernization.	  They	  acquired	  retired	  carriers	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  information	  gathering.	  On	  September	  25,	  2012,	  the	  Chinese	  commissioned	  the	  Liaoning,	  the	  People’s	  Liberation	  Army	  Navy	  Hirst	  aircraft	  carrier.	  The	  Liaoning	  is	  remodeled	  from	  the	  Kuznetsov-­‐class	  Varyag	  aircraft	  carrier	  (OfHice	  of	  the	  Secretary	  of	  Defense	  2012,	  7).	  Second,	  for	  the	  evaluation	  of	  doctrine,	  the	  American	  carrier	  program	  had	  favorable	  resource	  allocation	  while	  the	  Japanese	  and	  British	  programs	  did	  not.32	  While	  the	  United	  States	  passed	  the	  1938	  Naval	  Expansion	  Act,	  providing	  budgetary	  support	  for	  the	  aircraft	  carrier.	  Contrastingly,	  British	  and	  Japanese	  faced	  Hiscal	  constraints	  following	  the	  First	  World	  War.	  Lack	  of	  domestic	  support	  for	  defense	  spending	  in	  the	  interwar	  period	  translated	  into	  a	  weaker	  budget.	  More	  so,	  following	  the	  war	  the	  Allied	  occupation	  of	  Japan	  led	  to	  a	  new	  constitution	  forbidding	  a	  military.In	  summation,	  with	  regards	  to	  doctrinal	  congruence,	  the	  FMA	  Theory	  holds	  for	  lengthy	  FMA	  for	  the	  United	  States	  Navy	  as	  the	  Hirst	  mover.	  Internally,	  the	  American	  military	  exhibited	  doctrinal	  congruence	  with	  a	  compatible	  doctrine	  and	  favorable	  resource	  allocation.	  Externally,	  American	  adversaries	  displayed	  doctrinal	  incongruence	  with	  incompatible	  doctrine	  and	  unfavorable	  resource	  allocation.	  Moreover,	  the	  FMA	  Theory	  holds	  for	  brief	  FMA	  for	  the	  British	  Royal	  Navy	  or	  the	  Japanese	  Imperial	  Navy	  as	  the	  Hirst	  
Silverstein	  50
32	  The	  1922	  Washington	  Naval	  Conference	  imposed	  further	  %iscal	  constraints.	  The	  conference	  elicited	  the	  Five-­‐Power	  Naval	  Limitation	  Treaty,	  which	  limited	  the	  overall	  development	  of	  naval	  warships	  among	  prominent	  actors.	  It	  created	  the	  tonnage	  ratio	  for	  battleships,	  battle	  cruisers,	  and	  aircraft	  carriers	  of	  5/5/3/1.67/1.67	  for	  the	  United	  States,	  British,	  Japanese,	  French	  and	  Italian	  navies,	  respectively	  (Horowitz	  2010,	  76;	  Fontenoy	  2006,	  23).
mover.	  Internally,	  the	  British	  and	  Japanese	  both	  exhibited	  doctrinal	  incongruence	  while	  the	  United	  States	  Navy,	  the	  secondary	  actor	  in	  this	  case,	  maintained	  a	  doctrinal	  congruence.
Figure	  10.	  Aircraft	  Carrier	  Doctrinal	  Congruence
American	  Congruent	  Doctrine Compatible	  (Offensive	  versus	  Defensive	  Doctrine) Favorable	  Resource	  AllocationJapanese	  Incongruent	  Doctrine Incompatible	  (Offensive	  versus	  Defensive	  Doctrine) Unfavorable	  Resource	  AllocationBritish	  Incongruent	  Doctrine Incompatible	  (Offensive	  versus	  Defensive	  Doctrine) Unfavorable	  Resource	  Allocation
C2.	  The	  Aircraft	  Carrier:	  LeadershipHow	  did	  the	  aircraft	  carrier	  Hit	  into	  the	  navies’	  leadership?	  First,	  liberal	  and	  rigid	  organizational	  culture	  must	  be	  assigned	  to	  the	  three	  navies.	  The	  British	  held	  the	  most	  rigid	  organizational	  culture.	  Due	  to	  its	  recent	  hegemonic	  status,	  the	  British	  Royal	  Navy	  was	  unwilling	  to	  challenge	  its	  core	  competencies.	  The	  United	  States	  and	  Japanese	  navies	  were	  relatively	  young	  and	  both	  began	  naval	  modernization	  by	  World	  War	  I.	  The	  Imperial	  Navy	  modernized	  after	  the	  Meiji	  Restoration	  in	  1868,	  and	  the	  United	  States	  Navy	  modernized	  a	  bit	  afterwards.	  The	  lasting	  British	  naval	  superiority	  undercut	  its	  carrier	  platform.	  Geoffrey	  Till	  argues	  that	  the	  United	  States	  and	  Japanese	  navies	  became	  Hirst	  movers	  in	  carrier	  warfare	  because	  of	  their	  organizational	  age.	  “In	  contrast	  to	  the	  British	  policy,”	  Till	  writes,	  “the	  Japanese	  and	  American,	  being	  newer	  in	  the	  business	  were	  willing	  to	  make	  bolder	  departures”	  (1996,	  198).	  The	  United	  States	  Navy	  produced	  a	  culture	  productive	  paranoia,	  or	  a	  “healthy	  skepticism,”	  regarding	  a	  naval	  revolution	  that	  included	  aviators	  (Goldman	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2003,	  301).	  Nonetheless,	  the	  Japanese	  initiated	  a	  “more	  receptive	  organizational	  environment	  for	  developing	  offensive	  carrier	  doctrine”	  (285).	  Although	  the	  organizational	  culture	  favors	  the	  Japanese	  over	  the	  Americans,	  it	  is	  only	  a	  slight	  edge,	  for	  military	  mavericks	  publicly	  backed	  the	  carrier	  RMA	  since	  its	  infancy.Second,	  strong	  administrative	  support	  can	  further	  a	  weapon	  system	  adoption	  and	  weak	  administrative	  support	  can	  hinder	  it.	  The	  Royal	  Navy	  had	  the	  weakest	  administrative	  support	  among	  the	  three	  navies.	  British	  attempts	  at	  naval	  reforms	  failed	  to	  secure	  high-­‐level	  political	  or	  military	  support.	  The	  planners	  in	  favor	  of	  carrier	  warfare	  had	  low	  administrative	  authority.	  Unlike	  the	  British,	  the	  Americans	  and	  Japanese	  both	  enacted	  “administrative	  changes	  early	  on	  that	  paved	  the	  way	  for	  an	  air-­‐centered	  vision	  of	  naval	  operations.”	  President	  of	  the	  United	  States	  Franklin	  D.	  Roosevelt	  was	  an	  avid	  supporter	  of	  carrier	  development,	  but	  American	  central	  authority	  was	  slightly	  weaker	  than	  that	  of	  the	  Japanese.	  Compared	  to	  the	  Japanese,	  American	  carrier	  forces	  were	  less	  organized	  in	  the	  PaciHic	  theater.	  By	  August	  1939,	  Admiral	  Yamamoto	  single-­‐handedly	  directed	  naval	  strategy	  with	  highly	  central	  administrative	  authority.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  Japanese	  Naval	  Air	  Service	  progressed	  swiftly	  (285-­‐286).	  Third,	  bureaucratic	  rivalry	  can	  either	  enhance	  or	  stiHle	  innovation.	  This	  is	  particularly	  the	  case	  with	  the	  aircraft	  carrier,	  for	  naval	  aviation	  combines	  distinct	  air	  and	  sea	  functions.	  The	  degree	  to	  which	  a	  military	  was	  able	  to	  unify	  its	  naval	  and	  air	  departments	  decided	  the	  success	  of	  the	  program.	  Under	  divided	  control	  of	  the	  Fleet	  Air	  Arm,	  the	  aircraft	  carrier	  was	  undermined	  by	  the	  British	  Royal	  Air	  Force	  and	  the	  British	  Royal	  Navy.	  Inter-­‐branch	  competition	  turned	  to	  rivalry	  for	  the	  Japanese	  too.	  A	  separate	  Naval	  Air	  Service	  was	  formed	  in	  1912,	  an	  early	  and	  auspicious	  indicator	  for	  integration	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(299-­‐301).	  However,	  the	  Imperial	  Army	  dictated	  policy-­‐making	  in	  the	  Japanese	  defense	  bureaucracy,	  and	  the	  inferior	  status	  of	  the	  Navy	  caused	  budget	  setbacks	  for	  the	  aircraft	  carrier	  (285).	  For	  the	  United	  States	  carrier	  program,	  the	  Navy	  retained	  autonomous	  control	  over	  aviation,	  causing	  the	  innovation	  process	  to	  go	  uninterrupted	  (301).	   Fourth,	  there	  is	  no	  conclusive	  evidence	  on	  the	  impact	  of	  information	  safeguards	  being	  a	  factor	  on	  the	  diffusion	  of	  the	  carrier.	  This	  is	  because	  of	  the	  alliance	  between	  the	  United	  States	  and	  Great	  Britain	  and	  their	  joint	  carrier	  operations	  by	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Second	  World	  War.	   Figure	  11.	  Aircraft	  Carrier	  Leadership
























	   In	  summation,	  with	  regards	  to	  leadership,	  the	  FMA	  Theory	  holds	  for	  lengthy	  FMA	  for	  the	  United	  States	  Navy	  as	  the	  Hirst	  mover.	  Internally,	  strong	  leadership	  with	  a	  liberal	  organizational	  culture,	  strong	  administrative	  support,	  bureaucratic	  competition	  that	  enhances	  innovation,	  and	  strong	  information	  safeguards	  explains	  the	  lengthy	  FMA.	  Externally,	  the	  adversaries’	  weaker	  leadership	  with	  bureaucratic	  competition	  that	  stiHles	  innovation	  explains	  lengthy	  American	  FMA.	  Not	  all	  factors	  in	  the	  FMA	  Theory	  model	  are	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always	  weighted	  equally.	  For	  the	  aircraft	  carrier,	  the	  Japanese	  bureaucratic	  rivalries	  were	  more	  instrumental	  in	  weakening	  leadership	  than	  their	  relative	  advantage	  in	  organizational	  culture	  and	  administrative	  support.	  	   Moreover,	  the	  FMA	  Theory	  holds	  for	  brief	  FMA	  for	  the	  British	  Royal	  Navy	  and	  as	  the	  Hirst	  mover.	  Internally,	  the	  British	  exhibited	  weak	  leadership	  while	  the	  United	  States	  Navy	  and	  Imperial	  Japanese	  Navy,	  as	  the	  secondary	  actors,	  simultaneously	  maintained	  strong	  leadership.Ergo,	  the	  FMA	  Theory	  explains	  the	  length	  of	  FMA	  for	  the	  aircraft	  carrier	  revolution.
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IV.	  CASE	  STUDY:	  THE	  SUBMARINE	   When	  the	  submarine	  was	  Hirst	  introduced,	  military	  leaders	  denounced	  it	  as	  an	  unfair	  weapon.	  The	  story	  of	  submarine	  warfare	  is	  one	  of	  stealth	  and	  surprise,	  one	  of	  men	  with	  marrow-­‐deep	  courage	  and	  extraordinary	  gumption,	  one	  of	  philosophical	  controversy,	  and	  one	  of	  critical	  importance	  to	  21st	  century	  international	  politics.	  	   A	  submarine	  is	  a	  weapon	  system	  that	  is	  submersible	  and	  can	  independently	  function	  underwater.	  The	  submarines	  discussed	  in	  this	  study	  are	  not	  those	  used	  today.33	  With	  “limited	  underwater	  performance	  and	  endurance,”	  it	  was	  “essentially	  a	  surface	  ship	  that	  could	  submerge	  to	  hide”	  (Friedman	  1995,	  1).	  Over	  time,	  it	  became	  sustainable	  underwater.	  The	  RMA	  in	  question	  is	  unrestricted	  submarine	  warfare.	  In	  particular,	  unrestricted	  submarine	  warfare,	  used	  in	  both	  World	  War	  I	  and	  World	  War	  II,	  is	  the	  use	  of	  submarines	  to	  attack	  both	  merchant	  ships	  in	  raiding	  commerce	  and	  adversarial	  warships.	   	  In	  the	  following	  chapter,	  I	  will	  delineate	  the	  history	  of	  the	  submarine—its	  development,	  adoption,	  and	  integration,	  explain	  the	  Hirst-­‐mover	  advantage	  of	  unrestricted	  submarine	  warfare,	  and	  test	  the	  FMA	  Theory.	  I	  Hind	  that	  the	  Germans	  experienced	  a	  Hirst-­‐mover	  advantage,	  albeit	  an	  ephemeral	  one	  as	  its	  British	  Royal	  Navy	  and	  United	  States	  Navy	  adversaries	  promptly	  responded.	  The	  FMA	  Theory	  shows	  the	  Imperial	  German	  Navy’s	  weak	  leadership	  and	  incongruent	  doctrine	  and	  British	  and	  American	  navies’	  strong	  leadership	  and	  congruent	  doctrine.	  The	  FMA	  Theory	  explains	  the	  brief	  submarine	  FMA.
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33	  In	  1945,	  there	  was	  a	  technological	  shift	  in	  the	  submarine.	  While	  Cold	  War	  innovation	  with	  regards	  to	  submarine	  and	  antisubmarine	  warfare	  is	  not	  being	  considered	  here,	  it	  would	  certainly	  be	  a	  worthy	  study.	  After	  1945,	  technological	  changes	  included	  nuclear	  propulsion,	  ballistic	  missile	  launching	  capabilities,	  advanced	  ASW	  radar	  and	  sonar,	  and	  much	  more	  (Friedman	  1994).	  By	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  in	  1990,	  the	  United	  States	  Navy	  had	  100	  submarines	  available	  for	  ASW	  operations	  alone	  (McKitrick	  2003).	  For	  more	  on	  Cold	  War	  submarine	  warfare,	  see	  Owen	  R.	  Cote	  Jr.,	  The	  Third	  
Battle:	  Innovation	  in	  the	  U.S.	  Navy’s	  Silent	  Cold	  War	  Struggle	  with	  Soviet	  Submarines,	  Newport	  Paper	  
Number	  16	  (2003).
A.	  Development	  And	  Adoption	   The	  development	  of	  the	  submarine	  is	  dominated	  by	  private	  risk-­‐takers	  and	  constant	  experimentation.	  Individual	  inventors	  designed	  submersibles	  “despite	  the	  lack	  of	  any	  perceived	  need	  for	  their	  development.”	  Unlike	  the	  aircraft	  carrier,	  “whose	  features	  and	  evolution	  invariably	  reHlect	  ofHicial	  concepts	  and	  requirements,”	  the	  submarine	  developed	  because	  of	  man’s	  love	  for	  exploration	  (Fontenoy	  2007,	  1).	  As	  military	  historian	  Thomas	  Parrish	  writes,	  “Something	  about	  the	  surface	  of	  the	  earth	  has	  always	  made	  us	  try	  to	  leave	  it.	  Our	  ancestors	  scanned	  the	  heavens	  and	  sought	  to	  break	  way,	  Hlying	  toward	  the	  sun,	  into	  a	  new	  and	  temptingly	  close	  upper	  dimension,	  and	  they	  also	  cherished	  the	  dream	  of	  escaping	  the	  familiar	  surface	  by	  diving	  beneath	  it,	  into	  the	  depths	  of	  the	  sea”	  (2004,	  9).Due	  to	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  platform,	  experimentation	  of	  the	  submarine	  illustrated	  “sheer	  courage,	  [for]	  each	  and	  every	  one	  that	  let	  the	  waters	  close	  darkly	  over	  him	  was	  perfectly	  aware	  that	  he	  might	  never	  see	  the	  light	  of	  day	  again”	  (Compton-­‐Hall	  1999,	  ix).	   The	  development	  stage	  of	  the	  submarine	  begins	  in	  antiquity	  and	  ends	  at	  its	  demonstration	  point	  in	  the	  First	  World	  War.	  In	  its	  early	  history,	  exploration	  of	  the	  subsurface	  started	  with	  divers.	  According	  to	  Thucydides’	  History	  of	  the	  Peloponnesian	  War,	  the	  Hirst	  military	  use	  of	  divers	  was	  in	  the	  siege	  of	  Syracuse	  in	  413	  BCE.	  According	  to	  Aristotle,	  Alexander	  the	  Great	  used	  diving	  boats	  at	  the	  siege	  of	  Tyre	  in	  332	  BCE.	  In	  12th	  century	  Alexandria,	  primitive	  submersibles	  were	  said	  have	  been	  used	  in	  reconnaissance	  missions	  (Fontenoy	  2007,	  1).34	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34	  Supporting	  evidence	  of	  these	  phenomena	  are	  mixed.
	   Diving	  mechanisms	  prompted	  submersible	  vehicles.	  In	  1623,	  a	  Dutch	  inventor	  for	  King	  James	  I	  named	  Cornelius	  Drebbel	  traveled	  along	  the	  River	  Thames	  at	  London.	  In	  1648,	  Bishop	  John	  Wilkins	  of	  Chester	  wrote	  the	  theoretical	  military	  beneHit	  of	  the	  submarine.	  Wilkins	  noted	  the	  strategic	  privacy	  (”a	  man	  may	  thus	  go	  to	  any	  coast	  in	  the	  world	  invisibly”)	  and	  potential	  safety	  (”from	  the	  uncertainty	  of	  tides,	  pirates	  and	  robbers,	  ice	  and	  great	  frost”).	   Submersible	  development	  Hlourished	  in	  the	  18th	  and	  19th	  centuries.	  In	  Russia,	  Czar	  Peter	  I	  supported	  a	  prototype	  in	  June	  1720,	  but	  “leaking	  problems	  and	  Peter’s	  death	  led	  to	  the	  death	  of	  the	  project.”	  In	  1834,	  Engineer-­‐General	  Karl	  Andreyevich	  Shilder	  experimented	  with	  iron	  submersibles	  and	  armed	  them	  with	  six	  Congreve	  rockets.	  (Fontenoy	  2007,	  1;	  Compton-­‐Hall	  1999,	  61-­‐62).	  Then,	  the	  Crimean	  War	  of	  1853	  to	  1856	  prompted	  Russian	  submersible	  projects	  at	  the	  initiative	  of	  several	  naval	  ofHicers,	  though	  none	  were	  ever	  built	  (Fontenoy	  2007,	  1).	   In	  the	  United	  States,	  submarine	  development	  began	  with	  the	  one-­‐person	  Turtle	  in	  1776,	  “a	  hand-­‐powered,	  egg-­‐shaped	  device.”	  Designed	  by	  David	  Bushnell,	  it	  was	  the	  Hirst	  veriHied	  submersible	  to	  independently	  operate	  and	  move	  underwater.	  In	  the	  Revolutionary	  War,	  the	  Turtle	  attempted	  and	  failed	  to	  sink	  the	  HMS	  Eagle,	  the	  British	  warship	  blockading	  New	  York	  Harbor	  (Fontenoy	  2007,	  3-­‐4;	  Friedman	  1995,	  11;	  Parrish	  2004,	  11).	  In	  1800,	  American	  Robert	  Fulton	  built	  the	  Nautilus,	  the	  Hirst	  dual-­‐propulsion	  submarine,	  and	  offered	  it	  to	  France	  (Fontenoy	  2007,	  3-­‐4;	  Compton-­‐Hall	  1999,	  42-­‐46).	  During	  the	  War	  of	  1812,	  Silas	  Halsey	  died	  during	  a	  failed	  submarine	  operation	  on	  a	  British	  warship	  in	  New	  London	  harbor.	  In	  the	  American	  Civil	  War,	  the	  French-­‐designed	  Alligator	  was	  the	  Hirst	  to	  utilize	  compressed	  air	  and	  an	  air	  Hiltration	  system.	  The	  Alligator	  was	  built	  by	  the	  United	  States	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Navy	  by	  the	  Philadelphia	  Navy	  Yard,	  but	  it	  got	  lost	  in	  a	  storm	  off	  the	  North	  Carolina	  Outer	  Banks	  on	  its	  Hirst	  combat	  deployment	  (Fontenoy	  2007,	  4;	  Friedman	  1995,	  11-­‐13).	  In	  the	  late	  1800s,	  the	  American	  Submarine	  Company	  built	  the	  Intelligent	  Whale,	  but	  the	  United	  States	  Navy	  rejected	  it	  (Fontenoy	  2007,	  5-­‐6;	  Parrish	  2004,	  23).	  With	  John	  Holland’s	  Holland	  I,	  the	  Navy	  Hinally	  accepted	  its	  Hirst	  submarine	  in	  the	  1880s	  (Friedman	  1995,	  19-­‐31;	  Compton-­‐Hall	  1999,	  132-­‐133).	   In	  Europe,	  France	  became	  a	  Hirst	  mover	  in	  submarine	  development.	  Jules	  Verne	  published	  Twenty	  Thousand	  Leagues	  Under	  The	  Sea,	  a	  science	  Hiction	  classic	  in	  1870,	  which	  featured	  an	  advanced	  submarine	  and	  inspired	  inventors.	  France	  interpreted	  the	  submarine	  as	  a	  potential	  challenge	  to	  British	  naval	  supremacy.	  While	  the	  British	  failed	  to	  develop	  submarines	  until	  World	  War	  I,	  the	  French	  took	  signiHicant	  interest	  in	  the	  innovative	  weapon	  system	  early	  on.	  “Believing	  that	  they	  could	  never	  rival	  their	  traditional	  British	  enemy	  on	  the	  surface	  of	  the	  sea,	  younger	  ofHicers	  saw	  some	  years	  before	  1900	  that	  this	  new	  weapon	  might	  bring	  them	  an	  effective	  new	  way	  of	  commerce	  raiding—attacking	  enemy	  cargo	  vessels”	  (Parrish	  2004,	  38-­‐39).	  	   The	  French	  Navy	  is	  the	  ofHicial	  Hirst	  mover	  in	  development.	  From	  1850	  to	  1880,	  France	  invested	  efforts	  to	  develop	  the	  Hirst	  mechanically	  powered	  submarine,	  launching	  the	  
Plongeur	  in	  1863	  (Fontenoy	  2007,	  5-­‐6).	  In	  response,	  the	  British	  Royal	  Navy	  and	  the	  Imperial	  German	  Navy	  are	  secondary	  actors	  in	  development,	  both	  of	  which	  quickly	  surpass	  the	  French	  in	  submarine	  capabilities.	  In	  fact,	  Horowitz	  cites	  French	  naval	  analyst	  Herbert	  C.	  Fyfe’s	  frustration	  on	  the	  matter:	  “We	  [the	  French	  Navy]	  have	  been	  only	  the	  humble	  artisans	  working	  for	  [the	  British	  Royal	  Navy]	  to	  establish	  their	  superiority”	  (2010,	  2;	  Fyfe	  1902,	  281).
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The	  submarine	  is	  characterized	  by	  internal	  French	  weak	  leadership	  and	  incongruent	  doctrine	  as	  well	  as	  external	  British	  strong	  leadership	  and	  congruent	  doctrine.35	  The	  French	  submarine	  aligned	  with	  doctrinal	  priorities,	  because	  the	  submarine	  could	  act	  as	  a	  counter	  to	  the	  superior	  British	  battleships.	  Contrastingly,	  the	  British	  were	  doctrinally	  committed	  to	  their	  advantage	  in	  big	  gunnery	  vessels	  and	  battleship	  Hleets	  (Horowitz	  2010,	  1).	  However,	  in	  terms	  of	  resource	  allocation,	  the	  French	  did	  not	  commit	  enough	  resources	  to	  the	  program,	  especially	  compared	  to	  the	  superior	  British	  industrial	  production	  capabilities.	  Following	  a	  successful	  campaign	  in	  1869,	  French	  liberals	  controlled	  a	  larger	  part	  of	  government.	  Against	  the	  interest	  of	  Napoleon	  III,	  they	  demanded	  a	  reduction	  in	  naval	  expenditures	  (Ropp	  1987,	  10).	  Meanwhile,	  the	  British	  maintained	  a	  well-­‐funded	  navy.While	  the	  doctrine	  is	  ostensibly	  split	  between	  the	  two	  actors,	  the	  French	  lacked	  leadership.	  In	  organizational	  culture,	  the	  French	  could	  not	  “institutionalize	  their	  advantage...[as]	  crippling	  organizational	  debates	  prevented	  the	  integration”	  of	  the	  RMA	  (Horowitz	  2010,	  1).	  The	  French	  had	  not	  attempted	  any	  reform	  of	  their	  naval	  administration	  since	  the	  old	  monarchy	  while	  trying	  to	  integrate	  industrial,	  Napoleonic-­‐era	  weapon	  systems	  (Ropp	  1987,	  10).	  It	  is	  difHicult	  to	  assess	  actual	  administrative	  support	  by	  either	  actors	  at	  this	  infancy	  level.	  The	  French	  set	  up	  organizations	  for	  technical	  education	  for	  shipbuilders,	  while	  the	  English	  merely	  relied	  on	  French	  designs.	  In	  information	  safeguards,	  the	  British	  exploited	  France’s	  technological	  boon.	  Historically,	  English	  naval	  architects	  modeled	  their	  designs	  on	  ships	  captured	  from	  France.	  By	  1850,	  over	  one-­‐third	  of	  British	  vessels	  were	  based	  on	  French	  design	  models	  (8).	  In	  consequence,	  although	  the	  French	  possessed	  avant-­‐
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35	  While	  German	  doctrine	  and	  leadership	  will	  be	  described	  as	  incongruent	  and	  weak,	  this	  is	  relative	  to	  the	  British	  and	  American	  navies	  in	  World	  War	  I.	  In	  relation	  to	  the	  French	  submarine	  program,	  the	  Germans	  exhibit	  strong	  leadership	  and	  congruent	  doctrine.	  The	  speci%ics	  of	  the	  German	  submarine	  program	  will	  be	  described	  later.
garde	  thinking	  and	  technological	  ingenuity,	  their	  poor	  leadership	  disallowed	  their	  Hirst-­‐mover	  status	  to	  transform	  into	  a	  Hirst-­‐mover	  advantage.36	   The	  introduction	  and	  adoption	  of	  the	  RMA	  occurred	  in	  World	  War	  I	  with	  the	  German	  unrestricted	  submarine	  campaign	  and	  the	  Allied	  response	  (Herwig	  1996,	  228).	  The	  German	  Navy	  was	  the	  Hirst	  to	  conduct	  unrestricted	  submarine	  warfare;	  that	  is,	  a	  commerce-­‐raiding	  strategy	  against	  Britain	  using	  “submarines	  to	  attack	  and	  sink	  without	  warning	  all	  British	  shipping	  and	  neutral	  vessels	  trading	  with	  the	  United	  Kingdom”	  (Fontenoy	  2007,	  15).	  They	  accomplished	  this	  by	  means	  of	  their	  “Unterseeboot,”	  also	  known	  as	  U-­‐boat	  submarine.	  It	  began	  in	  response	  to	  the	  British	  blockade	  of	  Germany;	  a	  “counter-­‐blockade”	  against	  Allied	  commerce.	  While	  German	  and	  Austria-­‐Hungarian	  forces	  possessed	  small	  but	  relatively	  up-­‐to-­‐date	  Hleets	  of	  submarines,	  neither	  the	  Allied	  nor	  Central	  powers	  had	  doctrines	  for	  submarine	  use	  until	  the	  Germans	  began	  the	  counter-­‐blockade	  (14-­‐15).	  	   World	  War	  I	  German	  submarine	  warfare	  gained	  enough	  momentum	  to	  be	  considered	  a	  demonstration	  point.	  On	  September	  22,	  1914,	  a	  German	  U-­‐9	  torpedoed	  three	  British	  armored	  cruisers	  within	  an	  hour	  off	  the	  Dutch	  coast	  (14-­‐15).	  In	  a	  short	  period	  of	  time,	  the	  British	  Royal	  Navy	  realized	  the	  threat	  of	  the	  submarine	  to	  its	  naval	  superiority.	  The	  campaign	  began	  with	  limited	  resources,	  but	  sank	  a	  signiHicant	  number	  of	  merchant	  vessels	  (Herwig	  1980,	  163-­‐164).	  What	  was	  even	  more	  signiHicant	  was	  the	  German	  sinking	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36	  The	  French	  submarine	  experience	  is	  not	  being	  tested	  with	  the	  FMA	  Theory	  because	  it	  fails	  the	  required	  assumptions.	  It	  is	  true	  that	  the	  French	  submarine	  meets	  both	  technological	  and	  organizational	  barriers	  to	  entry	  in	  accordance	  to	  the	  Adoption-­‐Capacity	  Theory.	  (For	  evidence	  of	  suf%icient	  organizational	  and	  technological	  barriers	  to	  entry,	  see	  the	  study	  of	  German	  submarine	  FMA.)	  However,	  there	  is	  a	  difference	  between	  being	  a	  %irst	  mover	  and	  experiencing	  a	  %irst-­‐mover	  advantage.	  The	  French	  %irst-­‐mover	  status	  occurred	  in	  the	  RMA’s	  infancy	  period.	  The	  French	  never	  had	  an	  advantage,	  because	  the	  submarine	  was	  never	  really	  adopted.	  Therefore,	  while	  France	  as	  the	  %irst	  advanced	  developer	  acts	  as	  a	  %irst	  mover,	  their	  %irst-­‐mover	  advantage	  does	  not	  exist.	  Instead,	  Germany	  introduced	  and	  adopted	  unrestricted	  submarine	  warfare	  in	  the	  First	  World	  War,	  so	  they	  express	  the	  actual	  %irst-­‐mover	  advantage.
of	  the	  RMS	  Lusitania,	  a	  British	  boat,	  which	  enraged	  the	  United	  States.	  On	  board	  were	  1,959	  people,	  159	  of	  whom	  were	  American.	  The	  subsequent	  crisis	  between	  the	  United	  States	  and	  Germany	  led	  to	  a	  brief	  hiatus	  of	  German	  U-­‐boat	  operations.	  President	  Wilson	  threatened	  Germany	  with	  diplomatic	  severance,	  so	  German	  Admiral	  Henning	  von	  Holtzendorff	  reinstated	  his	  order	  to	  follow	  the	  Prize	  Regulations	  of	  the	  Declaration	  of	  London	  in	  1909	  (Fontenoy	  2007,	  17;	  Tucker	  2005,	  1125-­‐1126).	   In	  June	  1916,	  the	  Germans	  lost	  the	  Battle	  of	  Jutland	  to	  the	  Royal	  British	  Navy.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  Germans	  recognized	  that	  their	  surface	  Hleet	  alone	  would	  not	  be	  able	  to	  beat	  the	  British.	  On	  January	  9,	  1917,	  the	  Germans	  announced	  the	  reinstatement	  of	  the	  commerce	  raiding	  campaign.	  The	  unrestricted	  submarine	  warfare	  was	  a	  matter	  of	  necessity.	  For	  this	  reason,	  Jutland	  was	  the	  largest	  naval	  battle	  of	  the	  war,	  and	  the	  only	  one	  in	  which	  Hleet	  battleships	  combated.	  Among	  the	  Allies,	  British	  and	  French	  navies	  each	  began	  World	  War	  I	  with	  more	  than	  double	  as	  many	  submarines	  as	  the	  German	  Fleet.	  However,	  unlike	  the	  Germans,	  they	  lacked	  a	  methodology	  for	  effectively	  using	  the	  innovative	  weapon	  system.	  Wartime	  response	  of	  antisubmarine	  warfare	  (ASW)	  became	  their	  doctrine.	  	   Following	  heavy	  losses	  on	  shipping,	  the	  British	  Admiralty	  sought	  an	  aggressive	  strategy	  to	  seek	  out	  and	  destroy	  the	  U-­‐boats	  (Herwig	  1996,	  229).	  The	  ASW	  campaign	  began	  in	  1915	  and	  served	  as	  the	  primary	  mission	  of	  British	  submarine	  operations.	  They	  succeeded	  in	  sinking	  only	  13	  of	  290	  sighted	  U-­‐boats	  that	  year	  (Fontenoy	  2007,	  14).	  The	  United	  States	  Navy	  joined	  ASW	  in	  March	  1918.	  Over	  the	  course	  of	  the	  war,	  320	  German	  U-­‐boats	  were	  sortied,	  178	  U-­‐boats	  were	  lost,	  including	  134	  from	  antisubmarine	  operations	  (Herwig	  1996,	  231).	  While	  at	  Hirst	  the	  British	  refused	  to	  introduce	  convoys	  for	  preventative	  means,	  convoys	  eventually	  reduced	  the	  ability	  to	  attack	  merchants	  (230).
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   For	  the	  offensive	  British	  submarine	  program,	  the	  8th	  Submarine	  Flotilla	  primarily	  functioned	  for	  patrol	  and	  reconnaissance	  off	  the	  German	  coast	  (11).	  Missions	  included	  patrolling	  the	  Heligoland	  Bight,	  but	  none	  of	  the	  attempts	  at	  destroying	  the	  High	  Seas	  Fleet	  of	  the	  German	  Imperial	  Navy	  succeeded	  (Parrish	  2004,	  69).	   Like	  the	  British,	  French	  and	  Russian	  submarines	  experienced	  limited	  success	  in	  the	  First	  World	  War.	  French	  submarines	  were	  deployed	  in	  the	  Adriatic	  for	  defensive	  operations.	  Eight	  Russian	  submarines	  were	  deployed	  in	  the	  Baltic	  for	  short-­‐range	  operations	  (Fontenoy	  2007,	  12-­‐13).	   For	  the	  United	  States,	  World	  War	  I	  surprised	  submariners.	  While	  their	  surface	  Hleet	  was	  inferior	  to	  the	  British	  in	  gunnery,	  they	  wrongly	  believed	  their	  submarine	  was	  up-­‐to-­‐date	  when	  they	  entered	  the	  war	  in	  April	  1917.	  Pre-­‐war	  American	  naval	  planners	  had	  undervalued	  submarines.	  The	  Navy’s	  civilian	  leadership	  disdained	  submersibles,	  arguing	  that	  they	  violated	  international	  law	  (Herwig	  1996,	  253).	  In	  1911,	  the	  General	  Board	  divided	  submarine	  functions	  as	  either	  “coastal	  protection	  (defensive)	  [or]	  Hleet	  operations	  (offensive),”	  though	  they	  only	  utilized	  the	  former	  during	  the	  war	  (253).	  The	  war	  “conHirmed	  submariners’	  prewar	  suspicions	  that	  American	  submarines	  were	  far	  too	  small”	  (Friedman	  1995,	  149-­‐150).	  By	  the	  end	  of	  the	  war,	  the	  United	  States	  Navy	  considered	  submarine	  operations	  of	  far	  higher	  value	  than	  for	  support	  and	  reconnaissance	  (150).
B.	  Integration	  And	  First-­Mover	  Advantage	   The	  interwar	  period	  between	  World	  War	  I	  and	  World	  War	  II	  featured	  submarine	  integration,	  especially	  in	  the	  United	  States	  Navy.	  By	  the	  time	  World	  War	  II	  began,	  the	  United	  States	  Navy	  and	  Nazi	  Germany	  Kriegsmarine	  were	  prepared	  to	  face	  their	  respective	  Japanese	  Imperial	  Navy	  and	  British	  Royal	  Navy	  adversaries	  in	  submarine	  warfare.	  The	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effectiveness	  of	  the	  Imperial	  German	  Navy’s	  U-­‐boat	  sparked	  interest	  from	  the	  victors	  of	  the	  First	  World	  War.	  With	  the	  “impeding	  emergence	  of	  superior	  detection	  equipment,”	  the	  relevant	  interwar	  powers	  tried	  to	  “produce	  faster,	  stronger,	  more	  powerfully	  armed,	  and	  longer-­‐ranged	  boats”	  (Fontenoy	  2007,	  23).	  By	  design,	  these	  vessels	  were	  still	  submersibles,	  best	  operated	  on	  the	  surface	  yet	  could	  rapidly	  dive	  for	  stealth	  (23-­‐24).	  In	  terms	  of	  doctrine,	  they	  were	  used	  for	  scouting,	  minelaying,	  and	  operations	  against	  adversarial	  heavy	  warships	  (Herwig	  1996,	  262).	  The	  Second	  World	  War	  featured	  very	  matured	  submarine	  warfare	  by	  the	  Americans	  and	  Germans,	  and	  to	  a	  lesser	  degree	  by	  the	  Japanese	  and	  British.	   Under	  Article	  191	  of	  the	  Treaty	  of	  Versailles,	  the	  interwar	  German	  military	  was	  ofHicially	  unable	  to	  build	  or	  innovate.	  In	  1919,	  the	  Germans	  surrendered	  176	  boats	  to	  the	  British.	  But	  they	  innovated	  clandestinely	  by	  building	  for	  foreign	  navies.	  Although	  interwar	  Germany	  faced	  Hiscal	  hardship,	  Hinancing	  submarine	  development	  occurred	  anyway.	  In	  1935,	  only	  Hive	  weeks	  after	  the	  repudiation	  of	  the	  Versailles	  Treaty,	  the	  Germans	  were	  able	  to	  produce	  their	  Hirst	  new	  submarine,	  the	  U-­1	  (Herwig	  1996,	  231;	  Fontenoy	  2007,	  26-­‐27).	  The	  German	  U-­‐boat	  was	  a	  major	  factor	  in	  the	  Second	  World	  War.	  Due	  to	  its	  success	  in	  the	  Battle	  of	  the	  Atlantic,	  the	  Germans	  built	  1,162	  U-­‐boats,	  of	  which	  784	  were	  destroyed	  (Herwig	  1996,	  231).	   While	  the	  Germans	  were	  persistent	  in	  attempting	  to	  continue	  submarine	  adoption,	  the	  British	  spent	  the	  interwar	  period	  undervaluing	  the	  RMA,	  a	  move	  that	  later	  proved	  very	  costly.	  The	  British	  believed	  that	  the	  impact	  of	  	  Germany’s	  World	  War	  I	  unrestricted	  submarine	  warfare	  had	  been	  overestimated.	  “Ignorance	  and	  indifference	  led	  to	  a	  general	  failure	  to	  think	  through	  the	  lessons	  of	  the	  last	  war.	  Success	  is	  not	  always	  a	  good	  teacher,	  and	  the	  Royal	  Navy	  had,	  after	  all,	  accomplished	  its	  major	  objectives	  during	  WWI.”	  Although	  the	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British	  ofHicially	  proposed	  a	  ban	  on	  submarines	  at	  Versailles	  in	  1919	  and	  the	  London	  Conferences	  of	  1935	  and	  1936,	  they	  actually	  retained	  a	  very	  limited	  budget	  for	  submarines.	  Instead	  of	  investing	  in	  submarines,	  the	  British	  continued	  their	  “traditional	  service	  beliefs...wedded	  to	  its	  obsession	  with	  battleships	  and	  major	  Hleet	  engagements”	  (241-­‐244).	  Submarines	  remained	  in	  the	  prewar	  patrol	  roles	  for	  the	  Hirst	  year	  of	  the	  war.	  In	  September	  1940,	  the	  British	  ended	  their	  prohibition	  on	  attacking	  enemy	  trade,	  though	  their	  campaign	  against	  German	  and	  Italian	  merchants	  had	  mixed	  results	  (Fontenoy	  2007,	  31-­‐32).	  	   For	  the	  Americans,	  the	  interwar	  period	  prompted	  submarine	  adoption	  that	  was	  impactful	  in	  the	  World	  War	  II	  PaciHic	  campaign	  against	  the	  Japanese.	  The	  United	  States	  Navy	  standardized	  a	  single	  “Hleet	  boat”	  design;	  the	  38	  Porpoise,	  and	  subsequently	  Gato	  class,	  archetype	  submarines	  that	  were	  hardly	  changed	  throughout	  the	  entire	  Second	  World	  War	  (25).	  Among	  the	  Allies,	  the	  United	  States	  Navy	  was	  the	  most	  successful	  submarine	  force	  in	  the	  Second	  World	  War.	  In	  the	  PaciHic,	  the	  Navy’s	  campaign	  on	  merchant	  shipping	  and	  Japanese	  warships	  proved	  to	  be	  highly	  effective.	  Among	  merchant	  ships,	  the	  American	  submarines	  inHlicted	  a	  cost	  of	  about	  4.8	  million	  tons	  of	  Japanese	  goods	  and	  accounted	  for	  one-­‐third	  of	  its	  warship	  casualties	  (34).	  Technologically	  and	  organizationally,	  the	  American	  submarines	  became	  dominant.	  The	  PaciHic	  war	  demonstrated	  the	  importance	  of	  submarine	  warfare.	  The	  Americans	  faced	  some	  challenges,	  including	  unreliability	  of	  torpedo	  strikes	  and	  a	  mediocre	  start	  due	  to	  long	  dispatches	  from	  bases	  in	  Hawaii	  and	  Australia.	  In	  addition,	  the	  Japanese	  ASW	  was	  effective,	  taking	  out	  50	  submarines.	  The	  American	  casualties	  include	  3,500	  crewmen,	  over	  one-­‐Hifth	  of	  their	  operational	  submariners	  (33-­‐34).	   The	  Imperial	  Japanese	  Navy	  also	  utilized	  peacetime	  to	  standardized	  three	  submarine	  types	  for	  a	  wartime	  Hleet.	  The	  Hirst	  was	  a	  headquarters	  submarine	  for	  command	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facilities,	  which	  highlighted	  communications.	  Second	  was	  an	  attack	  submarine	  with	  torpedo	  capabilities.	  In	  particular,	  with	  German	  assistance,	  the	  Japanese	  constructed	  very	  large	  cruiser	  submarines	  called	  junsen	  as	  well	  as	  two-­‐man	  “midget	  submarines”	  for	  stealthy	  attacks	  on	  ports.	  Third	  was	  a	  small	  reconnaissance	  submarine	  used	  primarily	  for	  scouting	  (26).	  While	  the	  Japanese	  experienced	  success	  in	  ASW,	  their	  own	  submarine	  warfare	  was	  unproductive.	  The	  Japanese	  Imperial	  Navy	  sunk	  20	  warships	  and	  just	  over	  100	  merchant	  vessels	  throughout	  the	  war,	  while	  suffering	  crippling	  losses	  (38).	   Throughout	  the	  multifaceted,	  seemingly	  disorganized	  history	  of	  submarine	  warfare,	  the	  Imperial	  German	  Navy	  served	  as	  a	  Hirst	  mover	  in	  the	  First	  World	  War,	  losing	  their	  submarine	  advantage	  to	  the	  United	  States	  and	  Britain	  during	  the	  war	  as	  well	  as	  in	  the	  interwar	  and	  Second	  World	  War	  periods.	  The	  FMA	  Theory	  will	  explain	  the	  brief	  German	  FMA.
C.	  AnalysisThe	  brief	  unrestricted	  submarine	  warfare	  FMA	  by	  the	  Imperial	  Germany	  Navy	  is	  characterized	  by	  internal	  weak	  leadership	  and	  incongruent	  doctrine	  as	  well	  as	  external	  strong	  leadership	  and	  congruent	  doctrine.	  The	  Germans	  shocked	  the	  world	  by	  unveiling	  “excellent	  weapons,”	  especially	  the	  U-­‐boat,	  and	  “trained	  their	  forces	  within	  an	  ingenious	  tactical	  framework”	  in	  World	  War	  I.	  But	  they	  failed	  to	  remain	  the	  only	  actor	  with	  the	  RMA	  because	  they	  lacked	  “operational	  endurance”	  (Herwig	  1996,	  241).	  And	  soon	  enough,	  the	  Americans	  and	  British	  were	  able	  to	  reduce	  the	  submarine	  warfare	  advantage.
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Figure	  12.	  Submarine	  Results
Leadership CongruenceImperial	  German	  Navy Weak IncongruentUnited	  States	  Navy Strong CongruentBritish	  Royal	  Navy Strong Congruent
The	  submarine	  clearly	  Hits	  into	  the	  RMA	  template.	  As	  per	  the	  requisite	  assumptions,	  submarine	  warfare	  beginning	  in	  the	  First	  World	  War	  held	  high	  barriers	  to	  entry.	  Technologically,	  submarines	  were	  costly.37	  At	  the	  time,	  each	  German	  U-­‐139	  submarine	  cost	  approximately	  8.7	  million	  marks	  (Williamson	  2002,	  16).38	  The	  history	  of	  submarine	  warfare	  shows	  that	  “those	  forces	  that	  fell	  behind	  in	  the	  technological	  battle	  suffered	  disproportionately	  heavily	  in	  combat”	  (Fontenoy	  2007,	  38).	  For	  example,	  most	  actors	  experienced	  problems	  with	  torpedoes	  in	  the	  First	  World	  War,	  limiting	  their	  use	  among	  most	  actors.	  In	  addition,	  as	  the	  submarine	  matured	  in	  the	  interwar	  era,	  detection	  technology	  like	  sonar	  and	  radar	  reduced	  the	  ease	  of	  submarine	  use.	  Detection	  devices	  are	  important	  enabling	  technologies	  that	  impacted	  the	  FMA.	  Not	  only	  did	  detection	  devices	  help	  with	  offensive	  submarine	  warfare,	  but	  they	  also	  inspired	  countermeasures	  like	  antisubmarine	  warfare.	  “After	  the	  submarines’	  enemies	  received	  their	  own	  radars,	  the	  surface	  was	  no	  longer	  safe,	  day	  or	  night”	  (Friedman	  1995,	  1).	  Other	  instrumental	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37	  Even	  though	  the	  submarine	  has	  acted	  as	  a	  more	  cost	  effective	  response	  to	  the	  aircraft	  carrier	  and	  warships,	  its	  own	  cost	  is	  suf%iciently	  high	  to	  deter	  actors	  from	  integration.	  38	  The	  actual	  development	  cost	  per	  submarine	  does	  not	  matter;	  only	  that	  cost	  is	  a	  barrier	  to	  entry.
technologies	  include	  stealth	  measures,	  including	  wakeless	  electric	  torpedoes	  and	  anti-­‐escort	  homing	  torpedoes.Organizationally,	  the	  submarine	  is	  a	  very	  complex	  system.	  Navies	  have	  had	  difHiculty	  “integrating	  submarines	  into	  existing	  force	  structures”	  (Herwig	  1996,	  228).	  Like	  any	  RMA,	  submarine	  warfare	  prompts	  new	  strategies	  and	  operational	  concepts	  for	  use	  of	  force.	  In	  terms	  of	  personnel,	  it	  requires	  arduous	  training	  and	  faces	  challenges	  in	  recruitment	  of	  daring	  individuals.	  The	  RMA	  “represented	  a	  disruptive	  change.	  A	  shift	  in	  naval	  power	  away	  from	  the	  gun	  and	  capital	  ship,	  and	  toward	  the	  torpedo	  and	  submarine,	  contradicted	  centuries	  of	  thinking	  about	  the	  production	  of	  naval	  power”	  (Horowitz	  2010,	  32-­‐33).	  Because	  the	  submarine	  is	  an	  “organizationally	  disruptive	  change,”	  powerful	  naval	  forces	  like	  Great	  Britain	  were	  on	  the	  defensive	  relative	  to	  “newer	  and	  more	  nimble	  naval	  powers”	  like	  Germany	  (Horowitz	  2008).	  This	  organizational	  disruption	  allowed	  the	  FMA	  to	  occur.	  Moreover,	  what	  must	  also	  be	  noted	  in	  the	  assumptions	  is	  the	  timespan	  of	  the	  FMA.	  For	  the	  purposes	  of	  this	  study,	  German	  submarine	  warfare	  spans	  from	  the	  beginning	  of	  World	  War	  I	  in	  1914	  through	  the	  interwar	  period.	  Factors	  pertaining	  to	  submarine	  warfare	  use	  in	  the	  wartime	  and	  interwar	  periods	  will	  be	  scrutinized.39
C1.	  The	  Submarine:	  Doctrinal	  CongruenceBrief	  FMA	  is	  explained	  by	  Germany’s	  doctrinal	  incongruence	  (incompatibility	  and	  unfavorable	  resource	  allocation)	  and	  its	  adversary’s	  doctrinal	  congruence	  (compatibility	  and	  favorable	  resource	  allocation).Submarine	  compatibility	  favors	  the	  British	  and	  Americans.	  Compatibility	  to	  doctrine	  is	  exceptional	  for	  the	  submarine	  in	  three	  regards.	  First,	  the	  submarine	  experienced	  a	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39	  World	  War	  II	  submarine	  warfare	  will	  also	  be	  noted	  at	  some	  points,	  particularly	  the	  American	  Paci%ic	  campaign.
challenge	  in	  Hinding	  an	  operational	  role.	  “Competing	  wartime	  demands	  on	  submarines	  often	  preclude	  their	  achieving	  full	  potential.”	  Submarine	  warfare	  often	  leads	  to	  “class	  wars	  of	  attrition...[which]	  extend	  over	  entire	  oceans	  and	  requires	  prolonged	  effort	  to	  be	  effective”	  (Herwig	  1996,	  228).	  Second,	  once	  the	  operational	  mission	  is	  set,	  willingness	  to	  attack	  merchant	  vessels	  prompted	  a	  philosophical	  debate	  among	  naval	  leaders.	  Is	  it	  permissible	  to	  launch	  an	  offensive	  on	  adversarial	  commerce?40	  In	  none	  of	  the	  wars	  in	  featuring	  submarine	  warfare	  did	  actors	  plan	  on	  targeting	  merchants;	  each	  would	  have	  preferred	  offensive	  units	  of	  large	  surface	  warships.	  Instead,	  unrestricted	  attacks	  “appeared	  as	  an	  ad	  hoc	  child	  born	  out	  of	  necessity”	  (228).	  Third,	  the	  submarine	  is	  interesting	  in	  terms	  of	  compatibility	  because	  of	  its	  association	  with	  alternative	  platforms.	  The	  submarine	  both	  acted	  as	  an	  alternative	  platform	  to	  the	  aircraft	  carrier	  and	  faced	  an	  alternative	  platform	  from	  convoys	  and	  antisubmarine	  warfare.	  Part	  of	  compatibility	  is	  the	  response.	  Submarines	  were	  a	  reaction	  to	  carrier	  warfare;	  submarine	  warfare	  is	  a	  cheaper,	  offsetting	  technology	  for	  navies	  attempting	  to	  deal	  with	  carriers.”	  (Horowitz	  2010,	  82).	  In	  turn,	  consider	  that	  today	  approximately	  40	  countries	  operate	  submarines,	  compared	  to	  the	  10	  that	  have	  aircraft	  carriers	  (McKitrick	  2003).41	  And	  submarines	  faced	  a	  defensive	  response:	  ASW	  and	  convoys.	  Antisubmarine	  warfare	  is	  the	  defensive	  use	  of	  surface	  ships,	  air	  power,	  and	  submarines	  to	  Hind	  and	  attack	  offensive	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40	  In	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  Battle	  of	  Midway,	  Craig	  L.	  Symonds	  says	  of	  the	  change	  over	  time	  in	  submarine	  doctrinal	  norms,	  “It	  is	  a	  measure	  of	  how	  much	  the	  world	  had	  changed	  in	  25	  years	  that	  although	  the	  United	  States	  had	  professed	  horror	  at	  the	  German	  use	  of	  unrestricted	  submarine	  warfare	  in	  1917,	  the	  %irst	  United	  States	  Navy	  operational	  order	  of	  the	  Second	  World	  War	  was	  to	  ‘begin	  unrestricted	  submarine	  warfare	  against	  Japan’”	  (2005,	  208).41	  Only	  six	  actors	  have	  ballistic	  missile	  submarines:	  the	  United	  States,	  China,	  France,	  Russia,	  India,	  and	  the	  United	  Kingdom.
enemy	  submarines.	  A	  convoy	  is	  the	  defensive	  use	  of	  grouping	  vessels	  for	  mutual	  support.	  Armed	  with	  support	  submarines,	  air	  power,	  and	  surface	  ships,	  the	  convoy	  acts	  to	  protect	  merchants	  from	  offensive	  enemy	  submarines	  (Owen	  2007).While	  the	  Germans	  were	  Hirst	  movers,	  their	  naval	  doctrine	  was	  most	  compatible	  with	  a	  Mahanian	  surface	  Hleet.42	  In	  additional	  to	  technical	  problems,	  “naval	  doctrinal	  issues	  were	  more	  important	  brakes	  on	  the	  submarine	  development,	  as	  the	  German	  example	  demonstrates”	  (Millet	  1996,	  365).	  “If	  German	  submarine	  development	  had	  an	  Achilles’	  heel,	  it	  lay	  in	  its	  doctrinal	  conceptions,”	  write	  Holger	  H.	  Herwig.	  Instead	  of	  forming	  U-­‐boat	  compatibility,	  German	  naval	  planners	  “stressed	  the	  need	  for	  destroyers”	  (Herwig	  1996,	  237).	  The	  German	  Kleinkrieg	  (little	  war,	  or	  small	  engagements)	  strategy	  argued	  for	  drawing	  the	  British	  into	  geographically	  and	  numerically	  disadvantageous	  positions	  (Tucker	  2005,	  1125).	  Submarines	  did	  not	  necessarily	  further	  this	  strategic	  goal.	  German	  commitment	  to	  submarines	  was	  undermined	  when	  sinking	  merchant	  vessels	  led	  to	  a	  crisis	  with	  the	  Americans	  and	  “exacerbated	  concerns	  of	  the	  German	  Army’s	  general	  staff	  about	  increased	  complications	  with	  neutral	  nations”	  (Fontenoy	  2007,	  16).	  In	  turn,	  the	  Germans	  halted	  unrestricted	  U-­‐boat	  operations,	  “but	  for	  the	  next	  year	  and	  half	  its	  navy	  waged	  an	  increasingly	  effective	  political	  campaign	  at	  home	  to	  resume	  unrestricted	  U-­‐boat	  warfare”	  (Herwig	  1996,	  229).	  Later,	  in	  the	  interwar	  period,	  the	  Germans	  considered	  submarine	  warfare	  in	  their	  war-­‐gaming—not	  in	  their	  ability	  to	  attack	  enemy	  shipping,	  but	  instead	  only	  in	  attacking	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42	  Captain	  Alfred	  Thayer	  Mahan,	  the	  19th	  century	  United	  States	  Navy	  strategist	  and	  historian,	  argued	  that	  navies	  must	  obtain	  relative	  sea	  power	  in	  order	  to	  project	  superiority.	  With	  the	  introduction	  of	  the	  submarine,	  a	  “Mahanian	  navy”	  meant	  a	  big-­‐ship	  surface	  battle%leet.	  Mahan’s	  views	  were	  as	  extensive	  as	  his	  impact	  was	  pervasive,	  Livezey	  writes	  (1981).	  The	  American	  Historical	  Association	  resolved	  in	  1914:	  “The	  profundity	  of	  his	  views	  and	  the	  lucidity	  of	  his	  reasoning	  attracted	  the	  attention	  of	  the	  statesmen	  of	  all	  nations;	  and	  more	  than	  any	  American	  scholar	  of	  his	  day,	  he	  as	  affected	  the	  course	  of	  world	  politics”	  (1916,	  53;	  Livezey	  1981,	  35).
enemy	  warships,	  in	  laying	  mines,	  and	  in	  scouting.	  This	  strategy	  was	  only	  furthered	  by	  Konteradmiral	  Arno	  Spindler’s	  “Handbook	  for	  U-­‐boat	  Commanders,”	  which	  argued	  for	  ‘warfare	  against	  merchantmen	  only	  on	  the	  ‘stop,	  search,	  and	  seize’”	  basis.	  Similarly,	  Grand	  Admiral	  Erich	  Raeder	  argued	  that	  the	  submarine	  was	  “one	  of	  the	  best	  defensive	  means	  of	  the	  weaker”	  navies	  (237).	  The	  submarine	  should	  have	  been	  compatible	  with	  the	  German	  war	  doctrine.	  The	  submarine	  was	  a	  strategic	  advantage	  held	  over	  the	  British	  adversary.	  It	  directly	  challenged	  the	  core-­‐competency	  of	  the	  enemy.	  However,	  because	  of	  the	  novelty,	  the	  doctrine	  was	  not	  operated	  to	  the	  fullest.	  Overall,	  Germany’s	  inner	  perception	  of	  the	  RMA	  led	  to	  a	  weak	  compatibility.	  Like	  the	  Germans’	  incompatibility,	  the	  Allied	  navies	  had	  similarly	  poor	  compatibility	  in	  offensive	  submarine	  war.	  Like	  German	  compatibility,	  the	  Allied	  were	  committed	  to	  the	  Mahanian	  strategic	  culture.	  This	  continued	  through	  the	  First	  World	  War	  and	  through	  the	  interwar	  period,	  even	  favoring	  naval	  aviation	  over	  submarine	  (Herwig	  1996,	  254).	  The	  submarines	  themselves	  were	  an	  adverse	  factor.	  World	  War	  I	  submarines	  were	  “small,	  cramped	  and	  unseaworthy.”	  In	  turn,	  submarines	  “had	  insufHicient	  room	  to	  take	  on	  crews	  of	  captured	  vessels.”	  In	  fact,	  their	  successors,	  the	  American	  S-­‐class	  and	  the	  V-­‐Hleet,	  were	  unsuitable	  for	  their	  commissioned	  needs	  (254-­‐255).43	  In	  terms	  of	  naval	  philosophy,	  the	  Allied	  forces	  were	  no	  better	  on	  submarines	  than	  their	  German	  adversaries.	  American	  public	  opinion	  did	  not	  permit	  unrestricted	  warfare	  against	  merchants	  (Herwig	  1996,	  255;	  Bemis,	  13).	  Likewise,	  British	  Admiral	  Arthur	  K.	  Wilson’s	  denounced	  the	  submarine	  in	  1902	  as	  “underhanded,	  unfair,	  and	  damned	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43	  World	  War	  II-­‐era	  American	  submarine	  technology,	  however,	  improved	  these	  problems,	  rendering	  them	  successful	  against	  Japanese	  merchant	  and	  warship	  vessels.
unEnglish,”	  a	  notion	  that	  lasted	  through	  World	  War	  I	  (Herwig	  1996,	  247;	  Herwig	  1980,	  86).	  Allied	  political	  naval	  philosophy	  created	  complacency	  for	  offensive	  submarines	  in	  the	  First	  World	  War	  (Herwig	  1996,	  249).44	  While	  the	  British	  understood	  submarine	  technology,	  they	  struggled	  in	  adopting	  a	  Hitting	  operational	  concept.	  The	  British	  used	  the	  submarine	  for	  defensive	  purposes,	  but	  did	  not	  Hind	  the	  German	  commerce-­‐raiding	  strategy	  acceptable.	  More	  importantly,	  however,	  is	  the	  notably	  effective	  Allied	  response	  in	  the	  war.	  As	  a	  secondary	  actor,	  the	  British	  and	  American	  navies	  implemented	  alternatives	  to	  limit	  FMA	  because	  such	  alternatives	  were	  doctrinally	  congruent.	  In	  April	  1917,	  the	  Central	  Powers	  were	  close	  to	  a	  submarine	  warfare	  triumph	  against	  merchant	  shipping.	  Following	  the	  introduction	  of	  the	  convoy	  system,	  the	  Allied	  efforts	  undermined	  the	  submarine	  advantage.	  At	  Hirst,	  the	  British	  were	  hesitant	  to	  use	  convoys	  because	  they	  “feared	  the	  detrimental	  effect	  that	  convoys	  could	  have	  on	  the	  efHicient	  employment	  of	  shipping	  (Fontenoy	  2007,	  35).	  This	  was	  soon	  reversed.	  By	  1918,	  while	  German	  and	  Austrian	  submarines	  sank	  600,000	  tons	  of	  shipping,	  their	  losses	  rose	  to	  10	  submarines,	  double	  that	  of	  their	  total	  losses	  for	  the	  previous	  three	  years.	  By	  the	  end	  of	  the	  war,	  they	  sank	  less	  than	  250,000	  tons	  of	  shipping	  and	  lost	  an	  additional	  four	  submarines.	  (21).45	  While	  unrestricted	  submarine	  warfare	  was	  incompatible	  with	  neither	  the	  British	  nor	  the	  American	  naval	  thinking,	  it	  was	  not	  needed.	  Instead,	  what	  was	  even	  more	  important	  than	  having	  compatible	  submarine	  warfare	  was	  being	  able	  to	  effectively	  implement	  antisubmarine	  warfare.	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44	  Among	  the	  Allied	  Powers,	  theoretical	  support	  for	  offensive	  submarine	  warfare	  began	  in	  the	  interwar	  years	  and	  culminated	  in	  the	  World	  War	  II	  American	  campaign	  in	  the	  Paci%ic.	  Despite	  the	  Japanese	  and	  German	  technological	  superiority,	  American	  submarine	  warfare	  %lourished	  because	  of	  their	  need	  for	  a	  stealth	  offensive	  weapon	  system	  (Millett	  1996,	  347).45	  In	  the	  interwar	  period,	  ASW	  was	  furthered	  by	  the	  British	  ASDIC	  (Anti-­‐Submarine	  Detection	  Investigation	  Committee)	  sonar.	  The	  ASDIC	  ultrasonic	  sound-­‐wave	  technology	  was	  %irst	  introduced	  by	  the	  British	  in	  1917	  to	  locate	  submarines	  at	  ranges	  of	  up	  to	  1,000	  meters.	  Along	  with	  ASDIC,	  radar	  was	  developed	  in	  this	  period.	  Naval	  planners	  considered	  both	  technologies	  “as	  the	  critical	  deterrent	  to	  another	  U-­‐boat	  campaign”	  (Herwig	  1996,	  245).
Furthermore,	  because	  the	  submarine	  both	  served	  as	  a	  cheaper	  alternative	  weapon	  system	  and	  faced	  a	  cheaper	  alternative	  weapon	  system,	  allocation	  of	  resources	  for	  the	  submarine	  warfare	  was	  less	  impactful.	  Nonetheless,	  the	  Imperial	  German	  Navy	  allocated	  resources	  less	  favorably	  for	  the	  submarine	  than	  their	  Allied	  counterparts.	  As	  discussed	  previously,	  both	  British	  and	  French	  navies	  began	  the	  war	  with	  more	  than	  double	  as	  many	  submarines	  as	  the	  German	  Fleet.	  As	  the	  RMA	  was	  introduced,	  their	  hesitation	  translated	  into	  Hinancial	  hesitation,	  especially	  relative	  to	  their	  adversaries.	  In	  the	  interwar	  period	  represents	  the	  ultimate	  unfavorable	  resource	  allocation,	  because	  after	  Versailles	  the	  Germans	  were	  forced	  to	  surrender	  their	  military.	  Germany	  was	  ofHicially	  “forbidden	  to	  build	  either	  capital	  ships	  or	  submarines	  and	  had	  to	  undertake	  clandestine	  research	  and	  development	  cautiously	  and	  in	  modest	  proportions”	  (Herwig	  1996,	  262).	  The	  Allied	  navies	  faced	  Hinancial	  constraints	  in	  the	  interwar	  era	  too.	  The	  British	  budgeting	  until	  1939	  “discouraged	  nearly	  all	  innovation”	  (252).	  Overall,	  the	  British	  and	  American	  defense	  budgets	  were	  more	  favorable	  than	  that	  of	  the	  Germans.	  
Figure	  13.	  Submarine	  Doctrinal	  Congruence
German	  Incongruent	  Doctrine Incompatible Unfavorable	  Resource	  AllocationAmerican	  CongruentDoctrine Compatible Favorable	  Resource	  AllocationBritishCongruentDoctrine Compatible Favorable	  Resource	  Allocation
In	  summation,	  with	  regards	  to	  doctrinal	  congruence,	  the	  FMA	  Theory	  holds	  for	  brief	  FMA	  for	  the	  Imperial	  German	  Navy	  as	  the	  Hirst	  mover.	  In	  terms	  of	  compatibility,	  while	  no	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  War	  power	  viewed	  the	  submarine	  as	  the	  ideal	  weapon,	  the	  Allied	  response	  demonstrated	  the	  compatibility	  of	  alternatives.	  With	  regards	  to	  resource	  allocation,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  Allied	  submarine	  resources	  were	  superior	  to	  German	  resources.
C2.	  The	  Submarine:	  Leadership	  According	  to	  the	  FMA	  Theory,	  leadership	  is	  composed	  of	  four	  categories:	  organizational	  culture,	  administrative	  support,	  bureaucratic	  competition,	  and	  information	  safeguards.	  However,	  due	  to	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  submarine	  RMA,	  bureaucratic	  competition	  is	  a	  non-­‐factor.46	  On	  all	  three	  relevant	  categories,	  the	  Allied	  naval	  forces	  excel	  in	  leadership	  over	  the	  Imperial	  German	  Navy.First,	  regarding	  organizational	  culture,	  certainly	  every	  military	  is	  wary	  of	  an	  innovative	  weapon	  system.	  But	  the	  German	  Navy’s	  rigid	  culture	  was	  not	  open	  to	  the	  submarine,	  a	  weapon	  system	  requiring	  serious	  organizational	  capacity.	  The	  German	  naval	  culture	  did	  not	  “game”	  possible	  problems	  of	  submarine	  warfare.	  By	  not	  gaming	  how	  the	  adversary	  would	  respond,	  their	  lack	  of	  preparation	  undermined	  their	  advantage.	  In	  turn,	  they	  “Hloundered	  from	  one	  battle	  in	  the	  Atlantic	  to	  the	  next	  with	  no	  clear	  direction”	  (240-­‐241).	  Also	  consider,	  for	  instance,	  the	  work	  of	  Rear	  Admiral	  Arno	  Spindler,	  a	  U-­‐boat	  specialist	  yet	  Mahanian	  traditionalist,	  who	  was	  ignorant	  of	  the	  utility	  of	  the	  submarine	  for	  commerce	  raiding.	  In	  writing	  an	  ofHicial	  history	  of	  unrestricted	  submarine	  warfare,	  Spindler	  attempted	  to	  “misuse	  history	  to	  prove	  particular	  lessons,”	  a	  move	  that	  represents	  rigid	  organizational	  culture	  (233-­‐234).
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46	  For	  submarine	  warfare,	  interservice	  competition	  is	  non-­‐existent;	  for	  every	  actor,	  it	  neither	  fosters	  nor	  hinders	  growth.	  This	  is	  because	  the	  submarine	  clearly	  resides	  in	  any	  military’s	  naval	  force	  and	  does	  not	  initiate	  any	  interservice	  competition.	  Contrast	  that	  with	  the	  aircraft	  carrier;	  naval	  aviation,	  by	  nature,	  relates	  to	  naval	  and	  air	  divisions.
At	  Hirst,	  Allied	  organizational	  culture	  did	  not	  favor	  innovation	  either.	  The	  United	  States	  Navy	  had	  an	  organizational	  problem	  with	  recruitment	  of	  submarine	  commanders	  willing	  to	  take	  risks	  in	  a	  war	  that	  very	  much	  depended	  on	  the	  decisiveness	  of	  the	  commander	  on	  the	  spot	  (259).	  Britain’s	  rigid	  organizational	  culture	  seemed	  to	  be	  ubiquitous.	  Mahanian	  policy-­‐makers	  did	  not	  want	  to	  challenge	  the	  core	  competency	  that	  “had	  deHined	  British	  naval	  supremacy:	  gun	  battles	  between	  capital	  ships”	  (Horowitz	  2010,	  32-­‐33).	  “The	  culture	  of	  the	  ofHicer	  corps	  discouraged	  serious	  examination	  of	  disturbing	  challenges	  to	  the	  status	  quo”	  (Herwig	  1996,	  252).	  However,	  despite	  deleterious	  hesitation,	  the	  Allies’	  ability	  to	  effectively	  disperse	  a	  counterattack	  demonstrates	  relative	  organizational	  strength.	  That	  submarine	  warfare	  did	  not	  defeat	  Allied	  shipping	  in	  the	  long-­‐run	  shows	  that	  they	  had	  a	  strong	  organizational	  set.47	  Second,	  weak	  administrative	  support	  among	  German	  military	  and	  civilian	  leaders	  elicited	  a	  brief	  FMA.	  Submarine	  forces	  were	  able	  to	  “divide	  politicians	  and	  admirals	  on	  the	  issue	  of	  wartime	  roles”	  (Millet	  1996,	  364).	  Both	  Admirals	  Alfred	  von	  Tirpitz	  and	  Erich	  Raeder	  stood	  in	  opposition	  to	  submarine	  warfare.	  Only	  reluctantly	  did	  they	  realized	  it	  was	  their	  only	  available	  weapon	  (Herwig	  1996,	  231).	  Overall,	  German	  naval	  planners	  “remained	  wedded	  to	  the	  stolid	  belief	  that	  only	  a	  symmetrical	  Mahanian	  surface	  Hleet—not	  U-­‐boats—constituted	  sea	  power”	  (241)	  In	  the	  interwar	  period,	  Rear	  Admiral	  Arno	  Spindler	  was	  instrumental	  in	  collecting	  accounts	  of	  wartime	  experiences,	  especially	  from	  U-­‐boat	  commanders.	  This	  advanced	  German	  thinking	  about	  submarines	  in	  the	  1920s.	  His	  research	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47	  Interwar	  organizational	  culture	  among	  the	  British	  was	  even	  worse.	  Their	  defense	  bureaucracy	  “suffered	  from	  a	  sterile	  anti-­‐intellectualism...that	  prevented	  a	  thorough	  study	  of	  the	  ‘lessons’	  of	  1914-­‐1918.”	  The	  general	  sentiment	  was	  that	  war	  seemed	  unlikely	  in	  the	  foreseeable	  future,	  especially	  with	  the	  League	  of	  Nations	  serving	  “as	  an	  umbrella	  to	  ward	  off	  future	  wars	  of	  aggression.”	  When	  the	  Second	  World	  War	  began,	  their	  “decision	  to	  ignore	  history	  proved	  costly”	  (Herwig	  1996,	  249-­‐250).
“served	  to	  keep	  alive	  U-­‐boat	  traditions,	  attacked	  the	  prevalent	  view	  that	  the	  U-­‐boats	  had	  little	  signiHicance,	  and	  established	  small	  but	  enthusiastic	  band	  of	  submariners”	  (234).48	  On	  the	  Allied	  side,	  British	  Royal	  Navy	  Admiral	  John	  Fisher	  represents	  a	  maverick.	  His	  efforts	  to	  transition	  the	  Navy	  away	  from	  a	  solely	  Mahanian	  surface	  Hleet	  toward	  submarine	  and	  torpedo	  vessels,	  while	  ambitious	  and	  unrealistic,	  were	  impactful	  for	  protecting	  targeted	  commerce	  (Horowitz	  2010,	  141-­‐142).	  For	  the	  Americans,	  Admiral	  William	  Sims	  was	  the	  maverick	  who	  advocated	  for	  Hlotilla	  defense	  via	  the	  convoy	  system.	  Recently	  promoted	  to	  Rear	  Admiral,	  Sims	  was	  supervised	  “American	  naval	  shipping	  operating	  from	  Britain.”	  In	  that	  role,	  he	  conHlicted	  with	  his	  superiors	  like	  Secretary	  of	  the	  Navy	  Josephus	  Daniels	  and	  Chief	  of	  Naval	  Operations	  William	  Benson	  in	  order	  to	  bring	  about	  the	  convoy	  system.	  He	  brought	  in	  Atlantic	  commander	  Frank	  Mayo	  for	  administering	  anti-­‐submarine	  forces.	  Sims	  was	  an	  early,	  resolute,	  and	  vocal	  supporter	  of	  the	  convoy	  system	  (Bowling).49
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48	  In	  the	  Second	  World	  War,	  the	  debate	  among	  German	  admirals	  became	  lively.	  Admiral	  Karl	  Dönitz	  and	  Admiral	  Erich	  Raeder	  faced	  off	  regarding	  the	  impact	  of	  submarine	  warfare	  versus	  the	  impact	  of	  warships.	  After	  the	  war,	  Dönitz	  argued	  that	  the	  German	  submarine	  could	  have	  won	  the	  war,	  but	  failed	  because	  of	  lacking	  administrative	  support	  (Herwig	  1996,	  239).	  Dönitz’s	  support	  for	  unrestricted	  submarine	  warfare	  was	  partly	  the	  subject	  of	  his	  Nuremberg	  trial.	  He	  was	  found	  not	  guilty	  for	  actions	  against	  merchant	  vessels	  because	  the	  Allies	  committed	  similar	  actions.	  Dönitz	  was	  guilty	  on	  other	  charges.	  For	  more,	  see	  De	  Vabres,	  “Judgement:	  Doenitz.”49	  The	  United	  States	  did	  not	  start	  its	  own	  offensive,	  commerce-­‐raiding	  submarine	  campaign	  until	  1941.	  Chester	  Nimitz,	  %ive-­‐star	  Fleet	  Admiral	  of	  the	  United	  States	  Navy,	  served	  as	  a	  military	  maverick.	  Coming	  from	  the	  submarine	  community	  himself,	  Nimitz	  “immediately	  sent	  out	  the	  handful	  of	  submarines	  to	  conduct	  offensive	  operations”	  after	  Pearl	  Harbor	  (Symonds	  2005,	  208).	  With	  the	  political	  support	  of	  Charles	  Evans	  Hughes	  and	  President	  Franklin	  Delano	  Roosevelt,	  the	  unrestricted	  submarine	  warfare	  %lourished	  (Millett	  1996,	  364).	  Speci%ically,	  Roosevelt	  endorsed	  Admiral	  Harold	  R.	  Stark’s	  proposal	  following	  the	  attack	  on	  Pearl	  Harbor.	  Stark	  had	  already	  ordered	  Admiral	  Thomas	  C.	  Hart,	  commander-­‐in-­‐chief	  of	  the	  Asiatic	  Fleet,	  to	  prepare	  “economic	  starvation”	  of	  Japan	  in	  November	  1940.	  Roosevelt	  told	  Congressional	  leaders	  that	  the	  move	  would	  amount	  to	  a	  “strangulation	  of	  Japan—strangulation	  altogether”	  (Herwig	  1996,	  252-­‐253;	  Bemis,	  34).	  Admiral	  Nimitz	  attributed	  the	  triumph	  in	  the	  Paci%ic	  to	  the	  submarine:	  “It	  was	  to	  the	  Submarine	  Force	  that	  I	  looked	  to	  carry	  the	  load	  until	  our	  great	  industrial	  activity	  could	  produce	  the	  weapons	  we	  so	  sorely	  needed	  to	  carry	  the	  war	  to	  the	  enemy.	  It	  is	  to	  the	  everlasting	  honor	  and	  glory	  of	  our	  submarine	  personnel	  that	  they	  never	  failed	  us	  in	  our	  days	  of	  peril”	  (Roscoe	  1949,	  v).	  “Doctrinal	  development	  thus	  came	  in	  line	  with	  more	  realistic	  national	  objectives”	  (Herwig	  1996,	  256).
Third,	  the	  Germans	  were	  unable	  to	  keep	  submarine	  information	  away	  from	  their	  adversaries.	  Although	  the	  Allied	  naval	  forces	  were	  unable	  to	  use	  information	  for	  their	  own	  unrestricted	  submarine	  forces,	  the	  German	  U-­‐boat	  strategy	  was	  not	  a	  mystery	  to	  the	  Americans	  and	  British.	  In	  turn,	  the	  Allies	  were	  capable	  of	  implementing	  antisubmarine	  and	  convoy	  response	  campaigns.50	  The	  German	  information	  protection	  did	  not	  prevent	  the	  Allied	  response.51
Figure	  14.	  Submarine	  Leadership
German	  Weak	  Leadership Rigid	  Organizational	  Culture Weak	  Administrative	  Support Bureaucratic	  Competition	  Not	  A	  Factor	   Weak	  Information	  Safeguards	  American	  StrongLeadership Liberal	  Organizational	  Culture Strong	  Administrative	  Support Bureaucratic	  Competition	  Not	  A	  Factor	   Strong	  Information	  Safeguards	  British	  StrongLeadership Liberal	  Organizational	  Culture Strong	  Administrative	  Support Bureaucratic	  Competition	  Not	  A	  Factor	   Strong	  Information	  Safeguards	  
In	  summation,	  with	  regards	  to	  leadership,	  the	  FMA	  Theory	  holds	  for	  brief	  FMA	  for	  Germany	  as	  the	  Hirst	  mover.	  Internally,	  brief	  FMA	  is	  explained	  by	  weak	  leadership	  with	  a	  rigid	  organizational	  culture,	  weak	  administrative	  support,	  and	  weak	  information	  safeguards.	  Externally,	  brief	  French	  FMA	  is	  explained	  by	  the	  adversaries’	  strong	  leadership	  with	  liberal	  organizational	  culture,	  strong	  administrative	  support,	  and	  strong	  information	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50	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  the	  Allied	  convoys	  and	  antisubmarine	  response	  was	  also	  not	  protected.	  The	  Germans’	  inability	  to	  counter	  their	  response	  was	  not	  due	  to	  any	  information	  asymmetry.	  51	  It	  may	  be	  that	  such	  a	  safeguard	  is	  not	  possible.	  Submarine	  development	  occurred	  before	  the	  war	  and	  improved	  little	  during	  the	  war.	  Ultimately,	  the	  Allied	  response	  utilized	  ASW	  and	  convoys,	  which	  are	  different	  weapon	  systems	  that	  did	  not	  rely	  on	  gathering	  information	  from	  the	  German	  adversary.
safeguards.	  Ergo,	  the	  FMA	  Theory	  explains	  the	  length	  of	  FMA	  for	  the	  submarine	  warfare	  revolution.
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V.	  CASE	  STUDY:	  THE	  INTERCONTINENTAL	  BALLISTIC	  MISSILEWhen	  President	  Harry	  S.	  Truman	  ordered	  the	  use	  of	  the	  atomic	  bomb	  on	  Hiroshima	  and	  Nagasaki	  in	  August	  1945,	  he	  achieved	  two	  feats.	  First,	  the	  nuclear	  obliteration	  of	  the	  Japanese	  cities	  sealed	  the	  fate	  of	  the	  war.	  The	  United	  States	  had	  been	  invading	  the	  Japan	  homeland,	  resulting	  in	  tremendous	  casualties	  for	  both	  sides.	  Iwo	  Jima	  sustained	  over	  19,000	  American	  casualties;	  Okinawa	  sustained	  over	  80,000	  American	  casualties	  (Isaacson).	  A	  triumphant	  invasion	  of	  Japan	  was	  estimated	  to	  last	  18	  months	  and	  cause	  500,000	  American	  casualties.	  Japan	  was	  readying	  the	  deployment	  of	  2	  million	  soldiers,	  as	  well	  as	  millions	  of	  auxiliaries,	  all	  of	  which	  were	  prepared	  to	  die	  for	  the	  Empire	  of	  Japan.	  Between	  Hiroshima	  and	  Nagasaki,	  up	  to	  250,000	  Japanese	  casualties	  were	  incurred.	  Truman	  believed	  that,	  on	  balance,	  the	  Bomb	  saved	  lives.	  Second,	  through	  Hiroshima	  and	  Nagasaki,	  Truman	  signaled	  to	  Joseph	  Stalin	  and	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  an	  uncomplimentary	  World	  War	  II	  ally,	  his	  willingness	  to	  use	  the	  weapon	  system	  (Wainstock,	  2011	  96-­‐97;	  Craig	  and	  Radchenko	  2008).	  The	  latter	  represents	  the	  beginning	  of	  a	  cold	  war	  that	  lasted	  over	  four	  decades.52The	  method	  by	  which	  the	  Americans	  used	  strategic	  bombing	  was	  manned	  aerial	  bombers.	  They	  used	  the	  B-­‐29	  Enola	  Gay	  and	  Bockscar	  bombers	  in	  Hiroshima	  and	  Nagasaki,	  respectively.	  Following	  World	  War	  II,	  the	  20th	  century	  was	  marked	  by	  the	  feud	  between	  two	  global	  superpowers—the	  United	  States	  and	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  The	  introduction	  of	  nuclear	  weaponry	  spurred	  a	  perilous	  arms	  race,	  or	  the	  escalation	  in	  weaponry	  between	  the	  two	  powers,	  especially	  in	  terms	  of	  nuclear	  weapons.	  Julius	  Robert	  Oppenheimer,	  dubbed	  the	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52	  For	  a	  thorough	  report	  on	  the	  use	  of	  the	  atomic	  bomb	  and	  its	  role	  in	  the	  Cold	  War,	  see	  	  Campbell	  Craig	  and	  Sergey	  Radchenko,	  The	  Atomic	  Bomb	  and	  the	  Origins	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  (2008).
“father	  of	  the	  atomic	  bomb”	  for	  his	  work	  in	  the	  Manhattan	  Project,	  became	  an	  outspoken	  advocate	  for	  international	  nuclear	  power	  control.53Advances	  in	  missile	  technology	  led	  to	  a	  delivery	  system	  RMA,	  the	  intercontinental	  ballistic	  missile.54	  A	  ballistic	  missile	  is	  deHined	  as	  “any	  unmanned,	  actively	  guided,	  rocket-­‐propelled	  vehicle	  that	  can	  be	  Hired	  ground-­‐to-­‐ground	  along	  a	  ballistic	  (or	  parabolic)	  trajectory”	  (Karp	  1996,	  4).	  “Intercontinental”	  signiHies	  that	  the	  ballistic	  missile	  is	  capable	  of	  destroying	  targets	  at	  great	  lengths55	  and	  almost	  always	  of	  nuclear	  disposition.56	  After	  the	  impressive	  debut	  of	  Nazi	  Germany’s	  V-­‐2	  rocket	  in	  the	  last	  year	  of	  World	  War	  II,	  the	  Soviets	  and	  the	  Americans	  both	  pursued	  short-­‐range	  ballistic	  missiles	  (SRBM),	  medium-­‐range	  ballistic	  missile	  (MRBM),	  intermediate-­‐range	  ballistic	  missile	  (IRBM),	  and	  intercontinental	  ballistic	  missiles.	  While	  the	  Soviets	  were	  the	  Hirst	  to	  achieve	  ICBM	  capabilities	  with	  the	  Semyorka	  R-­‐7	  in	  August	  1957,	  the	  Americans	  countered	  with	  their	  own	  ICBM,	  the	  SM-­‐65	  Atlas,	  in	  December	  1958.	  In	  the	  following	  chapter,	  I	  will	  delineate	  the	  history	  of	  the	  ICBM—its	  development,	  adoption,	  and	  integration,	  explain	  the	  Hirst-­‐mover	  advantage,	  and	  test	  the	  FMA	  Theory.	  The	  ICBM	  demonstrates	  brief	  FMA	  due	  to	  simultaneous	  invention.	  As	  a	  Hirst	  mover,	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  experienced	  a	  brief	  advantage,	  though	  not	  because	  of	  its	  own	  faults.	  The	  FMA	  Theory	  shows	  strong	  leadership	  and	  congruent	  doctrine	  by	  both	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  the	  United	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53	  Many	  of	  the	  scientists	  and	  intellectuals	  who	  assembled	  fusion	  technology	  became	  vociferous	  advocates	  against	  the	  use	  of	  nuclear	  weapons.	  Oppenheimer	  later	  remarked	  at	  his	  1954	  security	  hearings,	  “When	  you	  see	  something	  that	  is	  technically	  sweet,	  you	  go	  ahead	  and	  do	  it	  and	  you	  argue	  about	  what	  to	  do	  about	  it	  only	  after	  you	  have	  had	  your	  technical	  success.	  That	  is	  the	  way	  it	  was	  with	  the	  atomic	  bomb.”	  Likewise,	  following	  his	  work	  on	  the	  Manhattan	  Project,	  Albert	  Einstein	  co-­‐signed	  the	  Russell–Einstein	  Manifesto,	  which	  decries	  the	  perilousness	  of	  nuclear	  escalation.	  54	  Hereafter	  referred	  to	  as	  ICBM.55	  What	  began	  as	  a	  short-­‐range	  ballistic	  missile	  that	  could	  travel	  200	  kilometers,	  the	  ICBM	  “may	  be	  launched	  from	  any	  place	  on	  earth	  and	  hit	  a	  target	  at	  any	  other	  location	  on	  earth”	  (Stine	  1991,	  2).56	  Because	  an	  ICBM	  threat	  incites	  a	  nuclear	  response,	  there	  exists	  no	  military	  reason	  for	  non-­‐nuclear	  ICBMs.
States.	  Because	  the	  United	  States	  was	  a	  simultaneous	  adopter,	  they	  followed	  quickly	  after	  the	  Soviets.	  The	  FMA	  Theory	  explains	  the	  brief	  ICBM	  FMA.
A.	  Development	  And	  Adoption	   The	  early	  history	  of	  the	  ICBM	  begins	  in	  Nazi	  Germany.	  Of	  the	  eight	  conHlicts	  in	  which	  a	  ballistic	  missile	  has	  been	  used,	  the	  most	  important	  was	  the	  German	  V-­‐2	  ballistic	  rocket.	  Today,	  the	  V-­‐2	  “remains	  the	  leading	  example	  of	  the	  use	  of	  ballistic	  missiles	  in	  warfare.	  Not	  only	  was	  it	  the	  Hirst	  successful	  long-­‐range	  rocket,	  and	  the	  Hirst	  Hired	  in	  anger,	  but	  it	  was	  also	  built	  and	  used	  in	  greater	  numbers	  than	  any	  other	  large	  rocket”	  (Karp	  1996,	  37).	  	   In	  1929,	  a	  group	  of	  amateur	  scientists	  began	  working	  on	  a	  rocket.	  A	  year	  later,	  Captain	  Walter	  Dornberger	  began	  the	  ofHicial	  development	  of	  short-­‐range	  liquid-­‐fuel	  ballistic	  missiles	  (Stine	  1991,	  14-­‐21).	  In	  1932,	  the	  Heer,	  Nazi	  Germany’s	  army,	  sponsored	  the	  project	  called	  A-­‐1,	  under	  the	  leadership	  of	  German	  rocket	  scientist	  Wernher	  von	  Braun	  (Stine	  1991,	  22-­‐26;	  Karp	  1996,	  38).	  Between	  Dornberger	  and	  von	  Braun	  and	  their	  Kummersdorf	  team,	  the	  V-­‐1	  and	  the	  V-­‐2	  missiles	  were	  created.57	  The	  V-­‐2,	  Hirst	  reaching	  Paris	  on	  September	  6,	  1944,	  was	  widely	  employed	  during	  the	  last	  year	  of	  World	  War	  II.	  Hitler	  and	  Nazi	  ofHicials	  decided	  to	  mass	  produce	  the	  V-­‐2	  because	  of	  its	  low	  cost	  (Karp	  1996,	  38-­‐40;	  Beard	  1976,	  46).58	  In	  turn,	  over	  5,700	  V-­‐2	  rockets	  were	  produced.	  It	  caused	  considerable	  damage	  to	  British	  and	  Belgian	  cities,	  delivering	  approximately	  2,400	  tonnes	  of	  high	  explosive	  and	  killed	  about	  7,000	  people	  (Karp	  1996,	  40;	  Beard	  1976,	  5).	  Although	  the	  German	  V-­‐2	  missile’s	  range	  was	  only	  a	  few	  hundred	  miles,	  “it	  was	  a	  clear	  harbinger	  of	  the	  future”	  (Zaloga	  2002,	  35).
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57	  For	  a	  more	  speci%ic	  account	  of	  V-­‐2	  missile	  development,	  see	  George	  Harry	  Stine,	  ICBM:	  The	  
Making	  Of	  The	  Weapon	  That	  Changed	  The	  World	  (Stine	  1991,	  27-­‐80).58	  While	  the	  operating	  costs	  were	  low	  relative	  to	  the	  devastation	  it	  created,	  research	  and	  development	  investment	  constituted	  60	  percent	  of	  the	  program’s	  total	  cost	  (Karp	  1996,	  38-­‐40).
	   In	  the	  immediate	  post-­‐war	  era,	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  began	  focusing	  efforts	  on	  missile	  development.	  Despite	  the	  war	  ending	  with	  the	  Red	  Army	  at	  its	  zenith	  as	  the	  largest	  army	  in	  the	  world,	  the	  August	  1945	  atomic	  bomb	  shifted	  the	  balance	  of	  power	  away	  from	  the	  Soviets.	  Joseph	  Stalin	  realized	  the	  implications	  of	  the	  atomic	  bomb,	  contrary	  to	  his	  public	  pronouncements	  saying	  otherwise.	  Accordingly,	  Stalin	  authorized	  an	  expensive	  crash	  program	  for	  missile	  development	  (1-­‐3).	  In	  May	  1946,	  Stalin	  formed	  Special	  Committee	  Number	  Two,	  tasked	  with	  overseeing	  the	  development	  of	  new	  strategic	  offensive	  weapons	  (36).	  The	  Soviets	  attempted	  to	  learn	  from	  German	  scientists.	  They	  attempted	  to	  recover	  lost	  documentation	  and	  study	  captured	  manufacturing	  plants.59	  Soviet	  rocket	  scientist	  Sergey	  Pavlovich	  Korolyov	  led	  the	  ScientiHic-­‐Research	  Institute	  Number	  88,	  a	  secured	  and	  independent	  bureau	  for	  missile	  research	  and	  development.	  In	  1947,	  Korolyov	  went	  to	  the	  Kremlin	  to	  meet	  with	  Stalin	  regarding	  the	  R-­‐1	  (Stine	  1991,	  125).	  Both	  the	  R-­‐1	  and	  R-­‐2	  ICBMs	  were	  not	  armed	  with	  nuclear	  warheads,	  but	  instead	  only	  high-­‐explosive	  warheads.	  This	  was	  because	  of	  low	  reliability,	  heaviness	  of	  early	  nuclear	  systems,	  and	  the	  relatively	  small	  number	  of	  warheads	  available	  (Zaloga	  2002,	  39).	  The	  R-­‐2	  exhibited	  range	  that	  was	  twice	  that	  of	  the	  German	  V-­‐2.	  Then,	  the	  R-­‐5M	  gave	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  nuclear	  strike	  capability	  up	  to	  750	  miles,	  though	  it	  still	  could	  not	  reliability	  reach	  American	  bomber	  bases	  in	  the	  United	  Kingdom,	  Japan,	  or	  the	  PaciHic	  (42).	   Prior	  to	  the	  unveiling	  of	  the	  R-­‐7,	  the	  hydrogen	  bomb	  was	  introduced.	  The	  Americans	  demonstrated	  the	  hydrogen	  bomb	  in	  the	  PaciHic	  on	  November	  1,	  1952.	  In	  response,	  the	  Soviets	  tested	  their	  Hirst	  hydrogen	  bomb	  in	  1953.	  The	  Soviet	  thermonuclear	  weapon,	  developed	  by	  Andrei	  Sakharov	  and	  1,000	  times	  the	  magnitude	  of	  the	  atomic	  bomb,	  was	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59	  Nonetheless,	  the	  eventual	  Soviet	  R-­‐7	  product	  was	  notably	  unique	  from	  the	  German	  V-­‐2	  experience.
demonstrated	  at	  the	  Semipalatinsk	  test	  site	  in	  northern	  Kazakhstan	  (Evangelista	  1988,	  168-­‐169).60 	  	   The	  Soviet	  R-­‐7	  was	  Hinally	  introduced	  in	  August	  1957,	  but	  it	  was	  a	  decade-­‐long	  project.	  At	  this	  point,	  the	  Soviet	  ICBMs	  were	  “not	  readily	  producible	  and	  were	  not	  good	  strategic	  weapons.”	  Regardless,	  the	  Soviets	  “had	  indeed	  ‘beaten’	  the	  United	  States	  to	  a	  vital	  weapon.”	  As	  Warner	  R.	  Schilling	  writes,	  “Beyond	  a	  doubt,	  the	  Soviet	  ICBM	  of	  1957	  both	  preceded	  in	  time	  and	  was	  of	  superior	  performance	  to	  its	  1958	  American	  counterpart”	  (Beard	  1976,	  4).61	   Far	  more	  public	  and	  impactful,	  however,	  was	  the	  Soviet	  launch	  of	  Sputnik	  I,	  the	  Hirst	  earth	  satellite,	  on	  October	  4,	  1957.	  One	  month	  later,	  the	  Soviets	  launched	  Sputnik	  II,	  a	  much	  larger	  satellite.	  Sputnik	  was	  an	  empty	  satellite—void	  of	  any	  cameras,	  devices,	  or	  research	  tools.	  Sputnik	  “caused	  an	  enormous	  shock	  in	  the	  United	  States,”	  and	  undermined	  presumed	  American	  technological	  superiority.	  It	  was	  of	  “enormous	  symbolic	  importance,	  [as]	  American	  international	  prestige	  and	  American	  domestic	  self-­‐perception	  and	  self-­‐conHidence	  were	  strongly	  shaken”	  (1).	  With	  “the	  entire	  world	  turning	  its	  eyes	  skyward,”	  Sputnik	  was	  a	  transformative	  moment	  for	  the	  Cold	  War.	  It	  “left	  Americans	  feeling	  vulnerable,	  behind,	  and	  scandalized.”	  In	  response,	  Senate	  Majority	  Leader	  Lyndon	  B.	  Johnson	  led	  hearings	  and	  voiced	  national	  outrage.	  Johnson	  spoke	  what	  was	  on	  everyone’s	  mind:	  the	  likelihood	  of	  the	  Soviets	  “dropping	  bombs	  on	  us	  from	  space	  like	  kids	  dropping	  rocks	  onto	  cars	  from	  freeway	  overpasses”	  (Heefner	  2012,	  27).	  Among	  American	  leadership,	  only	  one	  question	  was	  looming:	  how	  did	  we	  fall	  behind	  the	  Soviets?	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60	  Oppenheimer	  opposed	  the	  development	  of	  the	  hydrogen	  bomb	  because	  he	  rightly	  feared	  it	  would	  lead	  to	  an	  arms	  race	  between	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  the	  United	  States	  (Evangelista	  1988,	  106-­‐108).61	  Quoted	  in	  Warner	  R.	  Schilling,	  The	  Politics	  of	  National	  Defense:	  Fiscal	  1950	  (1962,	  39).
	   The	  United	  States	  emerged	  from	  the	  Second	  World	  War	  as	  a	  global	  superpower.	  With	  a	  monopoly	  on	  atomic	  weapons	  and	  the	  largest	  Air	  Force,	  the	  United	  States	  was	  rivaled	  only	  by	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  (Bottome	  1971,	  15).	  Concerned	  about	  the	  perceived	  Communist	  expansion,	  the	  United	  States	  adopted	  a	  policy	  of	  containment	  in	  1948.	  Containment	  policy	  “was	  the	  evolving	  concept	  of	  deterrence.	  According	  to	  this	  idea,	  the	  decisive	  task	  of	  the	  military	  leaders	  was	  no	  longer	  to	  vanquish	  in	  war,	  but	  to	  deter	  the	  enemy	  from	  precipitating	  an	  attack”	  (16).	  The	  American	  hydrogen	  bomb,	  showcased	  in	  1952,	  was	  a	  “crucial	  weapon	  in	  the	  emergence...in	  the	  policy	  of	  strategic	  deterrence”	  (17).	  	   From	  the	  onset	  of	  early	  German	  missile	  use,	  the	  American	  defense	  community	  was	  interested	  in	  developing	  a	  similar	  weapon.	  When	  the	  Hirst	  German	  missiles	  exploded	  in	  London	  in	  September	  1944,	  the	  United	  States	  Air	  Technical	  Service	  Command	  requested	  a	  similar	  weapon.	  In	  the	  fall	  of	  1945,	  the	  Air	  Staff	  expanded	  the	  guided	  missiles	  program	  within	  the	  United	  States	  Air	  Force	  (Beard	  1976,	  46).	  	   Following	  the	  war,	  the	  United	  States	  forced	  German	  scientists	  relocation	  to	  the	  United	  States	  via	  Operation	  Paperclip	  in	  order	  to	  learn	  more	  about	  the	  German	  V-­‐2	  missile	  program.	  Slow,	  yet	  meaningful	  development	  occurred	  in	  the	  late	  1940s.	  Research	  and	  development	  was	  at	  an	  all-­‐time	  high.	  Between	  presidential	  support	  for	  development	  and	  thorough	  assessment	  of	  German	  rocket	  technology,	  guided	  missile	  development	  had	  the	  means	  to	  Hlourish	  (46).	  However,	  some	  budgetary	  setbacks	  hindered	  the	  program,	  such	  as	  a	  7	  million	  dollars	  cut	  that	  cancelled	  11	  of	  the	  planned	  28	  guided	  missile	  projects	  in	  1947	  (53).	  Looking	  back	  on	  history,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  American	  missile	  development	  between	  the	  end	  of	  the	  war	  and	  Sputnik	  was	  slow.	  As	  Edmund	  Beard	  writes,	  “the	  story	  of	  the	  American	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ICBM	  through	  a	  long	  pattern	  of	  disbelief,	  neglect,	  and	  delay—some	  of	  it	  apparently	  justiHied	  in	  the	  clear	  light	  of	  hindsight,	  some	  of	  it	  not”	  (5).	  	   In	  the	  next	  decade,	  the	  American	  missile	  program	  developed	  through	  fear.	  American	  resources	  began	  to	  be	  redirected	  toward	  accelerate	  ballistic	  missile	  development	  only	  in	  1954,	  seven	  years	  after	  the	  Soviets	  had	  done	  so	  (12).	  Especially	  after	  Sputnik,	  the	  American	  ICBM	  program	  progressed	  remarkably	  quickly.62	  Although	  the	  Eisenhower	  administration	  tried	  to	  quell	  public	  fear,	  the	  overwhelming	  assumption	  was	  that	  the	  Soviets	  were	  dangerously	  ahead	  in	  missile	  development	  (2).	  In	  particular,	  the	  concern	  regarded	  a	  supposed	  “missile	  gap”	  scare—that	  the	  “USSR	  might	  be	  able,	  by	  taking	  advantage	  of	  its	  development	  lead,	  to	  gain	  a	  Hirst-­‐strike	  capability	  against	  the	  United	  States	  which	  could	  not	  be	  effectively	  answered”—a	  highly	  debated	  topic	  in	  the	  1950s	  (7).	  Edgar	  M.	  Bottome,	  who	  argues	  that	  the	  missile	  gap	  was	  a	  myth,	  explains:“The	  distinction	  is	  made	  between	  a	  possible	  ‘missile	  lag’	  which	  would	  not	  have	  endangered	  the	  security	  of	  the	  United	  States,	  and	  a	  possible	  “deterrent	  gap”	  which	  could	  have	  threatened	  American	  security.	  A	  missile	  lag	  would	  have	  meant	  simply	  that	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  had	  more	  missiles	  than	  the	  United	  States.	  A	  deterrent	  gap	  would	  have	  meant	  that	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  possessed	  the	  ability	  to	  destroy	  United	  States	  retaliatory	  installations	  in	  a	  Hirst	  strike,	  and	  thereby	  effectively	  remove	  the	  American	  ability	  to	  deter”	  (Bottome	  1971,	  9).In	  1958,	  the	  year	  after	  the	  launch	  of	  Sputnik	  and	  the	  R-­‐7	  demonstration	  point,	  the	  United	  States	  revealed	  the	  Atlas,	  its	  Hirst	  ICBM	  (Stine	  1991,	  189-­‐202).
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62	  See	  Figure	  15,	  United	  States	  Expenditures	  on	  Missile	  Systems,	  FY	  1946-­‐1960	  (87).
	   Before	  analyzing	  how	  the	  mutual	  timing	  of	  the	  ICBM	  by	  the	  Soviets	  and	  Americans	  created	  a	  brief	  FMA,	  the	  development	  gap	  must	  Hirst	  be	  explained	  in	  terms	  of	  weak	  American	  leadership	  and	  incongruent	  American	  doctrine	  between	  1948	  to	  1953.63,	  64 	  	   For	  leadership,	  the	  United	  States	  exhibited	  “not	  a	  short-­‐term	  struggle	  between	  competing	  interests	  over	  a	  speciHic	  decision,	  but	  rather	  a	  decade-­‐long	  pattern	  of	  non-­‐decisions,	  characterized	  by	  inaction,	  procrastination,	  selective	  ignorance,	  and	  an	  unwillingness	  to	  recognize	  new	  facts”	  (Beard	  1976,	  216).	  The	  United	  States	  organizational	  culture	  hindered	  ICBM	  development,	  because	  it	  challenged	  the	  Air	  Force’s	  manned	  bomber	  core	  competency.	  In	  fact,	  not	  uncommon	  to	  other	  challenges	  to	  a	  core	  competency,	  the	  organization	  faced	  a	  paradox:“Ballistic	  missiles	  obviously	  were	  among	  the	  most	  important	  Air	  Force	  functions.	  Were	  they	  to	  go	  to	  another	  service,	  the	  Air	  Force’s	  autonomy,	  and	  indeed	  its	  purpose,	  would	  be	  threatened.	  However,	  the	  missiles	  also	  challenged	  the	  organizational	  essence	  and	  thus	  the	  Air	  Force’s	  morale.	  The	  result	  was	  the	  ambivalent	  approach	  of	  the	  Air	  Force	  followed	  until,	  and	  even	  after,	  the	  dictates	  of	  the	  [Strategic	  Missiles	  Evaluation	  Committee].	  On	  one	  hand,	  missiles	  were	  dismissed	  or	  derided,	  while	  on	  the	  other,	  they	  were	  consistently	  claimed	  as	  Air	  Force	  weapons	  and	  missile	  efforts	  by	  the	  other	  services	  were	  strongly	  resisted”	  (229).Instead	  of	  developing	  the	  ICBM,	  the	  Air	  Force	  believed	  the	  next	  war	  “would	  be	  fought	  and	  won	  by	  attacking	  the	  enemy	  from	  the	  air	  and	  destroying	  his	  cities	  and	  industrial	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63	  This	  is	  not	  an	  explanation	  of	  the	  FMA.	  Rather,	  it	  aims	  to	  explain	  why	  the	  United	  States	  lagged	  in	  development.	  This	  explores	  the	  period	  prior	  to	  the	  Soviet	  introduction,	  while	  the	  FMA	  explores	  the	  period	  after	  the	  Soviet	  introduction.64	  After	  1953,	  the	  United	  States	  changed	  to	  strong	  leadership	  and	  congruent	  doctrine,	  like	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  had	  been	  maintaining,	  which	  will	  be	  explained	  in	  Analysis.
potential”	  (Bottome	  1971,	  18).	  On	  an	  individual	  level,	  “Men	  who	  had	  always	  Hlown	  and	  relied	  upon	  bombers	  found	  it	  hard,	  indeed	  almost	  impossible,	  to	  sense	  the	  revolutionary	  implications	  of	  ballistic	  missiles”	  (Beard	  1976,	  8).	  Thus,	  they	  developed	  the	  B-­‐36	  bomber,	  a	  weapon	  system	  that	  aligned	  with	  their	  core	  competency.	  	   Moreover,	  lack	  of	  mavericks	  within	  the	  defense	  community	  lead	  to	  a	  delayed	  start	  for	  the	  Americans.	  After	  the	  war,	  Air	  Force	  Chief	  of	  Staff	  General	  Henry	  Arnold	  noted	  that	  the	  long-­‐range	  ballistic	  missile	  was	  feasible,	  yet	  not	  in	  the	  near	  future	  (5).	   Institutional	  support	  for	  missile	  development	  was	  in	  minority.	  Following	  General	  Arnold’s	  retirement	  in	  1946,	  “no	  powerful	  Higure	  or	  group	  within	  the	  Air	  Force	  gave	  much	  consideration	  to	  long-­‐range	  ballistic	  missile	  potentials”	  (12).	  Although	  the	  Air	  Research	  and	  Development	  Command	  viewed	  the	  missile	  favorably,	  the	  agency	  was	  only	  created	  in	  1951.	  In	  turn,	  the	  agency	  was	  less	  able	  to	  lobby	  than	  its	  peer	  agencies	  (8-­‐9,	  107-­‐110).	  	  Instead,	  the	  Air	  Force	  concentrated	  on	  manned	  aircraft	  development,	  namely	  the	  jet-­‐engined	  Snark	  and	  Navaho.	  According	  to	  a	  June	  1947	  Air	  Force	  report,	  long-­‐range,	  surface-­‐to-­‐surface	  missiles	  ranked	  fourth	  in	  terms	  of	  development	  priority	  (5).	  	   In	  terms	  of	  doctrine,	  resource	  allocation	  did	  not	  favor	  the	  ICBM	  program	  until	  the	  late	  1950s.	  It	  was	  argued	  that	  with	  missile	  development	  came	  much	  technological	  uncertainty.	  However,	  this	  uncertainty	  was	  caused	  by	  “insufHicient	  funds	  (and	  for	  some	  time	  no	  funds	  at	  all)	  allocated	  to	  their	  solution”	  (9).	  Militaries	  typically	  operate	  under	  the	  principle	  of	  least	  harm.	  Yet,	  the	  United	  States	  Armed	  Forces	  failed	  to	  conduct	  a	  sufHicient	  research	  and	  development	  in	  order	  to	  prevent	  deleterious	  surprises.	  Even	  despite	  the	  defense	  spending	  increases	  during	  the	  Korean	  War,	  the	  ICBM	  “was	  kept	  on	  a	  sputtering	  back	  burner	  until	  outside	  civilian	  dictate	  caused	  a	  reversal”	  (9).	  For	  a	  breakdown	  on	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expenditures	  on	  missile	  technology,	  see	  Figure	  15.	  Note	  the	  extreme	  lack	  of	  ICBM	  funding	  before	  1954.	   Figure	  15.	  United	  States	  Expenditures	  on	  Missile	  Systems,	  FY	  1946	  -­‐	  196065
Fiscal	  Year IR/ICBM	  Programs Other	  Surface-­‐to-­‐Surface	  Missile	  Programs All	  Other	  Missile	  Programs Grand	  Total,	  All	  Missile	  Programs1946	  &	  Prior 2 19 51 721947 — 20 38 581948 0.3 36 45 811949 0.1 45 53 981950 — 65 69 1341951 0.5 185 598 7841952 0.8 239 818 1,0581953 3 403 760 1,1661954 14 336 717 1,0671955 159 398 911 1,4681956 526 387 1,368 2,2811957 1,401 603 2,502 4,5061958 2,150 639 2,391 5,1801959 2,946 685 3,269 6,9001960 3,303 509 3,173 6,985
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65	  Measured	  in	  millions	  of	  dollars.	  Adapted	  from	  the	  chart	  found	  in	  “Hearings:	  Missiles,	  Space,	  and	  
Other	  Major	  Defense	  Matters.”	  United	  States	  Senate,	  Committee	  on	  Armed	  Services,	  Preparedness	  Investigating	  Subcommittee,	  86th	  Congress,	  2nd	  Session,	  1960,	  509.	  In	  Edmund	  Beard,	  Developing	  
the	  ICBM:	  A	  Study	  in	  Bureaucratic	  Politics	  (1976,	  206).
	   While	  the	  development	  phases	  were	  varied	  and	  lengthy,	  the	  adoption	  phase	  of	  the	  ICBM	  occurred	  nearly	  simultaneously	  and	  quickly.	  Due	  to	  the	  nature	  of	  nuclear	  weaponry	  and	  ICBM	  reach,	  possession	  of	  the	  weapon	  system	  matters	  only	  as	  much	  as	  operational	  capability	  to	  use	  it.	  Therefore,	  adoption	  is	  a	  quick	  follow-­‐up	  to	  introduction.	  	   For	  both	  the	  Soviets	  and	  Americans,	  ICBM	  adoption	  occurred	  in	  the	  late	  1950s	  and	  early	  1960s.	  Strategic	  force	  structures	  were	  being	  institutionalized.	  Both	  the	  R-­‐7	  and	  Atlas	  ICBMs	  were	  “by	  no	  means	  mature	  weapon	  systems,	  but	  they	  held	  out	  the	  hope	  for	  a	  reasonably	  robust	  nuclear	  delivery	  system	  that	  had	  a	  high	  probability	  of	  being	  able	  to	  carry	  out	  their	  mission	  in	  the	  face	  of	  existing	  [adversary]	  defenses.	  (Zaloga	  2002,	  57).	  The	  Soviet	  program,	  ofHicially	  deployed	  in	  1961,	  “proved	  so	  poorly	  suited	  to	  the	  rapidly	  changing	  strategic	  environment	  that	  the	  program	  had	  to	  be	  curtailed”	  (60).66 	  	   Once	  the	  United	  States	  committed	  to	  the	  ICBM	  development,	  they	  achieved	  their	  goal	  quickly.	  As	  shown	  in	  Figure	  16,	  Atlas	  development	  was	  quick,	  relative	  to	  bomber	  programs.	  Following	  the	  lag	  in	  development,	  the	  Americans	  felt	  an	  obligation	  to	  “race	  ahead”	  both	  in	  the	  weapon	  systems	  actual	  adoption	  and	  publicity	  of	  its	  adoption	  (60-­‐61).	  For	  instance,	  advancement	  in	  Weapon	  System	  Q,	  commonly	  known	  as	  Minuteman,	  showed	  the	  American	  adoption	  of	  ICBMs.	  Public	  promotion	  of	  the	  platform	  was	  ubiquitous.	  Its	  very	  name	  was	  unique—unlike	  the	  previous	  mythological	  names	  (Thor,	  Jupiter,	  Titan,	  Atlas,	  Nike,	  and	  Zeus),	  “Minuteman”	  prompted	  American	  imagery	  (Heefner	  2012,	  30).	  Between	  local	  and	  national	  newspaper	  coverage,	  a	  public	  unveiling,	  a	  Hilm	  on	  the	  Air	  Force	  narrated	  by	  Walter	  Cronkite,	  and	  Roy	  Neal’s	  Ace	  In	  The	  Hole,	  the	  public	  was	  well	  aware	  of	  the	  ICBM	  program	  (34).
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66	  In	  fact,	  this	  led	  to	  a	  Soviet	  “missile	  gap,”	  which	  is	  credited	  with	  being	  an	  underlying	  and	  overlooked	  reason	  for	  the	  Cuban	  Missile	  Crisis	  (Zaloga	  2002,	  60).
	   Figure	  16.	  United	  States	  Development	  Pace	  Among	  Air	  Weapon	  Systems67
Program Years	  to	  First	  Unit	  DeploymentB-­‐47 7.6B-­‐52 9.4B-­‐58 11.2Snark 13.4
Navaho Cancelled	  After	  9.5	  Years	  of	  R&D	  TestingThor 3.3	  First	  Squadron	  Complete
Atlas 4.9	  First	  Complex5.2	  First	  Squadron	  Complete
B.	  Integration	  And	  First-­Mover	  AdvantageFor	  the	  ICBM,	  integration	  occurred	  in	  the	  1960s.	  With	  the	  arms	  race	  underway,	  both	  the	  United	  States	  and	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  fully	  integrated	  the	  ICBM	  into	  their	  bureaucracies.	  By	  1961,	  the	  missile	  gap	  no	  longer	  existed,	  because	  each	  had	  a	  sufHicient	  amount	  of	  ICBMs	  to	  deter	  the	  other.	  By	  1967,	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  had	  a	  over	  700	  ICBMs,	  and	  the	  United	  States	  was	  capable	  of	  delivering	  1,054	  warheads	  from	  its	  ICBMs	  (Beard	  1976,	  213;	  Dumbrell	  2004,	  62).	  In	  essence,	  the	  critics	  of	  missile	  escalation	  and	  strategic	  deterrence	  were	  unsuccessful	  (Zaloga	  2002,	  60-­‐61).Other	  methods	  of	  using	  ICBMs	  were	  integral	  to	  its	  integration.	  Ballistic	  missile	  submarines	  featuring	  ICBMs,	  or	  submarine-­‐launched	  ballistic	  missiles	  (SLBMs),	  only	  furthers	  the	  deterrence	  strategy.	  In	  the	  United	  States,	  the	  USS	  George	  Washington	  debuted	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67	  Adapted	  from	  the	  chart	  found	  in	  Edmund	  Beard,	  Developing	  the	  ICBM:	  A	  Study	  in	  Bureaucratic	  
Politics	  (1976,	  201).
its	  Hirst	  submerged	  missile	  launch	  in	  July	  1960,	  and	  eventually	  carried	  16	  Polaris	  missiles	  on	  board.	  In	  September	  1960,	  the	  Soviet	  Union’s	  Hirst	  SLBM	  was	  achieved	  through	  Project	  611	  (Stine	  1991,	  204-­‐211).	  By	  operating	  in	  stealth	  environments,	  submarines	  are	  capable	  of	  launching	  a	  devastating	  retaliatory	  strike,	  after	  a	  Hirst	  strike	  occurs.	  The	  incorporation	  of	  ICBMs	  into	  the	  Soviet	  and	  American	  navies	  demonstrates	  the	  interservice	  integration	  during	  the	  1960s.	  Moreover,	  the	  FMA	  must	  be	  clearly	  deHined	  in	  this	  case.	  Following	  the	  introduction	  of	  the	  Soviet	  R-­‐7	  ICBM	  in	  August	  1957,	  the	  United	  States	  was	  quickly	  able	  to	  catch	  up,	  and	  in	  December	  of	  the	  next	  year,	  the	  Americans	  launched	  Atlas.	  Thus,	  the	  Soviets	  had	  a	  brief	  FMA	  over	  the	  ICBM	  weapon	  system.	  SpeciHically,	  the	  brief	  FMA	  is	  due	  to	  simultaneous	  innovation.	  Following	  a	  dramatic	  shift	  to	  strong	  leadership	  and	  congruent	  doctrine	  in	  1954,	  the	  United	  States	  was	  able	  to	  adopt	  the	  ICBM.	  Meanwhile,	  the	  Soviets	  had	  a	  static	  strong	  leadership	  and	  congruent	  doctrine.	  In	  addition,	  the	  ICBM	  FMA	  is	  unique	  in	  two	  regards.	  First,	  like	  possessing	  a	  nuclear	  weapon,	  the	  advantage	  is	  not	  in	  actual	  deployment	  of	  the	  weapon	  system.	  Had	  either	  the	  United	  States	  or	  Soviet	  Union	  actually	  used	  their	  ICBM	  arsenals	  in	  combat,	  it	  would	  have	  likely	  caused	  extreme	  devastation.	  Achievement	  of	  just	  one	  ICBM	  is	  enough	  to	  shift	  the	  power	  distribution;	  ICBM	  capability	  is	  of	  inherent	  value.	  Second,	  the	  measurement	  of	  nuclear	  weapons	  or	  ICBMs	  is	  not	  in	  the	  absolute	  quantity,	  but	  the	  quantity	  relative	  to	  the	  adversary,	  evidenced	  by	  the	  American	  fear	  of	  a	  missile	  deterrence	  gap	  in	  the	  late	  1950s.
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C.	  AnalysisThe	  ICBM	  FMA	  explains	  the	  period	  from	  1954	  to	  1960—the	  period	  in	  which	  the	  United	  States	  realizes	  it	  is	  behind	  in	  missile	  development,	  receives	  a	  surprise	  with	  the	  Sputnik	  launch,	  and	  successfully	  acts	  to	  catch	  up	  to	  the	  Soviets.	  The	  brief	  ICBM	  FMA	  by	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  is	  characterized	  by	  internal	  strong	  leadership	  and	  congruent	  doctrine	  as	  well	  as	  external	  strong	  leadership	  and	  congruent	  doctrine.	  The	  ICBM	  FMA	  is	  an	  example	  of	  simultaneous	  innovation.
Figure	  17.	  Intercontinental	  Ballistic	  Missile	  Results
Leadership CongruenceSoviet	  Union Strong CongruentUnited	  States Strong Congruent
As	  per	  the	  requisite	  assumptions,	  the	  ICBM	  has	  high	  organizational	  and	  technological	  barriers	  to	  entry.	  When	  it	  comes	  to	  the	  ICBM,	  there	  is	  no	  room	  for	  error	  in	  technology	  or	  organization;	  miscalculation	  or	  oversight	  would	  prompt	  catastrophe.	  Technologically,	  missile	  technology	  requires	  an	  extensive	  research	  and	  development	  phase.	  Long-­‐range	  missiles	  were	  ostensibly	  impossible	  in	  the	  World	  War	  II.	  The	  ICBM	  only	  became	  feasible	  because	  of	  three	  enabling	  technologies:	  fusion	  weapons	  (developed	  from	  1950	  to	  1955),	  multistage	  rockets	  (developed	  from	  1945	  to	  1955),	  and	  inertial	  guidance	  (developed	  from	  1950	  to	  1955).68	  Organizationally,	  the	  ICBM	  also	  faces	  high	  barriers	  to	  entry.	  By	  nature	  of	  the	  weapon	  system,	  the	  ICBM	  does	  not	  easily	  Hit	  in	  one	  branch	  of	  the	  military.	  It	  requires	  deliberate	  planning	  and	  careful	  shielding	  from	  adversaries.	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68	  See	  Figure	  2,	  An	  RMA	  Requires	  an	  Enabling	  Technology	  (14).	  
C1.	  The	  Intercontinental	  Ballistic	  Missile:	  Doctrinal	  CongruenceAfter	  1954,	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  the	  United	  States	  militaries	  both	  demonstrate	  congruence	  through	  doctrinal	  compatibility	  and	  favorable	  resource	  allocation.	  First,	  the	  ICBM	  was	  compatible	  with	  both	  the	  American	  and	  Soviet	  military	  needs.	  In	  terms	  of	  deterrence,	  the	  long-­‐range	  missile	  promoted	  the	  notion	  of	  mutually-­‐assured	  destruction	  (MAD)	  and	  massive	  retaliation,	  effectively	  thwarting	  either	  side	  from	  reverting	  to	  nuclear	  warfare.	  MAD	  is	  the	  military	  policy	  in	  which	  one	  state’s	  use	  of	  a	  nuclear	  weapon	  will	  prompt	  a	  full-­‐scale	  nuclear	  holocaust	  to	  both	  parties.	  Massive	  retaliation,	  a	  term	  coined	  by	  Secretary	  of	  State	  John	  Foster	  Dulles	  which	  commits	  a	  state	  to	  respond	  to	  an	  attack	  with	  overwhelming	  greater	  force,	  renders	  the	  Hirst	  act	  of	  aggression	  unattractive.	  Assuming	  that	  rational	  actors	  are	  not	  willing	  to	  suffer	  from	  a	  nuclear	  bombardment,	  MAD	  is	  a	  form	  of	  Nash	  equilibrium	  that	  disincentivizes	  the	  use	  of	  nuclear	  weapons.	  Thus,	  neither	  side	  will	  incur	  the	  costs	  of	  a	  Hirst	  strike	  (Bettes	  1981,	  289-­‐290).	  As	  a	  strategic	  alternative	  to	  bombers,	  the	  ICBM	  made	  a	  devastating	  retaliation	  automatic,	  and	  thereby	  a	  Hirst	  strike	  less	  acceptable.The	  ICBM	  did	  not	  have	  a	  cheap	  alternative.	  Anti-­‐ballistic	  missile	  and	  missile	  defense	  systems	  were	  not	  plausible	  in	  the	  1950s	  or	  1960s.	  It	  did	  not	  affect	  the	  trajectory	  of	  the	  ICBM	  adoption.For	  the	  Soviets,	  the	  ICBM	  seemed	  like	  the	  perfect	  system	  to	  challenge	  the	  American	  nuclear	  superiority	  that	  resulted	  from	  the	  World	  War	  II	  bombing	  of	  Hiroshima	  and	  Nagasaki.	  For	  the	  same	  strategic	  necessities	  the	  Americans	  faced,	  the	  Soviets	  believed	  ICBMs	  were	  compatible	  with	  their	  defense	  goals.	  For	  the	  Americans,	  the	  ICBM	  adoption	  aligned	  with	  defense	  fears.	  Because	  of	  the	  missile	  gap	  threat,	  the	  Americans	  felt	  obligated	  to	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deter	  a	  Soviet	  Hirst	  strike.	  After	  1954,	  the	  Atlas	  was	  deemed	  a	  necessary	  project	  to	  promote.	  The	  pace	  of	  adoption	  was	  only	  quickened	  following	  American	  embarrassment	  and	  public	  fear	  over	  Sputnik	  (Beard	  1976,	  7).	  	  Second,	  both	  the	  American	  and	  Soviet	  ICBM	  programs	  received	  favorable	  resource	  allocation	  after	  1954.	  In	  fact,	  for	  the	  Soviets,	  constant	  resources	  were	  devoted	  to	  the	  program	  since	  Stalin’s	  observation	  of	  the	  1945	  American	  atomic	  bomb	  (Zaloga	  2002,	  2).	  For	  the	  United	  States,	  the	  Atlas	  was	  well-­‐funded,	  despite	  overall	  defense	  budget	  cuts.	  Sudden	  enlargement	  in	  ICBM	  funding	  occurred	  after	  1954.69	  The	  Gillette	  Proposals,	  which	  aimed	  to	  quicken	  the	  budgetary	  process	  for	  ICBMs,	  “permitted	  the	  bypassing	  of	  much	  of	  the	  normal	  Air	  Force	  review	  system”	  (Beard	  1976,	  216-­‐217).	  Implementation	  of	  the	  Gillette	  Proposals	  eliminated	  the	  previous	  “problems	  and	  delays	  that	  heretofore	  beset	  the	  ICBM	  program”	  (Beard	  1974,	  193-­‐194).
Figure	  18.	  Intercontinental	  Ballistic	  Missile	  Doctrinal	  Congruence
Soviet	  Union Compatible Favorable	  Resource	  Allocation
United	  States Compatible Favorable	  Resource	  Allocation
In	  summation,	  with	  regards	  to	  doctrinal	  congruence,	  the	  theory	  holds	  for	  brief	  FMA	  for	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  the	  United	  States	  as	  simultaneous	  innovators.	  As	  a	  Hirst	  mover,	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  internally	  possesses	  doctrinal	  congruence	  with	  a	  compatible	  doctrine	  and	  favorable	  resource	  allocation.	  As	  a	  secondary	  actor,	  the	  United	  States	  also	  possesses	  doctrinal	  congruence	  with	  compatible	  doctrine	  and	  favorable	  resource	  allocation.	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69	  See	  Figure	  15,	  United	  States	  Expenditures	  on	  Missile	  Systems,	  FY	  1946-­‐1960	  (87).
C2.	  The	  Intercontinental	  Ballistic	  Missile:	  LeadershipAfter	  1954,	  both	  the	  United	  States	  and	  Soviet	  Union	  possess	  strong	  leadership	  characteristics—liberal	  organizational	  cultures,	  strong	  administrative	  support,	  bureaucratic	  competition	  that	  enhances	  innovation,	  and	  strong	  information	  safeguards.First,	  the	  two	  actors	  express	  very	  different	  organizational	  cultures,	  and	  neither	  culture	  was	  better	  suited	  to	  adopt	  the	  ICBM.	  The	  United	  States	  was	  a	  maritime	  power.	  Navies	  tend	  to	  have	  a	  global	  outlook,	  and	  the	  Air	  Force	  adopted	  this	  perspective.	  The	  Soviet	  Union	  was	  a	  more	  traditional	  continental	  power.	  With	  an	  army-­‐dominated	  culture,	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  acted	  to	  emphasize	  ground-­‐based	  weapon	  systems.	  Decision-­‐making	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  was	  very	  centralized,	  allowing	  for	  swift	  changes	  to	  doctrine.70	  Although	  the	  Soviet	  organizational	  culture	  is	  identiHied	  as	  “liberal,”	  it	  must	  again	  be	  noted	  that	  “liberal”	  means	  open	  to	  innovation	  and	  not	  bureaucratically	  closed	  off	  to	  the	  RMA.	  In	  general,	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  was	  very	  much	  not	  politically	  liberal.	  Relative	  to	  the	  American	  organizational	  culture,	  Soviet	  bureaucratic	  politics	  played	  a	  lesser	  role	  in	  undermining	  the	  ICBM	  (Zaloga	  2002,	  2-­‐3).	  For	  the	  ICBM	  adoption	  alone,	  the	  Soviet	  culture	  was	  liberal,	  and	  thereby	  willing	  to	  consider	  the	  RMA.	  Second,	  administrative	  support	  allowed	  the	  rapid	  development	  and	  adoption	  of	  the	  ICBM.	  For	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  Joseph	  Stalin	  and	  Nikita	  Khrushchev	  each	  single-­‐handedly	  ensured	  ICBM	  success.	  Stalin	  ordered	  the	  establishment	  of	  three	  special	  organizations:	  the	  Special	  Committee	  Number	  One	  under	  Lavrenty	  Beria	  for	  the	  development	  of	  nuclear	  weapons,	  the	  Special	  Committee	  Number	  Two	  under	  Georgy	  Malenkov	  for	  the	  development	  of	  missiles,	  and	  the	  Special	  Committee	  Number	  Three	  under	  Maksim	  Saburov	  for	  strategic	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70	  Broadly	  speaking,	  the	  Soviet	  army	  culture	  was	  similar	  to	  that	  of	  Nazi	  Germany	  and	  the	  American	  naval	  culture	  was	  similar	  to	  Great	  Britain	  (Zaloga	  2002,	  2-­‐3).
air	  defense	  (4).	  The	  success	  of	  Sputnik	  “persuaded	  Soviet	  military	  and	  political	  leaders	  of	  the	  rocket’s	  potential	  as	  a	  weapon	  when	  it	  was	  joined	  with	  a	  thermonuclear	  warhead”	  (Evangelista	  1988,	  200).	  In	  December	  1959,	  Khrushchev	  ordered	  the	  Strategic	  Missile	  Force,	  a	  combat	  arm	  for	  ICBMs	  (Zaloga	  2002,	  22-­‐23).For	  the	  United	  States,	  political	  urgency	  accelerated	  the	  path	  of	  the	  ICBM.	  Among	  civilian	  leadership,	  public	  fear	  after	  Sputnik	  and	  concern	  over	  a	  deterrent	  gap	  forced	  Eisenhower	  to	  “reconsider	  his	  defense	  ceilings,	  loosening	  the	  constraints	  he	  had	  imposed	  on	  military	  spending”	  (Heefner	  2012,	  27).	  ICBM	  development	  leaders	  were	  “were	  assured	  of	  direct	  access	  to	  the	  highest	  civilian	  authorities	  whenever	  necessary”	  (Beard	  1974,	  194).	  Congressional	  concern	  also	  spurred	  missile	  development.	  In	  April	  1956,	  Senator	  Stuart	  Symington,	  Chairman	  of	  the	  Subcommittee	  on	  the	  Air	  Force	  of	  the	  Senate	  Armed	  Services	  Committee	  who	  previously	  served	  as	  the	  Hirst	  Secretary	  of	  the	  Air	  Force,	  conducted	  hearings	  to	  investigate	  the	  inadequacy	  of	  the	  United	  States	  strategic	  missile	  program	  (198).	   In	  a	  move	  that	  is	  telling	  of	  organizational	  leadership,	  the	  ICBM	  program	  was	  infused	  with	  non-­‐Air	  Force	  personnel	  in	  1953	  and	  1954.	  They	  were	  tasked	  with	  providing	  development	  ideas	  “outside	  of	  the	  prevailing	  cultural	  perspectives”	  (Beard	  1976,	  6).	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  administration	  changed	  the	  line	  of	  command	  for	  the	  ICBM	  in	  order	  to	  mitigate	  the	  “delays,	  obstruction,	  and	  funding	  scarcity	  that	  had	  plagued	  the	  program	  in	  its	  early	  years”	  (194).The	  ICBM	  demonstrated	  the	  American	  defense	  organization’s	  capacity	  to	  change	  under	  pressure.	  As	  Beard	  writes,	  “American	  national	  security	  policy	  clearly	  requires	  organizations	  capable	  of	  necessary	  change,	  innovation,	  and	  open-­‐minded	  planning.	  If	  bureaucratic	  structures,	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organizational	  inertia,	  and	  individual	  bias	  or	  misperception	  affect	  the	  output	  and	  implementation	  of	  American	  defense	  policy,	  such	  inHluence	  should	  be	  recognized	  and,	  where	  possible,	  remedied”	  (10).In	  1955,	  Secretary	  of	  Defense	  Wilson	  responded	  to	  the	  urgent	  call	  for	  ICBMs	  by	  establishing	  the	  OfHice	  of	  the	  Secretary	  of	  Defense	  Ballistic	  Missile	  Committee.	  One	  week	  later,	  Secretary	  of	  the	  Air	  Force	  Donald	  Quarles	  formed	  the	  Air	  Force	  Ballistic	  Missile	  Committee	  (196).	  	   Nonetheless,	  military	  mavericks	  still	  promoted	  the	  program.	  United	  States	  Air	  Force	  General	  Bernard	  Schriever	  played	  an	  instrumental	  role	  in	  implementing	  the	  crash	  ICBM	  development	  program	  (141).	  As	  a	  nuclear	  bomber	  pilot,	  Schriever	  “dismantled	  the	  hegemony	  of	  the	  nuclear	  bomber	  pilots	  in	  the	  Air	  Force.”	  “Despite	  the	  clear	  threat	  poised”	  by	  this	  novel	  weapon	  to	  the	  “way	  of	  life	  and	  core	  mission”	  of	  bomber	  pilots,	  General	  Schriever	  advocated	  for	  ICBM	  advancement	  (Ehrhard	  2010,	  45).	  Due	  to	  his	  personal	  bomber	  pilot	  role	  within	  the	  Air	  Force,	  he	  was	  successful	  in	  altering	  prevailing	  bureaucratic	  notions	  and	  advocated	  for	  this	  technological	  advancement.	  Indeed,	  Schriever	  was	  not	  alone	  in	  his	  quest.	  Secretary	  of	  Defense	  Wilson	  penned	  a	  memo	  to	  the	  Air	  Force	  Secretary	  in	  November	  1955,	  assigning	  missile	  development	  the	  highest	  priority.	  It	  read,	  “attainment	  of	  the	  earliest	  possible	  operational	  capability	  with	  this	  weapon	  [is]	  of	  utmost	  importance	  to	  national	  security”	  (Beard	  1974,	  197).	  Following	  1954,	  the	  military,	  political,	  and	  civilian	  leaders	  in	  United	  States	  were	  committed	  to	  missile	  development.	   Third,	  interservice	  rivalry	  ceased	  undermining	  ICBM	  development	  after	  1954.	  At	  Hirst,	  the	  ICBM	  was	  problematic	  for	  the	  Soviet	  General	  Staff,	  the	  policy-­‐making	  force	  of	  the	  military.	  Due	  to	  the	  organizational	  culture,	  General	  Staff	  is	  predominantly	  controlled	  by	  the	  Soviet	  Army	  and	  Ground	  Forces,	  which	  was	  more	  inclined	  to	  invest	  in	  bombers	  (Zaloga	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2002,	  43).	  However,	  Sputnik	  “convinced	  Khrushchev	  that	  future	  Soviet	  military	  power	  would	  be	  based	  on	  the	  nuclear	  missile”	  (22-­‐23).	  In	  the	  United	  States,	  the	  Air	  Force	  provided	  the	  Atlas	  with	  “a	  revolutionary	  management	  structure	  was	  implemented	  to	  speed	  the	  project”	  (Beard	  1976,	  216-­‐217).	  It	  was	  given	  unique	  development	  channels	  that	  differed	  from	  regular	  procedure,	  an	  auspicious	  result	  from	  strong	  administrative	  support.	  	  Fourth,	  proprietary	  information	  played	  a	  role	  in	  ICBM	  FMA.	  Both	  sides	  engaged	  in	  espionage	  while	  both	  maintained	  institutional	  safeguards.	  Both	  utilized	  German	  scientists,	  though	  they	  were	  less	  helpful	  than	  each	  side	  had	  hoped.	  Regardless	  of	  the	  Hlow	  of	  information,	  what	  is	  most	  important	  is	  that	  neither	  side	  received	  an	  edge.	  
Figure	  19.	  Intercontinental	  Ballistic	  Missile	  Leadership
















In	  summation,	  with	  regards	  to	  leadership,	  the	  theory	  holds	  for	  brief	  FMA	  for	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  the	  United	  States	  as	  simultaneous	  innovators.	  Both	  the	  Hirst	  mover,	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  the	  second	  mover,	  the	  United	  States,	  possessed	  strong	  leadership	  with	  a	  liberal	  organizational	  culture,	  strong	  administrative	  support,	  bureaucratic	  competition	  that	  enhances	  innovation,	  and	  strong	  information	  safeguards.	  Simultaneous	  innovation	  leads	  to	  a	  brief	  FMA.	  Ergo,	  the	  FMA	  Theory	  explains	  the	  length	  of	  FMA	  for	  the	  intercontinental	  ballistic	  missile	  revolution.
Silverstein	  97
VI.	  CONCLUSION
A.	  FindingsAfter	  scrutinizing	  the	  history	  and	  Hirst-­‐mover	  advantages	  of	  three	  RMAs,	  I	  have	  sufHicient	  evidence	  to	  support	  the	  FMA	  Theory.	  First,	  for	  the	  aircraft	  carrier	  revolution,	  two	  advantages	  exist—the	  lengthy	  American	  FMA	  from	  World	  War	  II	  and	  continuing	  to	  this	  day	  and	  the	  brief	  British	  and	  Japanese	  FMAs	  from	  World	  War	  I	  to	  the	  interwar	  period.	  Both	  FMAs	  conHirm	  the	  FMA	  Theory.	  Second,	  for	  the	  unrestricted	  submarine	  warfare	  revolution,	  the	  Imperial	  German	  Navy’s	  internal	  weak	  leadership	  and	  incongruent	  doctrine	  as	  well	  as	  external	  strong	  leadership	  and	  congruent	  doctrine	  explain	  brief	  FMA.	  Third,	  for	  the	  intercontinental	  ballistic	  missile	  revolution,	  strong	  leadership	  and	  congruent	  doctrine	  for	  both	  the	  Hirst	  mover	  and	  secondary	  actor	  characterize	  simultaneous	  innovation.	  See	  Figure	  20,	  FMA	  Theory	  Results,	  for	  proof	  of	  the	  FMA	  Theory.
Figure	  20.	  FMA	  Theory	  Results
Case	  Study Internal	  (First	  Mover) External	  (Secondary	  Actor) First-­‐Mover	  Advantage
Aircraft	  Carrier
Strong	  Leadership,	  Congruent	  Doctrine Weak	  Leadership,	  Incongruent	  Doctrine Lengthy
Weak	  Leadership,	  Incongruent	  Doctrine Strong	  Leadership,	  Congruent	  Doctrine Brief
Submarine Weak	  Leadership,	  Incongruent	  Doctrine Strong	  Leadership,	  Congruent	  Doctrine Brief
Intercontinental	  Ballistic	  Missile Strong	  Leadership,	  Congruent	  Doctrine Strong	  Leadership,	  Congruent	  Doctrine Brief	  (Simultaneous	  Innovation)
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When	  militaries	  act	  on	  the	  factors	  crucial	  to	  FMA,	  they	  increase	  the	  likelihood	  of	  keeping	  their	  edge.	  Strategic	  advantage	  is	  bequeathed	  to	  those	  actors	  who	  endeavor	  to	  have	  strong	  leadership	  and	  congruent	  doctrine.	  For	  those	  actors	  who	  do	  not,	  military	  innovation	  is	  merciless,	  and	  brief	  FMA	  is	  a	  deplorable	  fate.	  Actors	  may	  not	  be	  able	  to	  control	  their	  adversary’s	  leadership	  or	  doctrine,	  though	  they	  would	  like	  to;	  external	  factors	  are	  difHicult	  to	  steer.	  But	  internal	  factors	  can	  be	  controlled.	  Over	  everything	  else,	  the	  Hindings	  of	  the	  FMA	  Theory	  demonstrate	  the	  need	  for	  militaries	  to	  remain	  conscious	  of	  their	  actions.The	  theory	  delineated	  in	  this	  paper	  explains	  the	  leadership	  and	  doctrine	  factors	  that	  inHluence	  FMA	  length.	  But	  what	  decided	  each	  of	  these	  factors	  rests	  not	  in	  theory,	  but	  in	  people—high-­‐proHile	  admirals	  who	  risked	  their	  reputations	  to	  promote	  a	  new	  idea,	  uncelebrated	  inventors	  who	  audaciously	  plunged	  to	  the	  depths	  of	  the	  sea,	  and	  countless	  warriors	  who	  pushed	  against	  the	  bounds	  of	  nature.
B.	  Implications	  For	  The	  Next	  InnovationIn	  1901,	  Wilbur	  Wright	  said	  to	  his	  brother	  Orville,	  “Man	  will	  not	  Hly	  for	  Hifty	  years.”	  Two	  years	  later,	  the	  Hirst	  airplane	  took	  Hlight.	  After	  leaving	  his	  post	  as	  Assistant	  Secretary	  of	  the	  Navy,	  Franklin	  D.	  Roosevelt	  remarked,	  “It	  is	  highly	  unlikely	  that	  an	  airplane,	  or	  Hleet	  of	  them,	  could	  ever	  sink	  a	  Hleet	  of	  Navy	  vessels	  under	  battle	  conditions.”	  Two	  decades	  later,	  President	  Roosevelt	  ordered	  aerial	  bombing	  of	  the	  Japanese	  naval	  Hleet.	  History	  is	  replete	  with	  examples	  of	  our	  inability	  to	  foresee.	  Just	  as	  it	  is	  difHicult	  to	  judge	  history	  in	  the	  present,	  predicting	  the	  next	  revolution	  in	  military	  affairs	  is	  a	  venture	  I	  shall	  not	  attempt.	  As	  this	  study	  is	  written,	  security	  scholars	  and	  military	  planners	  ponder	  the	  next	  possible	  RMA.	  Perhaps	  it	  will	  be	  in	  cyber	  security,	  robotics,	  three-­‐dimensional	  printing,	  or	  biological	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enhancement;	  perhaps	  the	  next	  RMA	  will	  be	  something	  entirely	  different.	  Even	  more	  so,	  uncertainty	  surrounds	  which	  military	  will	  venture	  to	  be	  the	  next	  Hirst	  mover.Regardless	  of	  what	  becomes	  the	  next	  RMA,	  we	  know	  what	  will	  inHluence	  its	  Hirst-­‐mover	  advantage.	  An	  RMA	  originates	  in	  thought,	  develops	  in	  the	  research	  and	  development	  laboratory,	  and	  is	  assessed	  on	  the	  battleHield.	  Whomever	  is	  the	  Hirst	  actor	  to	  adopt	  will	  only	  keep	  its	  advantage	  under	  certain	  conditions—if	  its	  leadership	  is	  strong	  and	  the	  RMA	  aligns	  with	  its	  doctrinal	  needs,	  and	  if	  the	  secondary	  actors’	  weak	  leadership	  and	  incongruent	  doctrine	  disallows	  them	  to	  catch	  up.For	  peacetime	  onlookers,	  war	  can	  be	  an	  elusive	  phenomenon.	  Through	  the	  carnage	  of	  war,	  humanity	  is	  deeply	  expressed.	  War	  produces	  our	  greatest	  heroes	  and	  our	  most	  horriHic	  tragedies.	  For	  scholarship	  alone,	  the	  worth	  lies	  solely	  in	  the	  prospect	  that	  the	  understanding	  of	  military	  innovation	  may	  contribute	  to	  the	  distinguished	  actions	  of	  the	  men	  and	  women	  who	  serve.	  If	  wars	  are	  to	  persist,	  let	  us	  at	  least	  win	  them.
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